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Abstract
The engineering profession throughout the western world appears to be undergoing an identity crisis 
resulting from profound changes in the perceived role and prestige of engineers in society. Beder 
(1998) points out that the status and public image of engineering is declining; engineers are 
increasingly being passed over for management positions; they are being used by governments and 
developers to legitimise and promote questionable projects; they are being sued for accidents they 
believe they were not responsible for. Self-help organisations are increasingly questioning the right of 
engineering organisations to conduct their business in the private and opaque manner of the past, 
and often exercise their growing political power in direct ways.
Many perspectives have been offered in the engineering and sociological literature on how this 
situation has come about and what should be done to ameliorate it. However, most approaches 
attempt to address symptoms only fcom the perspective of engineering, without investigating theic 
significance as part of the broader changes occurring in society as a whole.
This work examines the roots of the present problems of engineering from the broadest possible 
view, putting the changing role of engineering in society into wider historical perspective. Using the 
framework of Anthony Giddens’ social theory, engineering is considered as part of the society it aims 
to serve, subjected to the same driving forces, uncertainty and dynamism that defines modernity in its 
present form. By understanding this dynamism at an abstract, holistic level, it is possible to interpret 
more usefully the specific problems and opportunities currently facing engineering, and to make 
specific proposals regarding the future direction of the profession.
This theoretical work is subsequently examined m the light of five case studies from the author’s 
experience of a major engineering consultancy company.
Beder, S. 1998 The New Engineer. Management and Professional Responsibility in a Changing World. 
Macmillan: South Yarra, Australia
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1 Project overview
This project is the result of simultaneous exposure to two very different but equally rewarding 
learning environments, between October 1993 and October 1998 .^
Working with my sponsoring company, WS Atkins Consultants Ltd^, I have been exposed to a 
wide variety of projects relating to what can fairly be collectively termed ‘environmental 
engineering consultancy’. I have shared the troubles of a small food manufacturer, for example, 
stru^ling technically to adapt to new environmental legislation. Working in Armenia, Slovakia 
and Romania with the European Commission, I have helped to transfer Western energy- 
efficiency techniques under highly challenging circumstances. For the UK government, I 
contributed to studies connected with the environmental impact of industrial technologies, and 
with the industrial prospects of novel, environmentally benign energy sources. Valuably, I have 
gained a thorough understanding of the process of consultancy itself, from bidding for new work 
to handing over completed reports, working alone, or more often, in small teams.
Particularly through the Centre for Environmental Strategy, I have been given an extensive and 
rewarding introduction to many aspects of the technological, sociological and philosophical 
literature relating to the role of technology in modem societies. Starting fcom the typically 
‘technocentric’ viewpoint of a chemical engineering graduate, I have gradually come to appreciate 
the full social complexity and depth of what were apparently straightforward technical problems 
of environmental pollution and resource depletion. In the spirit of the Engineering Doctorate 
(EngD) Programme’s emphasis on the continuous development of the Research Engineer during 
their time of study, the nature of this transformation is charted in the Appendix to this portfolio.
From the beginning of my involvement with the EngD Programme, I was immediately struck by 
the gap that appeared to exist between these two environments. From within the Industry 
Division of WS Atkins, I was somewhat separated firom the main body of ‘environmental’ 
specialists in the company, and my experience was probably the richer for this. By this I mean 
that on a day-to-day basis, I was working with ‘typical’ engineers—highly trained, highly 
accomplished, technically excellent engineers and industrial scientists of a variety of disciplines.
1 In the academic year 1994-95,1 took a break fcom the EngD Programme following the death of
my father.
2 WS Atkins are a large engineering consultancy company, with diverse interests in industrial
engineering and related disciplines. I was based in the Industry Division, which itself 
pursues work of a disparate nature, relying on a core flexible personnel base of chemical, 
electrical and mechanical engineers.
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each of whom largely viewed the problems they were presented with fcom an unprobiematically 
technical perspective.
As a large engineering consultancy with an involvement in many high-profile and controversial 
projects, it seemed only a matter of time before the company became the focus of at least some 
environmental pressure groups’ attention. That is not to say that WS Atkins were engaging in any 
ethically or environmentally reckless behaviour, at least as far as I was aware. But my growing 
familiarity with the sociological literature made it clear to me that in apparently operating in 
ignorance of the public perception of its actions, the company was likely to find itself the target 
of a hostile campaign sooner or later. Indeed, as a result of an incident stemming fcom its 
involvement with one such high-profile project, security was stepped up at the company’s 
headquarters in Epsom for many weeks. To my knowledge, the company has no enlightened 
contingency plan for dealing with such potentially hugely damaging eventualities.
Fortunately, as it became clear that a long-term technically based EngD project at the company 
was unlikely to emerge, I was able to pursue this matter further. As part of the company’s bid for 
a large, integrated waste management facility, I was able to look into issues relating to the likely 
public perception of such a development, and the practical ways in which the company might 
involve the public in its evolution. I was therefore working on the project from a double 
perspective—on the one hand working as a chemical engineer researching the technical 
possibilities—on the other, exploring how this work might be seen by other interested parties.
During this work, I became acutely aware of a central limitation in the way engineers were being 
advised to approach the public by the risk and land-use planning literature. Some writers offer 
advice on the practical tactics of public consultation—appear calm and confident, avoid public 
meetings, etc (e.g. Wilcox 1994). A great many more describe the various forms that participation 
can take, along with empirical accounts of their relative merits (e.g Petts 1994, Renn et al 1995, 
Kathlene and Martin 1991, Fioribao 1990). In case engineers are under any illusions, most (most 
famously Amstein 1969) point out the importance of the reciprocal nature of participation— 
“citizen participation is citizen power”, not merely education or tokenism.
However, public consultation is usually approached from the negative perspective that I had first 
approached it—engineers used to be able to do what they liked; now they often face expensive 
public resistance; therefore, how can engineers deal with the public in a way that allows them to 
get on with engineering? Participation is largely seen by engineers as the means to bypass public 
resistance—it involves a process of what has been described as “consent engineering”.
Such an approach is blatantly manipulative, but what options an open to engineers? Is the 
literature seriously su^esting that the public should be given some real control over the actions of 
engineering corporations? If so, why? What would this achieve? What engineering organisation
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would agree to this? What is wrong with the traditional systems of public participation, such as 
planning inquiries, lobbying etc?
I believe that the case for participation perse has not been effectively made to engineers. Attempts 
to devise ways of implementing public participation schemes in engineering organisations are 
therefore premature—without a clear understanding of what the purpose of lay involvement is, 
why it is necessary now and was unnecessary in the past, whether or not it is a passing phase, and 
whether or not it is worth the risk and effort of breaking with established norms—there is little 
reason to expect engineering organisations to take public participation seriously.
By failing to understand larger social changes, I believe, the engineering community is becoming 
steadily more confused about its role in society. Once a prestigious and revered profession, 
engineering is now more commonly seen in an openly ambivalent light. Engineers and their 
organisations have typically responded defensively, believing that public ignorance of engineering 
is at the root of the profession’s declining status.
As the waste management project also failed to develop over the longer term, I decided to tackle 
the issue of citizen participation directly and genetically firom the perspective of the engineering 
establishment as a whole. After becoming familiar with the work of sociological theorist Anthony 
Giddens, whose holistic approach to the problems of the modem word seemed to offer a 
powerful, all-encompassing sociological background to this issue, I have analysed engineering’s 
problems with respect to this work. My aim has been to produce a novel, clear and reader- 
friendly introduction to how Giddens’ work might be used to understand the role of engineering 
and public participation in the modem world.
2 Portfol io overview
This portfolio is presented in two Volumes and one Appendix. This Executive Sum m ary, 
Abstract and the essay B^ond Us and Them, tibe main body of academic work in my portfolio, 
constitute Volume 1  Case studies pertaining to my experience of WS Atkins Consultants Ltd 
that serve to illustrate the theoretical ideas of Beyond Us and Them are presented in Volume 2. The 
Appendix comprises a selection of additional pieces of work undertaken as part of the EngD 
programme that demonstrate the chronological development of my approach.
2. 1  V o l u m e  1: B e y o n d  Us a n d  T h e m
This essay is where I fulfil the major criteria required in order to be eligible for the award of 
Doctor of Engineering.
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Beyond Us and Them introduces and applies of the work of sociological theorist Anthony Giddens 
to engineers and the condition of engineering in a way that is accessible to engineers with no 
previous experience of the sociological literature. I introduce at some length my interpretation of 
Giddens’ major arguments of significance to engineering, and in doing so re-examine the 
traditional ‘us’ and ‘them’ attitude of the engineering community towards the public.
2 . 2  V o l u m e  2:  WS A t k i n s  C a s e  S t u d i e s
At WS Atkins I was involved with a wide variety of ‘environmental technology’ projects, in 
various technical and advisory capacities. Some of the projects I have been involved in include 
those summarised in Table 2.1:
Table 2.1: WS Atkins Project Work Summary
Prsliminaiy Feasibility Stucty for a Major Integrated Waste Management FaaBty 
Confidential Client (Large Utility Comparty)
Preliminary feasibility study into the development of a major, innovative, integrated waste management facility in the UK, 
potentially incorporating materials recycling (MRF), municipal waste to energy, sewage sludge incineration, construction 
waste recycling, tyre recycling, sod bioremediation and composting etc., with a zero untreated waste to landfill phdosophy.
Energj! Saving Programme for the Romanian Health Sector 
Commission of the European Communities (Directorate General I)
One of a team of two engineers developing an Energy Saving Programme for the Romanian Health Sector, funded under 
the PHARE programme. Included extensive energy audits of two large General and Paediatric Hospitals in Bucharest, 
Romania.
Feasibility Study for HoBc Heat Plant, Slovakia*'
Commission of the European Comsnunities (Directorate General I)
Sole responsibility for a study into the feasibility of a combined heat and power (CHP) plant for a small town in Slovakia.
Process En^neering Suppsort During Plant Upgrade*
Confidential Client (Small Food Mamfadurer)
One of a team of two providing practical engineering and administrative support to the Plant Manager during a process 
upgrade required by the local authority under the UK Environmental Protection Act, 1990.
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Preparation of Sourcebook on Alternative Refrigerant Retrofitting in Article 4 Countries 
United Nations Environment Pro^amme, Industry sP" Environment
Member of a small team researching a sourcebook on alternative refrigerants and their application in Developing World 
countries.
Study: Industrial Interest in Photoconversion Technolo^s*
UK Government Department of Trade and Industry (Dtij ETSU)
Sole responsibility for researching and analysing current international commercial interests in the solar energy field of 
photoconversion technology the non-thermal, non-photovoltaic use of sunlight to produce fuel or electricity).
Stud)i: The Reduction of Mercury and Cadmium Emissions*
UK Government Department of Environment (DoE/HMIPj
One of a team of five conducting a major study assessing die nature and magnitude of industrial releases of mercury and 
cadmium in the UK.
Preparation and Amendment of Contaminated hand Profiles 
UK Government Department ofEnvironment (DoE! HMIP)
One of a small team producing and amending contaminated land profiles for the metalliferous mining, vehicle 
manufacturing and aircraft manufacturing industries.
Reviea/ of Energy Usage at Chemes a.s., Slovakia 
Chemes a.s. Slovakia
One of a team of two examining the use of energy at a heat plant employing an unusual ‘Ignifluid’ coal fiuidised bed boiler 
system in eastern Slovakia.
Review of Energy Usage at the Perfnok Grape Products Plant, Slovakia 
AUIplan a.s., Slovakia
One of a team of two providing support to an investigation into a possible major overhaul of the heat supply system of a 
grape juice, wine and brandy fecility.
Esctension and Expansion of the Energy Centre, Yerevan, Armenia 
Commission of the European Commurtities ^Directorate General I)
One of a small team providing local support, business and energy consultancy to enterprises and organisations in Yerevan, 
Armenia
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Preparation ofMasterplan for the Reduction ofLow-ljevelAir Emissions in the Voivodship of Katowice, Poland 
Commission of the European Commurtities (Directorate General I)
One of a small team contributing towards an international effort to prepare a Masterplan for the reduction of low-level air 
pollution in an industrial region of Poland.
Preparation of Environmental Technology Project Proposals*
'x/arious
One of many small teams involved with business development and project proposal writing in the area of environmental 
technology
Study: A ir Pollution and Energy Usage in South-West Slovakia 
Commission of the European Communities (Directorate General I)
One of a small team modelling the use of energy in a region of South-West Slovakia, including the preparation of energy 
balances from a wide variety of data sources, a consideration of the displaced effects of energy consumption, and extensive 
interviews with local people.
* Case Studies considered in Volume 2
This work provided the basis of my understanding of the engineering sector as a whole and its 
interrelationship with society. Although I have accmed much technical knowledge and practical 
experience in the field of environmental technology, in this portfolio I wish only to highlight a 
small, representative number of tibese projects in order to illustrate the practical relevance of my 
general thesis described above.
In this Volume, I present five such case studies relating to my experience at WS Atkins. Each 
project is briefly introduced and discussed in relation to the thesis presented in Beyond Us and 
Them, alongside a representative sample of work produced as part of the WS Atkins project.
These case studies are summarised in Table 2.2:
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Table 2.2: Case Study Appendices
Case study Discussion Sample WS Atkins deliverable
A The future of photoconversion 
technologies
Final Report of study prepared for ETSU /  DTi
B A new heat plant for Holic Final Report prepared for European Commission
C The Plant Manager’s dilemma Sample correspondence with Plant Manager during 
process upgrade
D The use of mercury in dental 
amalgam
Two chapters of Final Report of study into 
mercury and cadmium prepared for HMIP /  EA
E The role of engineering consultancy Sample project proposal
2 . 3 A p p e n d i x :  P r o j e c t  D e v e l o p m e n t
One of the goals of the EngD Programme’s advocacy of the ‘thesis by portfolio’ approach to 
external examination is to convey the evolutionary way in which a four-year project develops. 
One means of achieving this is by the submission of biannual reports, aimed at creating a 
continuous narrative of progress from beginning to end. However, my progress is best 
demonstrated by a chronological presentation of those elements of work that show the 
development of my theoretical understanding of the sociological literature. The structure of this 
Volume is shown in Table 2.3; those entries presented in bold face are of particular significance.
Table 2.3: Directly Relevant Assignments and Coursework
Date Submitted Description
A.1 Apr 1994 Risk Perception
A.2 Nov 1995 Clean Technology
A.3 Apr 1996 Risk Communication
A.4 Aug 1996 Conference 1996 — Citizens Juries
A.5 Nov 1996 Year 2 Dissertation
A.6 Feb 1997 Risk Management
A.7 Apr 1997 Public Participation Proposal
A.8 Aug 1997 Conference 1997 — Justice, Culture and Nimbyism
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2 . 4  O t h e r  M a t e r i a l
Other EngD assignments and reports submitted to the portfolio throughout the course of the 
EngD Programme will be made available on the day of the viva.
3 Suggested p r io r i ty  areas
As the main body of theoretical work in this portfolio, I  would like to draw primary attention to 
Beyond Us and Them, in this volume.
The five Case Studies in Volume 2 are brief, and illustrate how the theory of Volume 2 might
be applied to illuminate typical real engineering problems—the actual WS Atkins reports are of
secondary significance. The case studies can either be read with or following Chapter 4 of Beyond 
Us and Them.
In the Appendix, five pieces of work were especially indicative of my developing appreciation of 
the social problems of engineering. These are:
A.2 Clean Technology
A.4 Conference 1996 —  Citizens Juries
A.5 Year 2 Dissertation
A.7 Public Participation Proposal
A.8 Conference 1997 — Justice, Culture and Nimbyism
Ironically, these pieces of work chronicle my path firom an ill-informed position of relative
confidence of the wider issues of environmental technology, to a weU-informed, utter confusion 
regarding these same issues. It was shortly after completing A.8 tiiat I was introduced to the work 
of Anthony Giddens.
O f the other portfolio material to be made available on the day of examination, I would like to 
draw attention to the A.dvanced "Leadership Coursework, in which I co-ordinated and edited the 
various contributions of 16 Research Engineers into a coherent joint report Given the intense 
workloads, disparate circumstances and geographical distribution of contributors, this was often 
considerably more challenging than working with business leaders in central Europe!
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4 Why this is ‘environmental  technology’
As work submitted for consideration for the award of a degree in “environmental technology”, 
some justification is required as to why this work constitutes a contribution to the field.
Environmental technology is taken to mean to the application of scientific knowledge and 
engineering techniques to meet certain human needs in ways that affect the environment more 
positively (or less negatively) than conventional technical strategies. This can be understood on 
two distinct levels:
Environmental technology can be synonymous with ‘clean-up’ technology—the well-established 
approach of using engineering techniques to ameliorate the negative environmental effects of 
existing processes. Clean-up environmental technology is often referred to as ‘end-of-pipe’ 
technology, as it usually an afterthought, a secondary process consideration.
Environmental technology can also be synonymous with ‘clean’ or ‘cleaner’ technology. This has 
been defined by Clift (1995) as:
...a  means ofproviding a human benefit which, overall, uses less nsources and causes less environmental 
damage than alternative means with which it is economically competitive.
This approach is more fundamental and far-reaching. It addresses all aspects of product 
conception, design, manufacture and disposal In this sense, environmental technology is more 
than just a category of engineering hardware. Rather, it is a wcry of thinking (Clift 1995).
The driving force behind this interpretation of environmental technology is the need to address 
the role of engineering within the paradigm of sustainability, or sustainable development. The 
Surrey/Brunei Environmental Doctorate Programme takes this perspective as its guiding 
philosophy (Brunei University & University of Surrey 1998):
The overall Tro^amme thesis is that the traditional practices of industry are unsustainable. For 
‘Sustainable Development' (i.e. the concurrent preservation of a quality environment and sustained living 
standards) to be viable, a great deal more research into the complete Hfe cycle ofproducts... is required. 
Holistic solutions must therefore concentrate on conception and design, since this is where sustainable 
solutions emerge.. .It is also necessary to move public discussions on the environment from an emotive to a 
more rational level Until the compkxities o f are more widely understood, there remains the risk of 
legislation being driven in a way that will ultimately damage the environment it is intended to preserve.
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The EngD Programme therefore holds environmental technology to be a way of thinking about 
finding holistic solutions to the problems associated with the unsustainable nature of traditional 
industrial practices.
Figure 4.1 shows how the major issues of sustainability might be represented in a Venn Diagram 
(Clift 1995):
Figure 4.1: Venn Diagram ‘Map’ of Sustainability
Environmental technology is the philosophy of engineering that hopes to move the focus of the 
profession firom one of ‘traditional’ industrial engineering, focussed primarily on the criteria of 
the top sphere, to one of sustainable engineering, that focuses equally on all three spheres.
Figure 4.2 illustrates how this project could be positioned on such a diagram. Whereas most 
EngD projects aim to marry specific aspects of technology and economics with ecology and 
thermodynamics, this project starts firom a consideration of social realities and asks how 
technology, economics, ecology and thermodynamics might be integrated into a sustainable 
whole. In approaching the field of environmental technology firom this direction, this project is 
m aking an unusual and novel contribution to the field.
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‘Typical’EngD 
Projects
Specific Technologies / 
Management Systems
S O D D D © ®  §i
This P ro ject
Generic P rocesses
0 0 0
A rea of 
stainabii
Figure 4.2: Locating this Project on a Map of Sustainability
5 Contribution to knowledge
My contribution to knowledge is to show:
• That the social theory of Anthony Giddens can be applied to engineering problems in order 
that those problems be redefined in a more complete and holistic way;
• That in examining engineering problems through the lens of Giddens’ social theory, current
confused and seemingly irrational disputes over the nature of technology, the environment 
and society can be brought into greater focus;
• That the engineering profession has good cause to re-examine its “reason for being” in the
light of profound social changes since the Industrial Revolution;
• That the engineering profession potentially has much to gain firom proactively engaging the
public sphere in matters previously considered routine technical issues.
6 Meeting the EngD goals
The objective of the EngD Programme, as defined by the Management Executive, is as follows:
“The Brunei/Surrey Engineering Doctorate aims to create graduate Research Engineers with the 
necessary background knowledge, skills and experiences to understand the relationship between
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the environment, technology and business and to apply this understanding to the development, 
promotion and execution of corporate strategy.
Particularly, they wiU:
• be able to plan and execute flexible, innovative, R&D programmes that respond to customer 
needs;
• form, work within, and where necessary, lead teams with multidisciplinary backgrounds;
• have expert knowledge in the field of environmental technology and be able to apply 
techniques that balance social and economic benefit against resource utilisation and 
environmental impact;
• possess a working knowledge of project management and business methods
• have excellent communication skills”.
The environment of WS Atkins Consultants Ltd has been an extraordinarily fruitful one with 
respect to the Programme’s criteria—this list would serve well as a definition of my job with the 
company, as can be seen from the wide variety of consultancy projects with which I have been 
involved and the work presented in Volume 2. Although not a traditional research environment, 
with WS Atkins I have been given the best of both worlds; on the one hand, I have been fully 
accepted as ‘one of the team’ and given considerable authority and autonomy to act in the 
company’s name in a variety of high profile and fascinating environmental technology projects. 
On the other, I have simultaneously been given the space to pursue a challenging and important 
academic issue of relevance to the future of the engineering profession and sustainability 
generally. For both these things I am tremendously grateful.
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Beyond Us and Them
Introducing and Applying the Social Theory of 
Anthony Giddens to Engineers and the 
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1 Introduction
For the chemical industry, applause is muted, and the biggest fans are those on the inside — those in scientific and 
business communities who in a very direct and personal sense are able to see the wonders of what can be done.. .It is 
my theory that criticism of the industry results mainly from lack of a clear u n d e rs tan d in g  about chemistry and chemical 
technologies — foam based on scientific illiteracy.. .we need to generate a sense of excitement, to capture the popular 
imagination. And we must also address [public] fears with sound science and risk assessment.
Vincent Calarco, Inaugural Speech as World President of the Society of Chemical Industry, 8 July 1998
The real problem.. .is surely the language of science. For example, anybody who listens to BBC radio programmes will 
be familiar with this sort of comment from the presenter “Could you just hold on there a moment please, professor? 
I’m not a scientist and I don’t think the listeners will know what risk assessment means either.” Small wonder then that 
the public has so much difficulty in coping with complex issues. Small wonder, too, that science is losing its appeal to 
young people. If the education reforms currently underway in the UK — and those proposed — do not manage to make 
science more popular, then the next generation of scientists and engineers wiU find themselves up against a far greater 
level of cynicism than there is today. And that will have profound implications for all aspects of industry, particularly 
the process sector.
Editorial, The Cbem ical Engineer^ 13 June 1996
[On the issue offalhng numbers of applicants for engneering ékgree courses] It certainly appears that the graduates of tomorrow 
have drawn thek own conclusion about die worth of a degree or career in engineering in the future.
Murray Eastman, MD Babcock Facilities Management Division, quoted in The Cbemical Engineer, 6 
November 1997.
We must learn that the public wants the benefits of chemistry but not its liabilities. The public wants no pollution. It 
wants no hazard to communities. It wants no environmental damage and no unsafe products. In the public’s view, all 
environmental incidents are acts of negligence or worse, and we should be able to eliminate them. We have only one 
real choice, and it poses an enormous technical challenge. We must recognize the public’s concerns as legitimate. A 
typical process plant operating ten years fiom now will not have hazardous waste leave the plant. Process risks wfll be 
reduced to the point where serious accidents do not occur, and people living near the plant site will fully understand 
how the plant operates. Moreover, they will have full confidence in the people operating the plant because they know 
that these people make safety the top priority. Meeting die enormous technical challenge may be the easy part. The 
harder part may be in accepting that the public must participate in both our operadons and our decisions.
H.J. Corbett (Monsanto), Cbemical Engineering Progress, September 1988
The reactionary green movement seizes on public misgivings about the potential hazards of genetically-modified 
foods] and pulls off publicity stunts, while simultaneously promoting its own Luddite agenda.
Editorial, Tbe Cbem ical Engineer, 8 October 1998
It remains to be seen whether British chemists, moaning endlessly about their low status in terms of funding and public 
image, have the wiU and the ability to tell the unwashed masses about their achievements. Pity them if they don’t. 
Cbem istry and Industry, 2 May 1988
In case after case, from CFCs to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, environmental interests are shaping 
public policy all around us, without all the facts and without the benefit of chemical industry’s input 
Eamie Deavenport, Cbem istry and Industry, 5 December 1994.
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Perhaps chemists have been too successful. Today, we have become satiated with all manner of innovations, so that 
anything new is quickly relegated to commonplace. The continuous stream of new fabrics, new building materials, new 
paints, new cleaning agents, new pesticides and new drugs is mosdy taken for granted...Unfortunately, whether well- 
founded or not, the activists’ negative hype makes good media fodder, even when proven to be wrong. Hence 
chemistry’s good image of yesteryear is becoming tarnished.
Review, C hem istiy and Jndustzy, 2 April 1995
That the chemical industry has a poor public reputation is a belief strongly held widiin the industry itself. There is a 
natural tendency to feel personally wounded by adverse press comment by the over-reported extravagances of 
pressure groups, and by criticism from one’s own community.
Guy Liardet (Chemical Industries Association), Chem istry and Industry^ 18 February 1991
The problem can be seen in the shrinking demand for chlorinated solvents.. .When used correctly, and with established 
process controls, chlorinated solvents pose no threat to humans or the environment.. .Shame on the chemical industry 
for not telling its story more effectively. We are a responsible group of people, and we have as much respect for the 
environment as other Americans. Our task is one of public information and education, and it falls not only on industry 
associations but individuals — employees of our plants and labs and sales offices, our customers and distributors and 
carriers. These ate our best spokespeople, and we must do all we can to muster them as publicists and voters.
R.B. Lienhart (The Dow Chemical Co.), Chemical Engineering Progress^ December 1988
The blitz by the news media is panicking the general public into nosophobia [dread of illness] and chemophobia. I 
believe chemical engineers must be made aware of the unfounded attacks being made on this industry by the news 
media for the sole purpose of improving ratings or selling newspapers. Ortiy items of shock value are reported and 
then only half the truth is told. It is the responsibility of the AIChE to formulate a plan to combat this negativism. If 
we don’t start challenging this assault on our image, eventually we will have no industry or image to protect.
Letter to the Editor, Chem ical Engineering Progress, A^ril 1990
Too often we in industry read or hear about our work in the press and scoff at its contents and laugh at its 
inaccuracies. American industry, the press, and the public have to find a common language to resolve today’s pressing 
issues. Industry has to take die lead. The public is involved in making major industrial decisions. Good decisions can 
only be made with a proper understanding of the issues and facts. American industry must help tackle the tough job of 
educating and informing the public so we can proceed intelligently.
Letter to the Editor, Chem ical Engineering Progress, .^ r i l  1990
TOE’S bulging post bag owes much of its girth to the ongoing debate about the status of engineers in society. Should 
they earn more? Are they worth more? Why don’t they have the respect of their counterparts in Germany, for 
example?
Editorial, The Chem ical Engineer, 11 ^ r i l  1996
Engineers in Great Britain believe that they do not have a very higjh status in society. But they are not alone in feeling 
that. Across Europe the engineering profession does not have a clear identity.
Lambertus de Steur, President of the European Federation of National Engineering Associations (FEANI), 
The Chemical Engineer, 13 December 1990
As a committee member of long standing of both the IChemE and the Engineering Council regional board, the bluest 
problem I have observed is that engineers (especially young engineers) do not come forward to try to influence their 
own destiny. We c an n o t  expect someone to point at us and say 'look at these wonderful engineers” and expect the 
public to suddenly recognise us. We have to prove our worth, not just by our professional actions but by being 
prepared to publicise our successes and to have an opinion about the things going on around us. Otherwise we will be 
relegated to being associated with the odd disaster when they come looking for us to explain our failings.
Letter to the Editor, The Chem ical Engineer, U  April 1996.
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... it only takes a Brent Spar for public opinion to nosedive. It may be the best option in this particular case and £lm 
may have been spent in assessing 16 other options, but at the end of the day sinking it just doesn’t feel right. Process 
engineers can do much, much better than that. We’ve just taken careful aim and shot ourselves in the foot.
Editorial, The Chem ical Engineer, 15 June 1995
When things do go wrong, it seems as though industry is very easily wrong-footed and made to appear defensive. It is 
hard for companies to turn out to give an account of their doings to the media. Companies can be made to seem 
devious when problems are discussed only with reluctance.
John Bridgwater, IChemE Presidential Address, 22 May 1997.
We have been through this cycle of identity crisis and self doubt a number of times before, but nothing seems to have 
changed. We can all agree that the status of engineering is too low, and that this is a significant reason why youngsters 
are not attracted to the profession.
Editorial, The Chem ical Engineer, 6 August 1998.
The more I think of it, the more I feel that the fundamental consideration in the work of a engineer—if he is ever to 
pull himself out of his present status of being a hired servant—is that he should make public interest the master test of 
his work
Morris L. Cooke, 9 June 1921. (In Layton E.T., 1971. The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the 
American Engineering Profession. Case Western Reserve University Press: Cleveland, Ohio)
1.1 T h e  p r o b l e m s  of  m o d e r n  e n g i n e e r i n g
The engineering profession throughout the western world appears to be undergoing an identity 
crisis resulting from profound changes in the perceived role and status of engineers in society. 
Beder (1998) points out that the status and public image of engineering is declining; engineers are 
increasingly being passed over for management positions; they are being used by governments 
and developers to legitimise and promote questionable projects; they are being sued for accidents 
they believe they were not responsible for.
Ansell et al (1985), a panel of eminent US engineers, comment that:
.. .in recent decades, the American public has become less enamoured of en^neers and en^neering. A  
duality of image has developed in which, on the one hand, the en^neer is a t^red for his (sic) 
inventiveness, competence, and practicality; while on the other hand he is often viewed as the “yes-man” of 
conservative views and little social conscience or consciousness. Mistrust of technolog)! and dissatifaction 
with its fruits have become significant new elements in American society.
Many per^ectives from within engineering circles have been offered on how this situation has 
come about and what should be done to ameliorate the situation, but most have focused 
narrowly on the immediate circumstances of the engineer without broader consideration o f larger 
social dynamics. As Buglarello (1991) puts i t
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In general, the voice of engneers in the discussion of engineering’s social role has been weak, episodical and 
often self-centred. The assessment of engneering’s impact on society has been largely left to other disciplines
Considering the plight of engineering in isolation from the wider context of recent social change 
in the western world necessarily leads to a skewed and incomplete view. The public 
disenchantment with engineering is largely mirrored in many other spheres of professional and 
technical expertise. As Segal (1990) observes:
Somehow, and despite a number of spectacular technological and scientific breakthroughs, there has emerged 
in recent decades a declining trust in the social and political explications of knowledge and, more broadly, 
in technical expertise itself. Indeed the triumphs of science and technobgy that once generated almost 
universalpraise increasingly generate distrust or at best ambivalence on the part of the public.
1 . 2  T h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of  c o n t e m p o r a r y  r e s e a r c h
A large body of academic literature has emerged over the past two decades that has sought to 
understand more about the ambivalent nature of the public's relationship with science and 
technology. Much of the emphasis of this work has been on investigating how the risks of 
science and technology are currently communicated to the lay public, implicitly suggesting that 
were much better ways of risk communication to be developed, then public faith would return. 
Engineers are therefore commonly required to be more honest with the public, to be more 
sensitive to the public’s needs and priorities, and to put statistical risk assessments into 
perspective. Others go further, and point to the limitations of scientific knowledge to explain 
changing public attitudes. Much of this literature is discussed in the Appendix.
There is no doubting that this work provides many enlightening perspectives on the practical 
consequences of dealing with engineers’ current problems. However, most such approaches 
address the symptoms of social change as they immediately affect engineering, without 
investigating in a broader sense the wider changes that mould society as a whole. No-one would 
deny that reduced public trust in science and engineering is related in some way to more 
widespread and effective education, for example, or in more effective communications 
technologies, or in changing of social values. But these changes are not occurring in isolation; 
they are part of broad, structural changes that are transforming society into a profoundly 
different social system to the one in which our grandparents lived.
RW Lucky (1991), another American engineer, gives an illuminating expression of this holistic 
dependency. In a train of logic that reflects very much the approach of this document, he writes 
in an honest and thoughtful essay, Tondering the Unpredictability of the Sociotechnical System:
The d^culty is compounded by the fact that society and its major subsystems are all adaptive systems— 
they change with time in werys that allow them to work better, function more or less at the level they 
currently do, or at least survive. The overall society adepts to tak£ account of changes originating in its 
subsystems, and the subsystems adapt in relation to changing demands from other subsystems andfrom the
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 1.4
needs of society as a whole. Engineers, unfortmatety, have not had much experience in analysing even 
adaptive technical systems; that limited art is only at the conceptual stage. The image of engneering as an 
adaptive sociotechnical subsystem functioning within the adaptive sociotechnical y  stem of society presents a 
daunting model to irnplement.
I believe that engineers will benefit enormously from seeing their current problems in the context 
of such wider social change. The purpose of this work is therefore to examine the social roots of 
the present problems of engineering firom the broadest possible perspective. Using the general 
and comprehensive framework of social theory offered by Anthony Giddens, a prominent social 
theorist, I examine how engineering might be seen in this light. In doing so, I aim to pull together 
many of the issues currently debated as relevant to engineering’s troubles and integrate them, 
mirroring Giddens’ own approach, into a single, coherent thesis.
1 . 3  A b o u t  A n t h o n y  G i d d e n s
According to sociologist Philip Cassell, Anthony Giddens is “presently at the very forefront of 
contemporary social theory, and is certainly the pre-eminent figure in the English-speaking 
world...his influence on the social sciences is considerable and growing” (Cassell 1993). In his 
earlier career, Giddens established a formidable reputation as a critic o f other sociological writers, 
including Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Habermas. Giddens is currently Director of the London 
School of Economics, and a key advisor to the present UK government.
Anthony Giddens is a social theorist whose primary goal is to account for the nature of the 
modem world. He is no more interested in the environment or engineering than he is welfare 
policy or gender politics. This is important because through this holistic’ approach, engineers can 
gain a more balanced insight into how the profession fits into society as a whole. In my opinion, 
this, more than any other single reason, justifies concentrating on Giddens’ work as the basis for 
the engineering establishment’s social introspection.
1 . 4  A b o u t  t h i s  w o r k
This document is an introduction to the work of Anthony Giddens and its potential application 
to engineering management. It is aimed at professional engineers with no previous experience of 
sociology, and therefore priority has been given to:
• clarifying basic concepts by the use of examples;
•  m aintaining a lively and interesting narrative;
• introducing complex topics gradually;
• emphasising key areas of ultimate relevance to contemporary engineering management at 
the expense of others;
•  sum m arising lengthy discussions at regular intervals and highlighting key points.
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1 . 4 . 1  N o t e s  on a n d  l i mi t a t i o n s  of t h i s  work
Since Giddens writes in a highly generalised and abstract manner, his work can be interpreted in 
many different ways, with more or less emphasis placed on particular parts of his many 
arguments. My perspective of Giddens’ work is therefore necessarily quite personal, and is 
written with an emphasis on the subsequent task of applying his perspectives to engineering. I am 
particularly persuaded that his treatment of ‘trust’, which is rooted in the existentialist philosophy 
of Heidegger and Kierkegaard, is a powerful basis for understanding the most basic behaviour of 
individuals, and their tendency to form societies. I have therefore relied heavily on this 
interpretation in my use of Giddens’ work; others might disagree with the need for such  ^an 
approach.
As an engineer attempting to make sense of his discipline’s troubles by using the literature of 
another, I am aware of many of my limitations in this new field. I am unsure of the chronological 
development of Giddens’ work, for example, and I am particularly ignorant of much of his earlier 
material relating to the development of Structuration Theory; these facts may be obvious to many 
sociologists. I hope sociologists will understand and forgive these shortcomings where they do 
not negatively detract from the lessons engineers can draw firom Giddens’ work.
During the preparation of this text, I have consciously tried to perform several balancing acts. 
These include:
1 . 4 . 2  J a r g o n  v e r s u s  s i m p l e  Engl i sh
In general, I have tended to stick to the jargon used by Giddens, mainly so as to not impede 
those who may want to go on to further sociological reading. Besides this, it is very difficult to 
capture the essence of much jargon without resorting to repeated convoluted description or the 
substitution of alternative jargon. However, I have sought to minimise the use of jargon, describe 
each new term at some length on introduction, and have included a glossary of sociological terms 
as an appendix.
1 . 4 . 3  T e c h n i c a l  e x a m p l e s  v e r s u s  e v e r y d a y  e x a m p l e s
Where I think points could be more clearly made by reference to technical examples, I have had 
no hesitation in using them, despite running the risk of patronising the technical reader. 
However, where everyday examples better clarify a point, I have not searched for a technical 
alternative.
1 . 4 . 4  G i d d e n s  v e r s u s  Long
Because of the abstract nature of Giddens’ writing, many questions present themselves during 
elaboration. Where this has happened I have, consciously or otherwise, elaborated in ways that 
Giddens may not have intended. I am aware of several instances where I have drawn lines 
between dots that Giddens does not explicitly draw. In some of these cases, I have made 
foomotes to highlight points of possible multiple interpretation.
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1 . 4 . 5  G i d d e n s  v e r s u s  t h e  r e s t  of  t h e  wor l d
Giddens’ work is a highly eclectic tapestry of ideas; various strands of his work are taken, often 
without explicit reference, firom other writers. Since I am not familiar with the breadth of 
sociological, psychological and philosophical literature that Giddens integrates, I have not 
attempted to trace the roots of each idea he presents.
1 . 4 . 6  M e t a p h o r  v e r s u s  p r e c i s i o n
As an engineer exploring a complex problem, I have used a number of visual and verbal 
metaphors that many sociologists may find inappropriate, inaccurate or simply incorrect. In my 
defence, I present these metaphors merely as aids to the reader to help understand my 
interpretation of the full picture. They have many failings, but to borrow a metaphor from 
Wittgenstein, they should be used as a stepladder to climb up to a higher level o f understanding 
firom where they can be seen as incomplete and so discarded. Please bear in mind that this 
document is a sketch of Giddens’ extremely complex and precise arguments, and that points of 
criticism the reader may raise are as likely to result firom my misrepresentation of Giddens as 
firom taking issue with Giddens’ work itself.
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2 Giddens’ Sociology
2. 1  A b r i e f  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  s o c i a l  t h e o r y
Giddens’ Structuration Theory is one of many works of social theory that try to describe how 
some aspect of the social world ^works’.
Social theories can broadly be divided into two types. On the one hand are structural theories that 
emphasise the aggregated effects of societies—looking at the anthill as a discrete phenomenon, if 
you like. On the other are social action theories that concentrate on looking at the behaviour of 
individual ants, and how that behaviour might be extrapolated to account for the whole anthill.
The structural theorists have generally received more attention, outside the discipline at least. 
There are two main kinds of structural approaches: conflict theorists and functionalists. Karl Marx is 
probably the best known of the former; he saw the whole of human history as a struggle for 
power between a number of opposing pairs of groups, most importantly the proletariat (working 
class) and the bourgeois (capitalists). In a more co-operative light, functionalists see the 
formation of groups—soldiers, clerics, associations, consumers, political parties—as analogous to 
the organs in a human body, each performing particular roles that perpetuate, and underscore 
their dependence on, society as a whole. To understand aspects of human behaviour, say 
structuralists, you must look at what conflicts are perpetuated or functions satisfied. The family 
unit exists, for example, to enforce monogamy and therefore property rights and capitalism 
(Engels, conflict), or to produce and/or socialise personalities (Parsons, functionalist), etc. 
(Haralambos and Holbom 1991).
Social action theorists believe that ‘society’ is simply the net result of individuals going about their 
business. They do not usually deny the existence of structures in society, but believe that they are 
just patterns that arise as a result of individuals doing there own personal things, and not at all 
defined by the needs or conflicts of society as a whole. To understand society, you need to focus 
on how and why individuals behave the way they do. A famous social action theorist was Max 
Weber, who argued that capitalism resulted firom Protestantism because the daily chore of hard 
work satisfied these individuals’ spiritual need for an austere lifestyle—the celebrated Protestant 
Work Ethic (Haralambos and Holbom 1991).
Phenomenologists, sociologists following the philosopher Husserl, have more recently argued 
that individuals respond to the world as they understand it, not necessarily to how it is (even if 
identifying the latter were possible, which it isn’t). Social stmctures therefore exist only in the 
heads of people who conceive of them as such. To understand society, you have to begin by 
discovering how sensual experience of the world is aggregated and made sense of in the heads of 
individuals.
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In contrast to structural theorists, social action theorists see the family as a typical behaviour 
pattern adopted by individuals, not to achieve a higher social purpose, but because they have a 
mixture of emotional, spiritual, intellectual, cultural, financial and/or other reasons for wanting to 
do so.
2 . 2  G i d d e n s ’ s o c i o l o g y
This Chapter comprises a highly personalised account of Giddens’ Structuration Theory and 
Modernity Thesis. In his Modernity Thesis, Giddens applies his Structuration Theory as a tool 
for analysing how we should understand the modem world. I introduce this analysis by 
considering social stmctures, and in particular how they have transformed the threats facing pre­
modem people. But equally it is by understanding the motivations of individuals, and in particular 
their relationship with time and space organisation, which provides the key to interpreting the 
modem condition. Armed with this analysis, we are then in a position to look at the role of 
particular social stmctures—engineering organisations—in defining, and being defined by, the 
future.
2 . 3  S t r u c t u r a t i o n  T h e o r y
2 . 3 . 1  S t r u c t u r a t i o n  T h e o r y  b a s i c s
In this very limited introduction to Stmcturation Theory, I introduce the basic principles that I 
wiU refer to later.
2 . 3 . 1 . 1  S t r u c t u r e s ,  social  ac t ion and social  s y s t e ms
Giddens brings together stmctures and social action by inserting in between the concept of social 
systems. A social system is any pattem of social relations which exists over a range of time and 
space. A social system is the result of the interaction of ‘knowledgeable agents’, enabled and 
constrained by the stmctural properties of the system (Giddens 1984, ppl63).
Social stmctures define to a large degree the ‘scope’ of individual action within a particular 
system—but equally, those stmctures depend on individual action for their continued existence 
and evolution. Stmctures are therefore both empowering and constraining influences on human 
behaviour (Giddens 1984 ppl6).
The use of language as a stmcture is a good example of this. Without some form of language, the 
communication of complex ideas is all but impossible. In writing this sentence, I am being both 
empowered by and constrained by the stmcture of the English language—I am getting my point 
across to you, the reader, but only in ways that the English language permits. In addition, each 
time I write a grammatically correct sentence, I am contributing to the perpetuation of the 
English language itself. Like all social stmctures, English is open to change from individual 
action: new words enter the language continuously, just as others fall into disuse. Social structures
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and human ‘action’ therefore are both sides of the same coin:, social stmcture is the medium of human 
action but is also the unintended outcome of i t
2 . 3 . 1 . 2  Agent s
‘Agents’ are essentially individuals who have some power to act independently. As I will discuss 
later, this essentially means everyone, all of the time (during waking hours, at least). All agents 
have a ‘transformative power’ to alter their surroundings in some way.
Giddens is very keen on emphasising the cleverness of individuals (Giddens 1994). One of the 
main criticisms of stmctural theories is that they largely deny much of a role for people as 
thinking, questioning beings; rather, we are poked and prodded sheep-like into mass forms of 
behaviour by the irresistible forces of stmctures. Marx, for example, saw the condition of the 
working class, and its future as inheritors of the world, as part of an impeding, inevitable, 
overwhelming tide of stmctural forces. Giddens rejects such concepts completely; for him, 
stmcture consists of mental concepts of rules and resources carried around in the heads of the 
‘knowledgeable agents’ of a system.
So what do the insides of peoples’ heads look like? In the following chapter on his exposition of 
modernity, I will describe in some detail Giddens’ views on the nature of the human self. Now, 
however, I will introduce his interpretation of human consciousness, as this is key to properly 
understanding the role of agents in Stmcturation Theory.
Human consciousness, Giddens reckons, can be thought of as having three distinct ‘levels’ 
(Giddens 1984 pp40-45). The least important of these is the subconscious, through which, as 
Freud describes, deeply-felt, psychologically motivating forces or ‘wants’ can influence action. In 
contrast to Freud, though, Giddens plays down the importance of subconscious motives on 
human action, asserting that they are mostly of significance at moments of personal crisis.
More important are discursive consciousness and practical consciousness, which are both in 
some way separated from the subconscious. Discursive consciousness refers to those aspects of 
action and behaviour that we can account for verbally. The more basic the action we are taking, 
often the more difficult it is to rationalise. Practical consciousness describes a taken-for-granted 
awareness of a situation in which we know what we are doing, but would have difficulty making 
this knowledge explicit.
By way of example, our understanding of office politics is mostly the realm of practical 
consciousness, and our actions in an office situation are often based on this. If asked to account 
for our actions, we might translate or rationalise some of this knowledge into discursive 
consciousness, but experience considerable difficulty in fully doing so. Most of our waking lives 
are spent engaging in practical consciousness, but there is no clear dividing line between it and 
discursive consciousness.
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 2.3
2 . 3 . 1 . 3  S t r uc t u r e :  ru l es  and r e s o u r c e s  (Giddens  1 9 8 4  p p 5 - 2 5 )
Giddens’ definition of structure is controversial, but key to his theory. Structures, he says, are 
made up of individuals’ understandings of the rules and resources of particular systems. By rules, 
he means the implied or Virtual’ patterns that underlie aspects of our behaviour rather than just 
formalised written rules. For example, all footballers know the written rules of the game, but in 
the professional game there are a whole array of Virtual’ rules that may vary firom season to 
season, referee to referee, or may even change depending on the stage of the game itself— e.g. 
the extent of permissible shirt-pulling or shoulder-charging, how likely you are to get a penalty 
from diving or to get sent off for tackling firom behind etc. While the official rules can pass 
fireely between the discursive and practical consciousness of the participants, the virtual rules are 
much more embedded in practical consciousness—that is, it would be very difficult for Alan 
Shearer to describe exactly how he fakes injury in order to get another player booked (i.e. 
rationalise practical consciousness into discursive consciousness), but he remains an expert 
nonetheless.
Philip Cassell (1993) notes the importance that Giddens attributes to the idea that, in order to 
enact a social practice, participants must necessarily draw on a set of rules. He gives a clear 
example:
1 am delivering a lecture during the course of which all the members of my audience unexpectedly begin to 
laugh. Have I  inadvertently said something mtty? or something incredibly stupid? or are thy laughing at 
an event quite separate from me? There is no rule that I  could draw on that would immediately define the 
situation, and allow me to continue my lecture, but I  would have no choice but to make use of the rule- 
based knowledge I  do possess so that I  mifot respond cppropriately: ignoring the laughter knowing that it 
will recede, or repairing the situation so that it might continue intact. Keeping socialpractices (float requires 
the active involvement of skilled actors, but these actors are in turn dependent on the structuring properties 
of the ‘rules’. . .actors must engage in the sometimes tricky business of ‘trying on’ particularformulae to see 
i f  they fit.
Resources are the units of ‘transformative capacity’ that an individual has ‘to make a difference’ 
when acting. There are two types of resources, ‘allocative’ and ‘authoritative’. Allocative resources 
refer to the material world, or at least, those elements of the material world that one could, and 
would be willing to, make use of in some way. Authoritative resources refer to the power people 
have due to social position to affect other peoples’ behaviour, life-chances etc. Note that 
resources are only considered to be such if the ‘owner’ is prepared and able to recognise and use 
them. Someone with a large greenfield site in a prime urban area might only have limited 
allocative resources if they lack the authoritative resources to develop it. Rules and resources 
therefore intimately intertwine with ‘power’ to form structure.
2 . 3 . 1 . 4  Time and s p a c e  (Giddens  1 995  p p 2 6 - 4 8 )
A major concept of Giddens’ work is the centrality of the organisation of time and space to societies. 
Societies, Giddens asserts, should be primarily seen as systems that serve to facilitate the time and
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space organisation of human action. Every day, even in the simplest societies, individuals trace 
out a complex path through time and space as part of their interaction with the world and each 
other. All human action is undertaken in the context of a ‘time-space’ path that is defined by the 
structure of society—just as society is defined by everyone going about their daily time-space 
paths. A factory, for example, is a system with structures that organise the time-space paths of a 
number of people as they interact with objects and each other through the working day.
2 . 3 . 1 . 5  Power
People are unequally endowed with resources, and so power infiltrates every encounter and 
action. The power relationship between two agents is always a two-way process—no agent, by 
definition, ever has ‘no choice’ about what to do in a given situation. In an employer-employee 
situation for example, the power of each to influence the other’s behaviour may be uneven, but is 
always reciprocal. As Giddens notes, even with a gun to his head, an agent can choose to perform 
a whole range of acts—complying witii the gunman’s demands, ignoring his demands, feigning 
unconsciousness, distracting him, begging for mercy etc.
This concept of power is important because it denies any form of ‘inevitability’ of human 
action—because agents are clever, there is always the potential to find novel ways of dealing with 
even the most desperate situations.
2 . 3 . 1 . 6  System cont inui ty  and t he  un i n t ended  c o n s e q u e n c e s  of act ion
Given that no human action is inevitable, and that social structures exist only as rules and 
resources in the heads of those that are affected by them, how is it that particular social systems 
survive? Why do the oppressed not regularly fling up their arms and start new systems of their 
own? Giddens sees this question as central to sociology (Cassell 1993).
There are several reasons why social systems often survive over large expanses of time and space, 
many of which I will discuss laterk O f particular interest to Giddens is the way that social 
systems are sustained and perpetuated over time and space as a result of the unintended consequences 
of action of those involved.
Giddens (1984 pp289-309) is particularly fond of a piece of research by Willis, who studied the 
interpersonal dynamics of a typical working class classroom in Birmingham. The teacher, 
ostensibly imbued with the authoritative resources of the situation, was engaged in a complex and 
subtle power conflict with a group of disruptive children known as “the lads”. The lads 
themselves had considerable authoritative resources, and were adept at manipulating the ‘rules’ of 
acceptable behaviour in order to achieve what they wanted out of school: “having a laff’. The 
lads were particularly adept at working out the basis and limitations of the teacher’s authority—a 
teacher cannot persistently suspend pupils—but stopped short of outright confrontation, 
enabling the system to continue. However sophisticated the lads’ understanding of classroom
Including ontological security, socialisation etc.
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power games, the unintended consequences of the lads’ actions would probably be to ensure that 
they left school with no formal qualifications, and most likely, begin a life of unfulfiUing manual 
labour or extended unemployment. Their children will also be likely to be schooled under similar 
conditions, thereby helping to perpetuate a localised system of working class people. O f course, 
the degree to which conforming in the classroom might have increased their prospects of a more 
positive future is debatable—a debate recognised, however vaguely, by the lads themselves. One 
thing is for sure, though—that in disrupting classes in their endless pursuit of a “laff”, the lads 
were unintentionally perpetuating a range of generalised features of industrial capitalism.
2 . 3 . 1 . 7  S t r uc t u r e  and c o n s t r a i n t
Not surprisingly, many structuralists are highly critical of what they think is Giddens’ 
overstatement of the power of individuals to do as they please. For some critics. Structuration 
Theory is not a ‘unifying’ theory at all, but is just another form of social action theory (Craib 
1993).
Equally unsurprisingly, Giddens and his many supporters reject this. From the point of view of a 
single individual, Giddens argues, the structural properties of a system are essentially objective 
(Craib 1993)—the question instead is how much structures serve to constrain or enable 
behaviour. Individuals’ actions are constrained and enabled by their power relationships with 
others and also by the physical realities of the objective world—we cannot just decide to 
disappear in a puff of smoke and reappear somewhere else. Equally, as is the case with language, 
it is wrong to consider structures as merely constraining individual behaviour.
Social systems, then, are patterns of social relations that exist over particular ranges of time-space 
and which are reproduced unintentionally by the day-to-day actions of those who comprise them. 
The structures that define individual action exist in the form of rules and resources in the heads of 
participants.
Returning to the example of the family mentioned in the introduction to sociological theory 
earlier, in contrast to structuralists and social action theorists, Giddens would say that the family 
is a social system perpetuated on a daily basis by the actions of its members in accordance with 
the rules and resources understood to be relevant to that system. Although all might be interested 
in perpetuating the family as a system, the system only actually exists for so long as the individual 
members continue to interact in particular (often unintentional) ways that perpetuate i t  For 
example, families often unquestioningly take dinner together, largely for logistical purposes— 
food is prepared in bulk in one place at one time, say—but the act of eating together is often an 
important way of emotionally bonding and exploring the dynamic rules and resources of the 
group, a fact that may or may not be recognised by the participants. Where it is not recognised, 
and where participants increasingly take advantage of technological developments that overcome 
the logistical reason for eating together (firozen prepared meals, for example), then participants 
are increasingly likely to engage in modes of behaviour that do not perpetuate the system, leading 
to its transformation or possible collapse. In this way, individuals’ desites (in this case, for a
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continued family unit) can be thwarted by the unintended consequences of their own actions. As 
Giddens’ discussion of modernity emphasises, people are becoming quite good at using 
technology to thwart their own aspirations.
2 , 3 . 2  Appl y i ng  S t r u c t u r a t i o n  T h e o r y
A perhaps more justified criticism of Giddens is that he does not offer much help in 
understanding how particular systems conflict with or integrate with each other. It is quite a big 
leap to move firom considering the perspective of an individual on a psychological level to 
suddenly discuss features of globalisation and world political systems, as Giddens often seems 
happy to do. In between these extremes are large numbers of social systems of varying sizes that, 
while being composed of and perpetuated by individual action as we have seen, also interact with 
each other as distinct entities. How are we to understand the relationship between a multinational 
corporation and its competitors, customers and stakeholders, for example?
A first step is to understand a multinational corporation firom the perspective of Structuration 
Theory. In The Awakening Giant, a richly detailed, large-scale study of ICI, Andrew Pettigrew 
(1985) discusses how the company’s structures constrain and empower individual action in ways 
that allow individuals’ personal goals to be achieved while (unintentionally from each individual’s 
point of view) perpetuating the system as a whole. Many aspects of corporate culture perpetuated 
in unintentional ways by employees are, of course, negative as well as positive. Sarah Parkin once 
commented that as a member of the UK Green Party, she found she received more positive 
reactions from the youngest or pre-retirement corporate managers—a trait she attributed to the 
tendency of middle-aged managers to have “souls smaller than their mortgages” (Parkin 1997). It 
is easy to see how Structuration Theory might be used to explain why companies might be more 
resistant to changes in attitude towards environmental matters than the lay population. All other 
things being equal, the financial situation of middle-aged managers often means they do have 
most to lose firom challenging their own conceptions of the role of managers in their position, 
rather than acting as they would like to. Perhaps if companies were managed only by under 30s 
and over 55s, they might be more responsive to cultural change!
One of the main problems with The Awakening Giant according to another management 
researcher, Richard Whittington (1992), is that it considers ICI in too much of a vacuum from its 
context. Pettigrew discusses how in the UK at the time, the limits of possible change within 
management were defined by the personal competencies and skills of individuals, who vied for 
managerial legitimacy on the basis of their class-related backgrounds, be they gentlemanly, 
capitalist or scientist. However, as Whittington notes, he does not use that insight to examine the 
internal politics of ICI itself, instead using it as an “outer” background somehow loosely affecting 
the “inner” organisation. Yet because of its size and prestige, the corporate behaviour of ICI was 
probably highly influential in defining what that “outer background”—that is, the organisational 
culture of companies in the UK—actually was. Clearly, examining a system as large as a
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multinational company in isolation of the myriad systems that intersect it is to miss a great deal of 
the structures that are enabling and constraining its action.
Whittington’s proposed solution seems to me to stem firom Giddens’ insistence that all actors are 
always guided by the rules they are familiar with. Give an individual any new situation, and she 
will, like Cassell’s lecturer, ‘try on’ a range of rules she knows and act on what seems to be most 
appropriate. This, for Whittington, is the key to managerial agency—to actively exploit the 
tensions between divergent structural principles and to find creative solutions to problems by 
successfully ‘trying on’ rules firom one system to another.
Each employee in an organisation, then, draws on a range of different sets of rules (embedded in 
both discursive and practical consciousness) firom the range of systems that they are personally 
familiar with. Below is my attempt to visualise how the rules and resources firom each specific 
system that an individual is familiar with might be drawn on, or ‘pooled’ when that individual is 
confronted with a novel situation.
clubs, 
gangs, 
community 
groups, etc
firms,
trade
associations,
etc.
Communal Economic
System Types
Potential 
pool of rules 
& resources
DomesticIntellectual
Political
households,
communes,
prisons
etc
professional 
bodies, 
universities, 
etc
Organisations
government, 
judiciary, 
parties etc
Figure 2.1: Whittington’s pool of rules and resources
Whittington then argues that because of both the ambiguity of structures governing complex 
single systems and the contradictions between a system’s internal structures and the ‘alien’
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structures of the systems it intersects, the more agents can draw on a wide variety of rules ‘to try 
on’ in new situations, the more creative management agency will be.
In other words,
'Exploiting their own plural identities and those of others they seek to influence, managers may exploit rules 
and resources from other systems in order to empower or Ultimate their conduct at work.
For Whittington, then, the multinational corporation is an extraordinarily vast collection of 
personally acquired rules and resources that could be employed to find the ‘best fit’ approach to 
the increasingly complicated problems that befall the system as a whole. From the CEO to the 
lowly research student, each individual potentially carries with them new oudooks on how novel 
situations could be approached—each goes home in the evening and goes to the opera, plays 
video games, organises a squash league, cooks for eight people, nurses a sick parent, takes part in 
a debating society, attends a pressure group meeting. Whittington (1992) again:
Instead of treating the organisation as a discrete entity within its environment, each firm and its activities 
should be examined as the expression ofpotentially diverse social structuralprinciples. The character of key 
organisational actors needs to be explored not only in terms of the internal hierarcly, but also in terms of 
theirpositions within and relations to external structures stretching beyond the organisation itself.
I will explore later in greater detail exactly why I think this approach to management agency is so 
appropriate to the modem world. Before I go on to discuss Giddens’ Modernity Thesis itself, 
however, the following comment firom Whittington (1992) is highly relevant to a later discussion 
regarding the respective roles of engineers and the lay public (Chapter 4):
Decisions between structural codes of conduct involve accepting or rejecting the social cpproval and le t^imacy 
of definite external communities...in this way, managerial agency can boil down to quite fundamental 
questions of social identity.
2 . 4  G i d d e n s ’ M o d e r n i t y  T h e s i s
2 . 4 . 1  Ove rv i ew
In The end of the world as we knew it, I introduce modem times firom a ‘structural’ perspective, that 
is, in terms of the forces and institutional bodies that describe the ‘essence’ of the modem age, 
how it ‘works’, and how it fundamentally differs firom ancient and medieval times. In The nature of 
the self, I present an overview of Giddens’ views on how, genetically, individuals make sense of 
the world around them, and how this strongly affects the most basic forms of human behaviour.
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In the following section. The victims of modernity, I discuss how individuals in the premodem and 
modem societies integrate the psychological needs of human beings. In Trust me, Vm an expert, I 
discuss in more detail how individuals in the modem world deal with the challenges of the age. 
Finally, in Enccpsulating Giddens, I present a way of integrating these sections together in a single 
model that may serve as a useful summary of Giddens’ ideas. Armed with this, I then go on to 
apply Giddens’ work more specifically to the problems of modem engineering.
2 . 4 . 2  Th e  e n d  of t h e  wor l d  a s  we knew it
Amongst historians there is a debate about when ‘modem times’ can be said to have begun. 
Many British historians look to 1485 and the beginning of the Tudor dynasty following the Batde 
of Bosworth Field. More widely, Columbus’ arrival in America in 1492, the Italian Renaissance 
circa 1500, the Protestant Reformation of 1521 or the fall of Constantinople in 1453 are seen as 
the events that ushered in a new era of history. What is less controversial is that modem times, or 
modernity, has brought with it ways of life so fundamentally different from previous modes of 
premodem existence as to represent a definite (if ill-defined) ‘break point’ with the past, in every 
way a new era of civilisation.
This ‘discontinuity’ is key to analysing the nature of modernity because it distinguishes between 
ancient, relatively unchanging and sustainable ways of life, and their dynamic, unsustainable, 
modem counterparts. Like laminar and turbulent fluid flows, premodemity and modernity are 
govemed by distinct ‘social mechanisms’. There was, of course, a transition between the two, as 
described by historian Geoffrey Parker (1993):
The period from 1500 to 1815 was a transitionalperiod in world history, and European society, for all its 
thmsting novelty, was still essentially an agricultural society of lords and peasants, closer to its agrarian 
past than to its industrial future.
The split between premodemity and modernity is central to this analysis, because the ‘social 
mechanisms’ of modernity are introduced by contrasting them to those of the usually simpler 
systems of premodemity. The premodem societies we are invited to consider are peculiarly 
westem European, though many of the features were (and no doubt still are) shared by many 
others around the world. Although many present societies in the modem world, particularly in 
Aftica and Asia, remain essentially premodem or at varying stages of the transition to the ‘fully 
developed flow’ of modernity, all societies are profoundly shaped by modernity’s influence.
The Enlightenment, an 18* Century intellectual movement, was of key importance in the 
transition from premodemity to modernity partly because it specifically spelled out modernity’s 
‘mission statement’. Enlightenment thinkers—including Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, Watt, 
Smith, to name but a few—believed above all in the liberating possibilities of rational thought
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and scientific knowledge. One of the movement’s explicit aims was to understand and gain 
control over the forces that govemed human destiny, both as an end in itself and as a means of 
overcoming the pervasive social inequities and religious dogma that had defined the past. 
Modernity should be understood as the embodiment of these Enlightenment principles (Spencer 
and Krauze 1997).
Modem societies vary enormously in appearance if less so in theory. The richest nations of the 
present have, over the past thirty years or so, seen the principles of modernity ‘radicalised’ to 
such an extreme that it is sometimes difficult to see what, in terms of social dynamics, modem 
France say, shares with its equally ‘modem’ Napoleonic past. Giddens (e.g. 1994, pp42) often 
therefore differentiates between the modernity of the late 19* Century and early 20* Century and 
the ‘late’ or ‘high’ modernity of present rich nations. To be clear, though, this difference is only a 
result of the ‘social mechaitisms’ of Enlightenment principles following through thek own ‘logic’ 
to the present day. This is absolutely not to say that the modem world in its present state inevitably 
followed firom Enlightenment thought, as I hope will become obvious firom the unfolding 
discussion of modernity’s character.
2 . 4 . 2 . 1  Overcoming t he  t h r e a t s  of p r emode r n i t y
Giddens’ comparison of premodem and modem societies contains a controversial proposition: 
modernity has either overcome the physical and psychological threats to the well-being of 
premodem people, or transformed them into fundamentally different problems.
Pre-modem people faced three main types of threats: The first relates to physical violence firom 
other people; the second to psychological threats from social stmctures; and the third to physical 
threats from the natural world.
One of the distinctive features of the nation state (itself a distinguishing feature of modernity) is 
the institutionalisation, to the point of near-monopoly, of the means of violence (Giddens 1995 
ppl82). As with aU social changes, counter-trends are evident—it might not be perfectly safe to 
walk around streets at night, and domestic violence is still alive and well—but during periods of 
civil stability, the state has absolute military power and is quick to track down and punish those 
who might challenge its authority. This by no means precludes violent oppression, of course; this 
is something modem states have proven themselves to be particularly adept at. But the character 
or profile of violence in day-to-day life has changed—physical prowess is no longer a significant 
indicator of personal power. This is entkely in contrast to premodem states, where lack of 
personal security severely limited the personal opportunities of the socially and physically 
powerless. Even in oppressive modem states people can, generally, go about thek daily business, 
even over large geographic regions, without the constant fear of being murdered and/or robbed. 
Modem people face physical violence in entkely different ways, as we shall see later.
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The dominance of tradition and religion are in some ways defining features of premodem 
societies. While both ‘stmctures’ empowered individuals in important ways, they were also not 
just constraining but actively threatening.
In societies that looked to religious leaders for spiritual protection firom the world around them, 
perhaps the most terrifying prospect of all was to be rejected by them, or altematively to be put 
under some kind of magical ‘curse’. The mass hysteria that periodically arose in medieval Europe 
as a reaction to such anxieties underscores the fact that for most people, the Devil and ‘black 
magic’ were an integral and terrible part of the ‘invisible world’ that co-existed with the material 
one. Partly through evoking the threat of spiritual horrors, the Church held a firm grip on the 
behaviour of countless generations of premodem people. The Enlightenment period did much to 
dismantle the power of the Church in this respect. When Nietzsche announced in the late 19* 
Century that “God is dead”, he was merely describing a social and political trend that was already 
two hundred years old. God hasn’t completely disappeared firom late modernity, and in some 
modem countries recent counter-trends have even led to something of a religious revival. The 
rise of religion, some of it fundamentalist, may perhaps be seen as fulfilling a widely-felt longing 
for the ‘certainties’ of old, or a response to a perceived moral vacuity of modem life. Modem 
wars continue to be fought, at least ostensibly, on religious grounds. But when it comes to the 
provision of widely accepted knowledge about the world, however, Nietzsche was surely right.
Just as modernity killed God, so, says Giddens, it has ended tradition. This may seem an odd 
thing to claim given that traditional practices are evident everywhere—warm beer and cricket, the 
state opening of parliament, etc. What Giddens means by this is that traditional practices that are 
perpetuated only because “this is how things have always been”, and cannot on any other grounds 
be defended as suitable for a modem state, have, by and large, been abolished. The monarch 
remains head of state because society has decided it is reasonable, not because he or she always 
has been head of state. “Ye Olde Ship Inne” owes its name more to the power of modem 
marketing practice than it does to that of tradition. Traditional practices maintained like this are 
not traditions defended just because ‘this is the way things have always been’, and are therefore 
not, according to this definition, tradition at all. This is a key feature of modernity—practices and 
conventions are continuously scmtinised for possible adaptation or rejection by society. When 
the odd example of “tradition defended in the traditional way”—i.e. fundamentalism—is exposed 
in late modem states (for example the continued existence of men-only institutions), it is usually 
accompanied by bemused media coverage (Giddens 1994 pp5-7).
The third main threat to premodem people—the natural world—similarly no longer exists m the 
way premodem people understood it. As with tradition, this is a matter of definition, this time of 
the word ‘natural’.
Defining nature has always been a contentious issue for environmentalists, ecologists and 
political conservatives alike—all share an anxiety that human activity encroaches in a problematic 
way on ‘the natural order’ of things, but disagree on what, for practical purposes, this means. For
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example, is the British countryside ‘natural’? ‘Yes’ say political conservatives, because it is the 
result of a harmonious relationship between simple, sustainable and traditional ways of life which 
are every bit part of ‘nature’ as the birds and trees. ‘Nonsense’ say ecologists—the countryside is 
as natural as the city of Los Angeles—both are manufactured products of grubby human hands. 
This applies to wider social issues, of course. Is organically grown food natural? Is aromatherapy 
a natural treatment? How natural are the deaths resulting fcom a ‘natural disaster’? Surely the 
Amazonian rainforest must be considered natural?
Nature, says Giddens (following the work of McKibben) can most usefully be thought of as any 
external system independent of human endeavours (Giddens 1994 pp208-212). The British 
countryside is indeed the result of continued human interference, as is, of course, all forms of 
medicine, conventional or alternative. Other aspects of what could be debatably referred to as 
‘nature’ should instead be seen as ‘socialised nature’—something entirely different. The weather, 
for example, was seen in premodem times as part of the extemal forces of fate that affected 
people—if a hurricane ripped through your house, it was for extemal, usually religious, reasons 
that you just had to live with. Weather systems themselves are entirely beyond the control of 
modem science, but the human capacity to withstand the effects of those systems is not. 
Predictive scientific instruments, transport systems, telecommunications and material 
technologies now mean that practically all ‘natural disasters’ can to some degree be foreseen, 
avoided, run away from or withstood.
This debate over the nature of nature is far from academic. Once we recognise that we have little, 
in principk, to fear firom ‘traditional’ nature—that is, we have the capacity to protect ourselves 
from the worst of what the elements have, up to now, ever thrown at us—then concepts of fate 
and inevitability regarding natural disasters are supplanted by ones of socio-economic power and 
political choice. That Central-American shanty towns suffer more human losses firom the passing 
of a hurricane than the suburban developments of their northem neighbours has litde to do with 
nature.
From this perspective, then, ‘natural’ medical treatments are simply traditional or non- 
‘conventional’ treatments. The Amazonian rainforest is a ‘socialised’ natural environment, not a 
‘natural’ one in the premodem sense. From the Brazilian loggers and multmational gold strip- 
miners to the environmental campaign action groups in Surrey villages, no one can doubt that 
every square inch of the planet’s surface is at the mercy of human whim and power. This is 
absolutely not to say that late 20* Century technology is in more control of ‘natural’ systems—as I 
wül expand at length later, the reverse is probably tme. But nature, like tradition, is a concept 
only of historical significance in the world of late modernity.
In conclusion, I have (I hope reasonably) argued that the threats to premodem societies have 
been either dispelled or transformed unrecognisably by modernity. Outcomes may appear 
similar—hundreds of millions, perhaps billions of people have died in modem times from human 
violence, political oppression or ‘natural’ disasters—but the reasons behind these deaths are not
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the same as they were. Modernity, for all its successes, presents an entirely different portfolio of 
physical and psychological threats to human beings. Before looking specifically at these, however, 
I will first describe the ‘mechanisms’ of modernity as the basis for understanding where these 
threats arise. Before that, though, here is the first of several summaries of the points raised so far:
Summary:
• The premodem and modem social worlds are fundamentally différent in  terms of the 
forces and mechanisms that define them
• A transition period between the two became evident during the Enlightenment 
period during the early seventeenth Century, although its roots pre-date this
•  The Enlightenment ‘Project’ specifically set out to discredit superstition and received 
dogma, and to adhieve mastery over the natural world through the application of 
reason and the scientific method
•  Modernity is essentially the embodiment of Enlig^itenment principles
• The widespread application of these principles has succeeded in overcoming the 
threats and problems of earlier timesrr-butiin doing so has created a whole range of 
new ones
2 . 4 . 2 . 2  The ‘i ns t i t u t i ona l  d i m e n s i o n s ’ of modern i t y  (Giddens  1990
p p 5 5 )
For Giddens, modernity has four, ‘dimensional’ characteristics—mutually interdependent 
elements that serve both to define modernity and act as the engine for its growth. These 
components—capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and the monopoly of military power—can 
be thought of as the four wheels of an ever-expanding colossal vehicle. As the vehicle rolls 
forward, a number of ‘side-reactions’ occur which effectively act as ‘change accelerating 
mechanisms’, transforming the social landscape. It is these ‘side reactions^  that collude to define the 
fundamental differences between living in a premodem and modem society.
Capitalism
Capitalism is one of the main causes of the dynamic nature of modernity—competitive advantage 
requires constant innovation and novel application of resources. It may seem odd to count 
capitalism as a ‘dimension’ of modernity, for at least two reasons:
Firstly, capitalism has been around for very much longer than modernity. By around 1500, as the 
first hints of the modem world were just beginning to surface, Europe alone had a large network 
of ‘international’ traders and financiers. With Spain’s discovery of the Americas and Portuguese 
arrival in India, European merchants were already rapidly going global. Secondly, the majority of 
the 20* Century saw conflict between modem states, not aU of whom were capitalist at all. The 
Soviet Union is obviously the most important of these.
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In answer to the first point, capitalism was considerably transformed at the onset of the 
Enlightenment period. Burgeoning volumes of trade and changing ‘consumer’ practices were the 
driving forces of industrialism. In turn, industrialisation required labour, which became 
commodified in a way that did not occur in premodem states. People without capital became 
forced to sell their labour as though it were any other resource and, as Karl Marx described, were 
denied any ownership of the fruits of their labour. Private property suddenly became the key to 
entry into a class system, rather than family lineage (though the two were usually related). Once 
locked into propertylessness, the working class effectively had as little chance of escape as the 
paupers under premodem hereditary systems.
Marx’s socialism, to address the second point, was concemed more with production of goods for 
society rather than meeting the demands of the market—it sought to bring the production of 
goods under direct, conscious control, and so to merge the economy with the state. Marx saw 
this as the destiny of humanity. He believed that the ‘free market’ bartering of goods in 
premodem societies gave rise to the capitalistic companies of modernity, but that those 
companies would grow ever larger due to the accumulation of capital. The concentration of 
power in this way would lead to evermore conscious control of production and consumption by 
the managers of these companies, usurping the firee market from which they grew. Eventually, 
the ‘workers’ would unite in a revolution to transfer this power to form a socialist society. The 
point is that even socialist theory recognised that modernity is the product of capitalism (Giddens 
1990 pp62). The ultimate collapse of communism back to capitalism can be traced, Giddens 
argues, to the increased complexity of modernity that inherently defies conscious or ‘cybemetic’ 
control (Giddens 1994 pp8).
Industrialism
In contrast to capitalism, industrialism is very much a product of modernity. It is important to 
remember just how recently industrialisation occurred—the impact of the industrial revolution 
remained limited in most of Europe until the mid-19* Century, and further afield much more 
recently still (Parker 1993). Industrialism is the application to the production process of some 
kind of machinery, powered by an ‘inanimate’ material or resource (Giddens 1990 pp56). The 
term applies equally to mass food production and computer technology as it does to the noisy, 
steam-driven beam engines it perhaps more readily evokes.
Industrialism is of key importance to us as engineers, because in some senses it constitutes what 
we do. I will explore later in detail how the ‘abstract systems’ of science and economics become 
transformed by industrialism to create the manufactured environment of modernity.
Surveillance
Since all modem societies are based on capitalism, they are only distinct ‘societies’ because they 
are organised into nation states (Giddens 1990 pp57). The adrninistration and co-ordination 
systems of modernity are far more comprehensive and far-reaching than anything found in 
premodem societies. Modem societies are ‘supervised’ and monitored both politically and
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commercially, and labour and materials can be deployed in far more efficient ways than was ever 
possible previously. Surveillance technologies are of particular relevance when considering the 
change-accelerating ‘side effects’ of modernity, as I wiU discuss in a moment.
Military power
In modem societies, the modem state effectively has a complete monopoly over the deployment 
of physical force. This monopoly has the effect of stabilising individual nation-states and allowing 
weapons to be ‘pointed outwards’ towards other nation-states, rather than inwards during the 
suppression of civil unrest.
Together, these dimensions form the mutually reinforcing, dynamic whole of modernity, that I 
hope Table 2.1 illustrates:
Table 2.1: Mutually reinforcing dimensions o f modernity
Capitalism
Indusbdalism
Surveillance
Increased efficiency 
and productivity
Improved accuracy of 
market indicators
Increased dynamism 
and change
Improved
organisational
administration
Surveillance Militarj" Power
People tied to “Extrusion’ of local
organisations and violence via the
institutions labour contract
Improved surveillance Improved military
technology technology
Improved military 
intelligence
Military Power
Defence of private property and social stability. Protection from extemal
threats.
This Table shows the inherent stmctural strength of modernity: each of its four dimensions leans 
on, and simultaneously supports, the others. Running briefly through the Table:
Capitalist markets institutionalise dynamism and create a constantly changing environment for 
industrialism to explore and ‘grow into’. Capitalism’s network of employers and employees form 
a web of individual interaction that lends itself to systematic information collection and analysis 
by surveillance systems. The labour contract removes the incentive for dominant groups to 
physically force others into subservience, leaving the state a monopoly of the means of violence. 
Industrialism perpetuates the growth of capitalist markets by increasing productivity. It also 
constantly re-invents and develops itself, via its products—including those required for the 
purposes of surveillance and maintaining military authority. Surveillance systems provide the 
feedback of social and financial indicators required for the efficient operation of the market, such
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as income levels, fashion trends, retail sales etc. They also are vital for the internal co-ordination 
of industrial organisations and the provision of military intelligence. Finally, unchallenged military 
power exists to physically protect internal institutions from criminality or civil unrest, and the 
nation state from extemal threats.
Modernity’s dimensions therefore form a virtuous cycle, a powerful, self-reinforcing system that 
steadily grows, feeding on its inherent dynamism. But as well as simply becoming more 
encompassing, modernity also produces ‘side reactions’ which serve to transform more features 
of the premodem in fundamental ways. These changes are not necessarily ‘good’ or ‘bad’—they 
are simply change.
2 . 4 . 2 . 3  The c h a n g e - a c c e l e r a t i n g  ‘s i d e - r e a c t i o n s ’ of modern i t y
Giddens identifies three distinct types of ‘change-accelerating’ mechanisms that are constantly 
generated by modernity:
Separation o f time and space
In the brief introduction to Giddens’ Stmcturation Theory above, I discussed the importance of 
the organisation of time and space for human societies, and in particular, how the co-ordination 
of individuals’ time-space paths should be seen as cmcial to the existence of societies per se. In 
premodem times, time and space were inextricably linked by physical presence. To have 
influence somewhere, an individual either had to be somewhere at a particular time, or have 
previously-established power over those that were. This formed certain boundaries around the 
kinds of social pattems that were logistically possible. For example, the physical distance between 
people, or the difficulty of the terrain between them, directly influenced the nature of the power 
relationship they developed (Cassell 1993).
Such was the absolute link between time and space in premodem times that time was only 
conceivable by reference to local markers, or ‘space’, as in, for example: “when I was as big as 
that rock, such and such an event happened”. Similarly, large separations in space were usually 
understood in terms of the time that it took to traverse them. To someone in medieval Venice, 
for example, London was 27 days away, Lisbon 46 days and Damascus 80 days (Parker 1993).
With modernity, various developments transformed the space and time perception of ordinary 
people. The maps of early explorers, for example, became widely circulated and developed. The 
premodem sense of ‘locality’ lost pre-eminence—the geographical world came to be viewed 
independently of the particular perspective of the viewer. Rather than, ‘three mountains that 
way’, a perspective dependent on location, objects became ‘three hundred miles south-east of 
Venice’. Similarly, time became an independent dimension with the development of mechanical 
clocks. With the onset of the Enlightenment, the whole of human history gradually became 
charted in a unified framework with the independent ‘axes’ of space and time. The re­
combination of ‘empty’ time and space became the basis for the reorganisation of society around
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‘timetables’, which pinpointed activity in absolute, rather than relative, terms of time and space 
(Giddens 1995 ppl89).
The upshot of this is, with the widespread application of technological and jSnancial ‘abstract 
systems’—telecommunications, transport systems, stockmarkets etc—modernity has open to it a 
whole range of new logistical possibilities that were precluded by the premodem fixed 
relationship of relative time and space. Rather than having to be each place at a particular time, a 
Venetian can telephone firom home to people in London, Lisbon and Damascus aU at the same 
time, rather than sequentially over a several-month-long joumey. Time and space have become 
distanciated, that is, the premodem relationship between them has been destroyed: Damascus is no 
longer 80 days away in ‘space’, but effectively nearby, as a phantasmagorical ‘place’, immediately 
accessible by telephone or a few hours away by air travel. In fact, the modem world is full of 
ghostly ‘places’; the more ‘connected’ to global systems each place becomes, the less relevant is 
their actual position in ‘space’ to their character or prosperity. Frankfurt, Hong Kong, London, 
New York and Tokyo, for example, are equivalent phantasmagorical ‘places’ in terms of financial 
systems—few stockmarket traders have any conception at all of the actual geographical 
relationship between them, and even fewer know anything about the rocks, oceans and trees 
around which their optical cables weave.
The ‘emptying’ of time and space accelerates change because it allows intensely complex co­
ordination of action across vast areas of geographical ‘space’. Multinational organisations can 
exist as coherent entities; although their managers are on different continents, they can 
communicate more effectively than if they were in the next premodem village. The lives of 
millions of people can be affected by one person’s ideas in hours rather than centuries. The 
separation of time and space is also the prime cause of the next ‘change accelerating side effect’ 
of modernity, the disemhedding of social relations.
Disembedding and re-embedding o f so d  ai reiations (Giddens 1990 pp21)
This term refers to the way that the same ‘abstract systems’ of modernity tend to ‘lift out’ certain 
pattems of social behaviour firom a locality, often to be restructured and ‘dropped back’ 
somewhere else and at some other time. This can produce increasingly strange and novel forms 
of local circumstances— change, locally and globally, is accelerated.
A typical airport lounge is a bizarre collage of disembedded social relations. Business people work 
away on laptop computers as if they were in an office environment, absently drinking coffee as 
though they were in Brazil or eating a banana as if they were in the Caribbean. Skiers drunkenly 
discuss the condition of mountains thousands of miles away, as if they were settling in for an 
evening in an Alpine cabin. Savers remove money firom a banking machine far way from the local 
environment where it was eamed and locked away. Football fans watch a game on television that 
actually took place several days ago on a different continent, perhaps even cheering at the 
reproduced image of a goal as if they were in a stadium. A woman using a mobile phone, 
engrossed in a conversation with a friend in another city, is much more aware of the feelings and
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 2.18
concerns of that person than those of the couple sitting chatting nearby her. And aU this 
disembedded behaviour has been re-embedded, or ‘dropped back’ into a building on a piece of 
land where, until a few years ago, countless generations of farmers had raised cattle.
Modernity’s ‘abstract systems’ disembed certain social relations by removing them from the 
immediacy of their context. In effect, social practices that were once performed locally by familiar 
people are increasingly ‘anonymised’ in modernity. Rather than obtaining bread from the local 
baker and cheese from the local dairy farmer, late modem people are more likely to buy a pre­
packaged sandwich from a disinterested kiosk attendant. Increasingly, in contrast to premodem 
societies, we habitually rely on others who we have never met: the sandwich maker; the laptop 
maker; floppy disk manufacturer; coffee-, beer-, banana-, -grower, -exporter, -importer, - 
distributor, -caterer, -server; television producer, financier, designer, network manager; bank 
manager, commercial software designer, etc.
The changes in modem life that this ‘change accelerating side-reaction’ of modernity produces 
are well known—indeed they stereotypicaUy preoccupy the attention of older people who have 
first-hand experience of the loss of local ‘community’ in its premodem sense. But to moum the 
loss of the old ways is to naïvely ignore their often oppressive nature, and may also be to miss the 
positive opportunities of the new. Our airport departure lounge is a site of enormous potential 
for ‘dropping-back’, or ‘re-embedding’ certain types of social relations in entirely new contexts.
Consider what happens when one lap-topped businessperson starts a conversation with the 
businessperson in the next seat about the dreadful state of pre-packaged sandwiches. Before long, 
they are planning a pan-European sandwich empire, with one office in Paris and another in 
Milan. In their plan, the production of sandwiches will be disembedded from its original local 
environment (English kitchens), and re-embedded in many new ones, perhaps train stations 
throughout every major European capital—thereby affecting the lives of millions of travellers. 
Nevertheless, the relationship that the two will share will be essentially the same as thek 
premodem counterparts, only disembedded from a single locality and re-embedded in two 
distanciated localities through ‘abstract systems’. This example leads dkectly into the thkd ‘change- 
accelerating side-reaction’ of modernity, institutional rejkxivity.
Institutional (or ‘wholesale j  reflexlvlty (Giddens 1990 pp36)
Institutional reflexivity is the term given to this highly chaotic and ‘adaptive’ characteristic of 
modem systems. Because so many social systems are interconnected in different ways, any 
change in one element of the network produces knock-on effects that ultimately alter the nature 
of the whole network of systems. Changes in one system may also trigger different changes in 
another, and so on—often small initial changes in one system can cause very large changes in the 
network as a whole. The global financial market is a prime example of the growing institutional 
reflexivity of modernity.
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The enormous scale of time-space distanciation and social disembedding in late modernity 
produces increasing numbers of situations where all kinds of cross-fertilisation of ideas and 
opportunities, be they cultural, intellectual, entrepreneurial, academic, etc can occur, all tinged by 
constantly-revised power relationships. We have, for example, Thai-food pizzas, Indian offices 
performing engineering drawings for western firms, a profusion of new academic disciplines, 
space technology applied to non-stick frying pans, traditional Asian music blended with 
European ‘technopop’ etc. Further, each new connection triggers another and another, each 
enhancing and perpetuating the time-space distanciation, disembedding and refiexivity of society 
as a whole. The situation has long been reached where it is impossible—not just difficult but 
impossible—to predict how an object, idea or technology wiU be distributed, applied or developed 
once it enters the global environment.
Time-space distanciation, disembedding mechanisms and refiexivity are not new; they were 
present in premodem systems. Story telling, for example, produces all three. In some ways, aU 
forms of communication serve to produce these same change-accelerating ‘side-reactions’. What 
is different about modernity is that, so powerful and penetrating are its abstract systems, these 
‘side-reactions’ have become the dominant or defining features of modernity.
Premodernity, modernity and the refiexive monitoring o f action
One way of looking at this difference between premodemity and modernity is to examine how 
each ‘system’ integrates what Giddens calls the reflexive monitoring of action. This is quite different 
from institutional refiexivity, in that it refers to the fact that every sentient human being, unlike 
an automaton, is in some way aware of what he or she is doing as part of the process of doing it. 
In other words, anyone, if asked, can provide some explanation of why they engaged in a 
particular activity. You are reading this document, for example, because I asked you to, or 
because you thought it might be interesting or relevant to you. But you are also constantly 
monitoring your actions to see if they are achieving what you require of them, and if not, how 
your actions might be modified to better suit you. For example, you might now be thinking that 
this is taking you too long to read, and so in a moment you might skip ahead and just read the 
summary sections, or you might telephone me and ask me to explain the gist of it to you. 
Behaviour modifications of this type are the result of reflexive^ monitoringjour action (Giddens 1984 
pp5-6).
In premodem times, the aggregated impact of individuals’ reflexive monitoring of action on 
society as a whole was limited. Larger social changes did occur in premodem times, but did so 
slowly and over much greater lengths of time: it was because of social reflexive monitoring of 
action that the stone age gave way to the bronze age and so on to medieval times. Generally, 
however, social practices were faithfully reproduced generation after generation, at least partially 
because of the dominant, aU-encompassing nature of traditional and religious sources of 
knowledge—the change-accelerating tendencies of time-space distanciation, disembedding and 
reflexive mechanisms were minor influences on social life. In premodem times, the future arched
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predictably away beyond the time-horizon, in much the same way as the past had arched to the 
present, as Figure 2.2 illustrates.
Time Horizon’
Reflexive monitoring of action 
mostly subsumed by tradition
‘Continuity’ of past, present 
and future practices
Figure 2.2: The path of the premodem
With the rejection of relatively non-negotiable traditional and religious ideas about what, 
physically, socially and ethically was ‘right’, the Enlightenment sought to banish dogma. While 
scientific institutions claimed a monopoly on what was ‘right’ in terms of knowledge about the 
physical world, what was so ethically and socially was more open to question. These issues have 
troubled modernity ever since, and again, in an important way remain to define the modem age.
Modernity ‘handles’ the reflexive monitoring of action in a different way to premodemity. At 
every tum, we are exposed to different ways of doing things; firom glossy magazines to academic 
papers, firom chats in a bar to parliamentary debates, the questions that dominate modem minds 
are variations of the question: ‘what are we to do?’ Far from having closed options, modem 
people are increasingly firee to pick and choose what they want to do, based on information on 
what the world is like. And when the information on what the world is like changes, so, too will 
peoples’ choices. The consequences of these choices change, in tum, what the world is 
hke...which changes peoples’ choices. In this way, modernity’s integration of the reflexive 
monitoring of action actually serves to increase institutional refiexivity.
Giddens (1990, pp42-43) uses the example of marriage to illustrate this. When the first academic 
survey of married couples’ behaviour was conducted in the 1950s, the results were widely 
published and enthusiastically consumed by the lay public. In theory, every couple reading the
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results of that survey adapted in some way their attitude to aspects of their own marriages. 
Perhaps information regarding the incidence of divorce opened up a topic of conversation to 
some couples who had previously considered the subject taboo. Statistics relating to the number 
of hours spent together talking might have provoked others to reconsider the way they related to 
each other. Of course, the next time such a survey was performed, the results were different— 
the previous study, again in theory, affected its subject through empowering large numbers of 
individuals to reflexively monitor their actions in an informed way. The second survey report, in 
tum, could point to a trend in changes, which could further accelerate change. Social knowledge 
of any kind becomes almost immediately redundant—it is assimilated into society, which changes 
as a result. More knowledge about a society does not help to establish more control over it—quite the opposite, it 
accelerates its change.
This defines absolute limits on the ultimate uses of social research in conditions of modernity— 
sociology can provide snapshots of the present, but in doing so shuffles the cards of the future. 
Sociology can elucidate the mechanisms of change, but in the process, stimulates or lubricates 
them—for example, simply knowing this fact wiU probably alter in some vjzyjou regard and react 
to social knowledge in the future.
Onset of 
Modernity
Reflexive Monitoring 
of Action defines Modernity 
-Future is Open
Figure 2.3: Unleashing the juggernaut
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In contrast to Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3 is an attempt to represent the nature of modernity.
Without the stabilising framework of traditional ‘norms’ of behaviour, the ‘juggernaut’ of 
modernity lurches forward this way and that, gathering pace and momentum. No one knows 
where it will head next; those that guess only serve to change its path anyway. The modem world 
was not preordained: the present state of global affaics results from the chaotic, turbulent and 
fleeting (but not randonf) interactions of the ‘now*.
With so many new contexts of action and novel technological systems, the modem world 
presents a hugely dynamic and exciting environment in which to live. The Enlightenment goal of 
mastering our own destiny has been achieved, but with a twist we are responsible for our own 
futures, but there is Httie prospect of ever controlling them. The ‘side-reactions’ of modernity have 
risen up to take over and define it.
In the following paragraphs, I discuss how this absolute-power-with-minimal-control has led to a 
new way of looking at the future, one dominated not by certainty, but by its antithesis: risk.
Summary;
Modernity is driven by an ‘engme* o f four, mutuaHyrreinforcing institutional 
dimensions—capitalism^ industnalism, surveillance and military power 
The dynamism of modernity is the product of three forms o f ‘change accelerating’ 
mechanism, which in some ways arise a s ‘side-reactions’:
« The separation o f space and time 
•  The disembedding o f social relations 
•  Institutional refiexivity 
Modernity involves a fundamental change in how societies deal with the way 
indimduals continuously monitor and modify their day-to-day behaviour (the
renexive m om rorm g  or acuon^
From predictable ‘cycles’ of premodern sbciety, modernit)^ piloM ess juggernaut 
lurches away, with increasirig momentum, into an uncertain future
2 . 4 . 2 . 4  Moderni ty as  a risk cu l t ure
In the remainder of this Section, I discuss the different ways in which uncertainty and risk have 
come to dominate the ‘view of the future’ of modem people, and how this stands in conflict with 
the Enlightenment goal of controlling the world through applied reason. Throughout this 
discussion, the irony pervades that the more abstract systems are used to make life easier and 
more comfortable, the more the unexpected consequences of refiexivity ‘twist* them to make it 
less so.
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Modernity is inherently uncertain
The concept of risk is entirely foreign to premodem societies—premodem Europe certainly had 
no equivalent of the modem word (Giddens 1990, ppl30). Premodem future was dominated 
by fate; if a rock fell on your head, it was because that was your fate, and there was nothing you 
could do about it. Without the premodem notion of fate, the future becomes the province of 
uncertainty. WiU the sun rise tomorrow? Wül I become rich? Que sera, sera, a premodem person 
would say—what wiU be, wiU be. FoUowing the Enlightenment’s rejection of fate and dogma, 
modem people take a very different view of the future: what will be, m il be what we allow to happen, or 
what we make happen.
In sweeping away notions of fate, the Enlightenment has forced us to face up to the fact that the 
future is very much in our own hands. Such was the confidence of many at the onset of the 
Enlightenment that it was held that before long, the scientific method would have discovered 
everything necessary for human beings to live like gods on Earth—the certainty of fate would be 
replaced by the certainty of scientific knowledge. ^^ Sapere audeP encouraged Immanuel Kant. 
“Dare to know! Have the courage to use your reason!” (Spencer and Krauze 1997).
Things, however, have not tumed out quite this way. Our future is in our hands, but absolute 
knowledge about the future is not. As I mentioned above, this is partly because of the way 
modernity generates change to an extent that absolutely precludes science firom anticipating the 
problems of tomorrow in order to solve them in advance. But another reason goes deeper, even, 
than this: science cannot generate any certain knowledge at all, and the ‘useful’ knowledge that it 
does generate stands open to revision at any time.
This fact was picked up by philosophers soon after the onset of the Enlightenment, and quickly 
became quite a philosophical problem—with implications that are far from academic. On the one 
hand, we cannot leam anything certain from experimentation because our senses might be defying 
us—they are just organs that send signals to the brain in response to some stimuli, after all. On 
the other hand, we cannot use reason to say something is certain, because we can’t defend the use 
of reason without using reason to construct an argument.
All scientific knowledge is, strictly speaking, the most useful interpretation of the world that is 
currently available, as judged by the scientific principle of ‘radicalised’ doubt. For practical 
purposes, a something is said to be ‘true’ when no one can construct an empirical experiment or 
use logical argument (i.e. reason) to show that it isn’t. Even our most cherished scientific ‘laws’ 
are not statements of absolute fact, but rather are ‘theories’ that have so far remained reliable 
despite many attempts to discredit them.
Therefore uncertainty is, and always was, at the very core of the Enlightenment project—and 
therefore modernity. Giddens argues that there is a general, vague awareness of this that filters
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into the general anxieties of everyone. Perhaps this general awareness stems &om the fact that, in 
modernity, risk becomes a central organising concept.
Risk follows firom the rejection of fate and instead demands a recognition of the possibility of 
danger—most usefully thought of as the threat to a desired outcome (Giddens 1990, pp34). Looked at 
in this way, our every waking moment is permeated by implicit risk assessments—judgements we 
make about the balance of risks and benefits associated with an action or inaction—that help us 
to define, to some degree our future. Am I likely to get sick if I eat tiiis mouldy cheese in the 
back of my fridge? Will having an un-ironed shirt prevent me firom getting that job? If I talk to 
this person next to me, will I get stuck in a boring conversation? Without fate dominating the 
future, uncertainty—and therefore risk—fills the vacuum. Through decisions made in the 
present, based on risk assessments, we influence some aspect of the future—but only in an 
uncertain way. To say that modernity is a risk culture, therefore, is not necessarily to say that it is 
in anyway ‘riskier’ than in premodem times. Rather, modernity is a risk culture because it 
recognises uncertainty, and ‘thinks’ in terms of risk, opportunity and danger.
Institutionalised risks
In modernity, risk is institutionalised as a central organising principle. This takes many forms, 
though the global financial market is perhaps the most obvious. Capitalist markets are a form of 
institutionalised risk because speculators give up some of their assets aware of the danger that 
they might lose them, but hopeful of a return ‘in proportion’ to their perceived risk. Financial 
markets help to ‘colonise the future’ by facilitating the conversion of today’s capital into 
tomorrow’s ventures—they have the effect of structuring space and time into the future. Of 
course, the same is true of aU investments, be they mortgages, learning to play the piano, taking a 
degree, working for a salary etc
Sometimes, institutionalised risks can also develop into being ‘high consequence risks’, another 
defining characteristic of our age (Giddens 1994, pp78-79). High consequence risks are risks 
created by the widespread application of abstract systems, and are discussed in greater detail later 
(Chapter 4).
The global stockmarket, for example, has developed into a system of such complexity that all but 
its most fundamental mechanisms and sensitivities are completely beyond the comprehension of 
the human mind. No one has the slightest idea about the effects a certain trend or event will 
ultimately have on the system as a whole. The robustness of the system to its own mechanisms is 
itself a matter of speculation. Undoubtedly, a collapse of the global market could well produce 
devastating consequences for billions of people—food production on anything but a local 
subsistence level would surely cease without financial incentive, for example.
High consequence risks have certain common features, which together are the source of diffused 
anxiety to modem people.
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Features of high consequence risks
First and perhaps foremost, high consequence risks potentially threaten everyone. There cannot be 
many people on Earth today whose way of life would not be threatened by a total collapse of the 
planet’s financial system, for example. Similarly, the consequences of a full-scale nuclear war, or 
major nuclear accident, would be likely to impinge on billions of lives. Perhaps even more 
worryingly, the consequences of a liigh consequence risk’ wiU typically affect generations to 
come, for example through genetic mutation, or through the potentially irreversible effects of 
climate change.
Secondly, high consequence risks have potential outcomes that are so horrifying, so cataclysmic, 
so counter-factual, as to not be readily believed as being ‘real’. The world could be transformed in 
an infinite number of ways, for example, by the introduction of ‘rogue’ sequences of genetic 
material into the environment. While we may be able to understand how this could be a ‘bad’ 
thing, few of us can really conceive of, or in any way take seriously, just what could happen. 
Instead, thoughts of an end to our current way of life are cast aside with only vague anxiety 
remaining.
High consequence risks also contribute to the failure of modem institutions to protect society 
from manufactured risks;
The failure of the ‘providential s ta te ’
As modem societies developed, institutions arose that were intended to spread the load of 
fortune and misfortune across the society as a whole; in effect, this is parallel to the ‘hedging’ 
behaviour of stockmarket investors. Ulrich Beck has most famously developed tiiis line of social 
analysis, arguing that many modem institutions—state unemployment benefits, pension schemes, 
the insurance industry, emergency services, etc., collectively referred to as the ‘Providential State’, 
were an attempt to protect or compensate individuals firom the potential consequences of 
modernity’s manufactured risks (Beck 1992). As Beck (1995) uncharacteristically coherently put 
it, in modernity “if the rafters are on fire, the fire brigade will arrive, the insurance company will 
pay, medical attention and so forth wiU be given”.
Beck argues that high consequence risks, in combination with institutional refiexivity, have 
effectively undermined the ‘Providential State’ in several ways, including:
The by-passing of blame
The legal system of the ‘Providential State’ is often thwarted by the unexpected consequences of 
reflexively applied technology—which leaves it unable to right criminal and civil wrongs. In many 
cases, the traditional notions of cause and effect break down, and prosecutions can’t succeed 
because the guilt of individuals can’t be proven. Who is responsible for urban air pollution? Who 
could those with respiratory diseases prosecute, even if they could prove breathing it brought on 
their condition? The oil producers? Local authorities? Vehicle manufacturers? Haulage
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companies? Government? Car owners? Because blame can’t be assigned, no one takes 
responsibility, and to quote Beck again, “the hazards increase and their anonymisation is 
legitimised” (Beck 1995).
The out-growing of compensation
Even in situations where blame could be established, the negative effects of certain technologies 
are potentially so severe that in the event of ‘an event’ it would be impossible to meaningfully 
compensate the victims. If an urban western nuclear power station failed today in the spectacular 
fashion of Chernobyl, there would be hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of people with 
legitimate claims for compensation. What would become of its insurers (even if underwritten by 
government), and therefore victims? Typically, nuclear power stations operate without any or 
with inadequate insurance cover (Beck 1996).
The unmasking of expert fallibility
In the early days of the ‘Providential State’, technical experts successfully addressed most of the 
problems facing humanity: mouths were fed, homes were heated, clean water was supplied, 
livelihoods were created etc. Just as the authority of scientific knowledge became firmly 
established as a replacement for the authority of religious knowledge, the institutional and 
personal authority of scientists and engineers in many ways replaced that of religious clerics. This 
is not to say that modernity has ever been a strict technocracy—scientists are often as politically 
manipulated as any other group—but the word of science as to what, technically, was right was 
rarely questioned and usually very influential for the development of a state.
The modem world is a world of experts and expertise. We are all lay people when it comes to 
practically all expertise—we would expect a nuclear scientist to know no more (perhaps even 
less) about healthy nutrition or architecture than the rest of us. As specialisation has increased, 
the knowledge of individual experts has become increasingly narrow—leaving technological 
development with no overall direction, opening the door to institutional refiexivity. Yet as 
modernity has advanced, people have become ever more dependent on experts, as applied 
through their abstract systems.
This affects almost every aspect of our lives. As a result, the range of personal skills of the 
average late modem citizen is considerably different to her premodem counterpart, as people 
often bemoan. How many of us could now survive in the wild? Bake bread? Start a fire? Build a 
basic cabin? If you were suddenly transported back in time two hundred years, what practical 
knowledge could you pass on to the people there? The skills we have—how to use a bank’s 
ATM, how to operate a computer’s word processor, how to negotiate an intemational airport— 
are increasingly dependent upon established systems of expertise. When something goes 
wrong—the television breaks or the car won’t start—our complete vulnerability to experts is 
exposed. We may know how to interact with expertise to our advantage, but we cannot do so 
without experts. Like drug addicts and their dealers, we have made a bargain with modernity; in 
retum for the convenience of central heating, sewage treatment and electric hghting, we have
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given up autonomy over more and more aspects of our lives. Our children are bom into expert 
dependency without any say in the matter, and without any possibility of rehabilitation. No 
matter how hard you may try, how extreme your lifestyle, it is impossible to escape the modem 
addiction to expertise (Giddens 1990, ppl44).
And yet, just at the time when we are more dependent than ever on expertise, so its limitations 
are beginning to become evident. For reasons mentioned already, the unexpected consequences 
of reflexively applied technology are tearing through Providential States’ ability to control 
modem systems through expert knowledge—knowledge that was always anyway uncertain. 
Consequential political decisions continue to be taken on the advice of the ‘best available’ 
scientific knowledge—but increasingly, the usefulness of what is truly scientifically known in 
typical complex situations becomes diminishiagly small Increasingly often, the credibility of 
science is questioned when the ‘Providential State’ makes bad decisions in its name in an attempt 
to ‘protect’ us from the reality of uncertainty (Giddens 1990, ppl31).
The ‘Providential State’, then, has relatively inflexible systems that were developed from the 
needs of the society of its birth—that of the late nineteenth, early twentieth century. As 
technology and its reflexive application has transformed the lives of everyone, the ‘Providential 
State’ institutions—legal, financial, political, etc—have failed to adapt; instead, they continue to 
exert their authority as if the world were following the Enlightenment’s predicted path towards 
total expert control. And yet, in the name of casting light on ignorance, applied science exposes 
more and more aspects of our lives to exactly that.
This discussion leads ultimately to examine how our psychological ‘self adapts to the world 
around it, and in particular to the modem world of ‘manufactured’ risks. But first I will introduce 
Giddens’ analysis of the nature of the human ‘self, which, according to his Stmcturation Theory, 
is as important an influence on the ‘stmcture’ of modernity as this structure is on the ‘self.
Summaty:
• AQ threats to humanity are now, in  an ihty>ortattt sense, ^anufiu:tured* Ity modernity
• Unlike premodem societies, modem people recognise that their future is defined by 
the Ufe decisions they make, based on personal goals and risk assessments
• Daily activity is therefore undertaken in the knowledge that today’s actions can 
‘colonise the future’. Le., in some way ‘shape’ tomorrow before it arrives
• However, modemity^s ‘charge accelerating mechanisms’ increasingly thwart these 
expectations, defying institutional attempts to control tiiem
• This uncertainty is inherent to the Enlightenment Project
• Technical advances intended to help master nature, meanwhile, have been 
transformed by ‘change accelerating mechanisms’ into double-edged swords, 
threatening the future of the world
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•  Individuals have become dependent on expertise and technology to live their daily 
lives
•  However, the creation of new contexts of technological intemction with the real 
world has created a complexity that definitively defies esqpert understanding
2 . 4 . 3  T h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  ‘s e l f ’
2 . 4 . 3 . 1  In t roduc t i on
This section might come as a bit of a surprise to engineers, dealing as it does with what may 
appear to be a curious blend of psychology and philosophy; in fact, it draws eclectically fcom the 
work of Freud, Kierkegaard, Heide^er and the later Wittgenstein, to name just a famous few. 
Those familiar with sociological and psychological disciplines may also recognise the influence a 
whole host of others, perhaps most obviously Harold Garfinkel and Erving Goffman. That 
Giddens has managed to weave the work of these writers into a coherent single ‘model’ of the 
human ‘self is fascinating in itself; what comes out of this model is, to my mind at least, an 
extraordinary insight into the nature of humanity. More to the point, I believe this approach gives 
us a thorough theoretical grounding on which to base discussions about ‘what to do’ when it 
comes to the role of engineering in modem society, particularly regarding the recovery of social 
trust.
This section is in three parts. The first introduces the existentialist concept of ‘Being’, and how 
the human mind engages in a constant stm ^le to accept the reality of the object world around it. 
In the second part, I describe the day-to-day techniques human beings employ to provide relief 
from the ‘angst’ this struggle can evoke, and how these techniques can lead to greater problems if 
over-employed. In the final part, I discuss how the mind ‘takes on’ the s tru ck  to accept reality 
though the exercise of trust.
2 . 4 . 3 . 2  Ontological  secur i ty  and t he  na t u r e  of being (Giddens  1 9 9 1 ,
p p 3 5 - 6 9 )
Giddens starts his analysis of human psychology with an assumption upon which all-else sits: that 
every human being has a burning, encompassing need to attain and sustain a sense of ontoloÿcal 
security.
It is unfortunate that Giddens should choose his most baffling terminology for perhaps his most 
central concept. People’s sense of ontological security relates to the firmness of their sense of 
being-in-the-world. Take, for example, yourself. Here you are, now, sitting reading this text. 
You’re holding some paper in your hands, and if you look round you can see your immediate 
material surroundings—most likely, four walls, a door or two, assorted bits of furniture, etc. How 
sure are you that you really are where you appear to be? How confident are you that the world 
works in the way that everyone else seems to think? Couldn’t it be true that the whole world is 
just a figment of your imagination? Why do you get up in the morning? Why do you work quite so
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hard? Can you imagine your own death, that is, actually ‘being’ dead—or put another way—not 
‘Being’ at all?
These questions are called existential questions, because they probe an individual’s sense of 
being-in-the-world, of actually existing in the muck and grime of the material world as opposed 
to living through some kind of wholly spiritual experience. O f course, many people—perhaps 
even most people—will get through their lives never having considered these questions 
consciously. But, as I wiU go on to describe, they crop up implicitly through day-to-day 
interaction with the world. To take an extreme example to make the point, consider your reaction 
if you were to wimess, fcom a position of safety, a fatal road accident. Even though you don’t 
know the individual killed, and even though you are aware that thousands of people die in similar 
accidents every year, you are more than likely to feel completely shocked and 'numbed' by the 
experience. You are implicitly asking yourself the question, “what if that had been me, or 
someone I love?” Existential questions usually arrive unbeckoned and unwanted, and when they 
pose themselves in ‘uncontrolled’ circumstances they make us deeply uncomfortable.
People with a firm sense of ontological security cope better with these questions. Their sense of 
reality as living, breathing, farting mammals who have lived a life of endless years of getting up in 
the morning, getting through the day and going to bed at night, is quite solid. When asked who 
they really are, ontologically secure people generally launch into a coherent story about 
themselves—where they were bom, how they got the scar on their forehead, why they studied 
engineering, everything up to how they ended up sitting here now, reading this. This indicates a 
strong sense of identity, illustrated through being able to sustain a coherent personal narrative.
Ontologically insecure people, on the other hand, feel more uncomfortable when faced with 
existential questions. This anxiety can manifest itself as an excessive aversion to them, as in 
simply being flatly unwilling to think about them. More negatively, existential questions can 
become an overriding fixation, and in extreme cases an individual can disengage firom society 
altogether, overwhelmed by confusion over what is real and which things, if any, ‘matter’. The 
existentially insecure person may feel separated firom society, and may seek to ‘blend with the 
environment’ (Giddens 1991, pp54).
Ontological security can be supported through the development of personal authenticity. In 
Giddens’ understanding of the term (which is somewhat modified firom that of other existential 
philosophers such as Heidegger), living authentically primarily involves being ‘true to oneself 
(Giddens 1991, pp78-79). To do this, people must first understand what one’s ‘self is, a 
realisation that can only come about through exploring the moral meanings of one’s life. 
Authenticity and identity therefore go hand in hand.
Existential questions can come flooding to the fore at fateful moments. A fateful moment occurs 
when you are forced, often at times of great personal stress, to consider the nature of Being. A 
fateful moment may be precipitated by any event that breaks daily routine, for example, changing
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your job, retiring, moving house etc, or by an event that reminds you of your own finitude, such 
as becoming ill, being physically threatened, having children, and, of course, the whole range of 
exposure to human death. In complex ways that Giddens describes, the ‘self protects itself from 
experiencing a ‘fateful moment’ in many of these circumstances, so not all (perhaps even not 
many) relevant events lead to the experience of a ‘fateful moment’. On the whole though, when 
fateful moments do arise, they are deeply unsettling because of their associated existential angst.
An adult’s sense of being one of many beings in a world of objects, possessing a full sense of 
personal identity and emotional authenticity, derives from basic trust. Basic trust is developed 
very early in the life of an infant. An infant and its caretaker begin a relationship of routine 
interaction from birth (and possibly before?). For its very early Hfe, an infant does not have a 
sense of existence as such: it is its own universe, a going-on-bemg, if you like, a being-to-be. It is 
gradually ‘called into Being’, or given the ‘courage to be’ by the routine established by the 
caretaker—the infant begins to recognise and associate external attention with its absence. Space 
and time become structured so that the absence of attention is the inevitable period between 
regular periods of attention. The child develops an awareness of the caretaker as an independent 
figure through the emotional acceptance of absence—a ‘faith’ that the caretaker will retum. 
Routine, the reproduction of space and time relationships, and the sense of being ‘at home in the 
world’—ontological security—become connected. Basic trust is therefore based on the fear of 
loss—fear that the caretaker may not retum. Because of the importance of basic trust on the 
emotional development of the adult, the basic trust developed by infants in their caretakers is, in 
effect, an ‘emotional inoculation’ against existential anxieties.
Human beings have evolved a numbers of ways of dealing with Being, techniques we all employ 
interchangeably. There are two fundamental ways of doing this: firstly we can mentally bypass 
existential questions by employing reality ‘bracketing’ techniques, rooted in routine, that allow us 
spend time ‘as if  existence was certain. Secondly, we spend other time actively engaging in 
exploring the ‘reality’ of the world through trust—‘putting ourselves on the line’ on the basis of 
our faith in reality. It is important to emphasise at this point that we all regularly use both types 
of techniques. However, some people may use one type rather more than others.
Figure 2.4 illustrates how the self, shown as a helium balloon with a tendency to drift away, is tied 
to the real world by two strings: one, the anchor of routine, and the second, the more 
fundamental anchor of trust. As Milan Kundera (1985) suggested. Being can, at times, seem to 
have an unbearable lightness.
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Self
Trust
(Reality
Engaging)
Routine
(Reality-
Bracketing)
Figure 2.4: The unbearable lightness of Being 
2 . 4 . 3 . 3  ‘Real i ty b r a c k e t i n g ’ t e c h n i q u e s
Human beings create social worlds of organised space and time which structure activities that are 
performed, not just for day-to-day subsistence purposes, but also—-primarily, perhaps—to 
perpetuate our sense of ‘Being’ in an objective, real world. Organised space and time helps us to 
connect the presence of things with their absence, and so to convince us that there is a continued 
reality external to, and independent of, the ‘self. Organising the space and time of an individual 
essentially involves defining a routine of places to be at specific times through the day, e.g. up 
from bed at sunrise, eat breakfast in a common area, visit someone here, have lunch, say this 
here, do that there, etc. Giddens proposes that the existence of societies themselves should be 
seen in this light—as means of structuring space and time through practical consciousness and 
routine, supporting ontological security.
Woven into practical consciousness and routine is another existential question avoidance 
technique, the sustenance of a ‘natural attitude’ (Giddens 1990, ppl47). People subconsciously go 
to great lengths to convince each other of their willingness to ‘play along as i f  we all exist in the 
ordered, ‘framework of reality’ that our sense of ontological security demands. Many 
interpersonal actions—shaking hands, sharing anecdotes, even the exchange of glances of two 
people passing in the street—are subtle cues and hints between people who are signalling to each 
other that they intend to acknowledge and share the other’s reality, and therefore wiU not 
threaten it Giddens (1991, pp37). People who break these rules, even in minor ways, can evoke 
great anxiety in those around them; behind the façade of the ‘natural attitude’ lies the chaos of 
the possibility of an infinite variety of ways of behaving, of the dissolution of the selfs sense of 
reality. Try this for yourself: in the next conversation you have with someone, suddenly stop, 
stare them in the eye and make, with sincerity, a loud quacking noise. If their defence mechanism 
of laughter isn’t triggered, then they will probably be swept with discomfort and angst, and will
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want to get out of your presence (This actually happened to me once, incidentally—perhaps I 
was the unwilling subject of a sociologist’s experiment? Genuine or not, I can confirm I was very 
disturbed!). This feeling is parallel to witnessing the road accident; it is the feeling of staring 
involuntarily into the void of non-existence. One outcome of this is that people go to great 
lengths to convey a ‘natural attitude’ even when they are under great stress—they implicitly 
acknowledge that others expect to have their sense of ontological security preserved (Giddens 
1991, pp37).
Time spent involved in the practical consciousness of routine activities is comforting to us all— 
existential questions are kept well away. However, an over-reliance on routine for ontological 
security can cause problems when routine is interrupted, perhaps because of a fateful moment. 
Without routine, the self has to rely upon basic trust for ontological security. People with an 
underdeveloped basic trust, perhaps those with an over-attachment to routine, find such events 
greatly anxiety inducing, to an extent beyond the specific physical uncertainties inherent to the 
situation. For this reason, many people persist with routines that have long since ceased to be 
satisfying as things in themselves.
Another problem with over-dependence on routine and practical consciousness is that because it 
is a form of mental ‘autopilot’, life can become morally void. By failing to ask ourselves 
existential questions, we have no basis for establishing what is right or wrong in our own minds, 
or to generally express ‘humanity’—that is, to live authentically (Giddens 1991, pp54). When 
existential questions do finally force themselves into the fore, many people can be left with an 
overwhelming sense of personal meaninglessness.
2 . 4 . 3 . 4  Active e n g a g e m e n t  with exi s t ent i a l  q u e s t i o n s  -  i .e.  t r u s t
A habitual testing of the ‘string’ of basic trust is essential for psychological welfare and a sense of 
being alive, as opposed to living as a routine-bound automaton. Any behaviour which seeks to 
deliberately step out of daily routine, however fleetingly, tests (and perhaps serves to reinforce or 
undermine) the self’s basic trust in the realness of a coherent outside world. This includes all 
types of active thinking, spontaneous action, adventure sports, and crucially, creativity. The 
‘creative’ individual breaks out of established modes of practice, takes a ‘leap of faith’ into the 
unknown, and in doing so rests her ontological security openly on her basic trust o f the real 
world. This is an experiment, a gamble with trust, because the negative effects of consciously 
considering the real world might be to stare headlong into the void, and so be hugely 
psychologically damaging. Giddens implicitly takes all manner of creative or active engagement with reality to 
be ‘trust’ relations. Trust therefore occupies a central role in his thesis. As we have come to expect, 
his understanding of the term ‘trust’ is quite specific (Giddens 1990, pp 34):
Trust is the confidence you have that a desired outcome will happen, where that confidence is based on a 
faith in the ‘integrity’of someone else or in the ‘correctness’ of knowledge that is being applied.
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Trust, we are told, is based on faith. Therefore without faith, there can be no ‘real’ trust So the 
first concept we must understand is faith:
To have faith in someone or some knowledge system, we must consider them to be reliable. 
“Reliable to do what?” you may ask. That seems to me to be the key question. As an engineer, I 
have faith in the reliability of Newtonian physics as the basis for the design of a suspension 
bridge, for example. I have faith in the reliability, or integrity, o f my bank manager to look after 
my money. A Christian may have faith in the reliability of the Bible as the word of God. I do not 
have faith in the reliably of astrologers to predict my future.
However, trusting someone or some knowledge system involves activelyputtingyourself on the line on 
the basis of yourfaith in his, her or its reliability in the specific context of action. When I put ^500 in 
my bank, I am expressing trust in my bank manager, and am able to do that because I have 
sufficient faith in his integrity to have the confidence that he won’t steal it. When I carelessly sit 
down on a chair, I am trusting that it won’t collapse and hurt me, and am therefore expressing a 
confidence that is based on my faith in the integrity of, and/or the correctness of the knowledge 
system of, the chair’s manufacturer. These examples foUow firom, and are parallel to, the basic 
trust an infant develops through its confidence in the existence of the world, which is based on 
its faith in the reliability of its caretaker’s retum.
Trust, therefore, is focussed on situations where an individual relinquishes control or 
understanding over contingent events to someone or something else, with confidence that the 
desired outcome will prevail. Trust, by definition, presumes ignorance—if you are physically 
present while someone does something you fully understand and upon which you must later rely, 
you are not trusting them, because you are not expressing a faith m their integrity. Trust is also 
therefore a way of coping with absence in space and time—you may need to trust people or 
systems to ensure your preferred outcome occurs even though you may be physically elsewhere.
There are two important clarifications to be made here regarding Giddens’ interpretation of trust. 
Fitstiy, only those social relations that incorporate trust in trust perpetuating ystems are of 
importance to understanding modernity, he says (Giddens 1990, pp30). Giddens would not agree 
that I trust Saddam Hussein because I am willing to put on the line my confidence in his 
reliability to use biological weapons, a confidence based on my faith in his integrity when he 
threatens to use them, and upon my faith in the correctness of the knowledge behind biological 
weapons. This use of the term is not trust-perpetuating as it only refers to the reliability of 
Saddam to act in a certain way given a certain set of circumstances.
Secondly having ‘faith’ in someone’s integrity means more than just believing they will tell the 
truth. To have faith in a person, you must further have confidence that they will act 
appropriately, with good judgement, and broadly in keeping with your values about what you 
believe is ‘right’ in the situations in which you may have to trust them. I might not doubt the
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Chancellor’s integrity in preparing a budget, for example, but equally I may not have ‘faith’ in him 
as Chancellor because I may not feel the budget to be appropriate for the needs of the country^.
I hope that you trust me enough to be confident that I am not wasting your time with semantic 
trivia (assuming, of course, that you have faith in me and/or in the correctness of Giddens’ thesis 
so far).
In the next section, this theory of the nature of the human ‘self is examined in the contexts of 
premodem and modem societies to see how each general ‘system’ of social organisation serves to 
support the needs of individuals.
Summary:
•  All human beings seek a sense of ‘being at home’ in a teal, continuous and 
predictable world, a need known as ‘ontological security’. Without ontological 
security, we feel existential angst and ‘cut o ff fcom society
• Existential questions, those that query the nature of Being, are deeply challenging to 
ontological security, but pose themselves implicitly in the ‘background’ of our lives 
whenever we are reminded of our finitude
• Existential questions can be ‘put to one siidë’ Ify a cT bracketing’
techniques, institutionaHseddiroughconiforting routines.
•  These techniques, however, do not in themselves allow rnoral and personal 
development to occur
• Reality can be ‘tested’ through putting ourselves ‘on the line’ on the basis o f our faith 
in it—i.e., by engaging in trust. Through engaging in  the real world, we can ‘grow’ as 
human beings rather than acting as automatons.
• Beqple with a strorig serise o f the reality o f Being have a well-developed idea of ‘who 
they are’ a n d  can account for their lives with a coherent personalnarrative
•  At fateful moments, reality-bracketing techniques dissolve. If we do not have a well- 
developed sense of Being, our ontological security may be shattered, flooding the 
‘se lf with existential angst
•  Trust relations are the way people engage with the reality of the world
•  Trust involves ‘putting yourself on the line’ on thehasis of your faith in something or 
somebody
2 Giddens does not raise this point specifically so this is a debatable point based on my 
understanding. Without this paragraph, Giddens would seem to have us ‘perpetuating tm sf with 
people whose actions we profoundly disagree with. I’m sure David Bellamy is a terrific chap and 
I don’t doubt his scientific knowledge, but I’m not sure whether I would trust him with great 
influence in environmental matters with the government, say, because I suspect he might prove 
to be politically naïve and easily manipulated by pressure groups.
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2 . 4 . 4  The  v i c t i ms  of  m o d e r n i t y
In the following sections I discuss how reality-bracketing techniques and reality-engagement 
techniques are expressed in premodem and modem societies. The last of these combinations, 
reality-engagement techniques in modem societies, are of greatest interest to us, and so have a 
section, Trust me, Vm an expert, all to themselves.
2 . 4 . 4 . 1  P r emo d e r n  r e a l i t y - b r acke t i ng  t e c h n i q u e s  ( r out i ne)
All societies perpetuate a sense of objective space and time through the institutionalisation of 
routine. In premodem societies, this was the role of tradition. This isn’t to say that tradition 
demanded things were done just for the sake of perpetuating routine—the reflexive monitoring 
of action means that every individual, under normal circumstances, is able to ‘rationally’ account 
for their actions. In premodem societies, much routine was, however, ritualised in the name of 
religious tradition; the Catholic Church remains typical in this respect. Unchanging traditional 
practices connect space and time over vast numbers of generations, and so enhance ontological 
security through the creation of an unchanging future, stretching ahead in time Giddens (1991, 
pplOl).
Tradition and religion also tend to bracket off certain existential questions by providing non- 
negotiable answers to them on behalf of the individual. This involves the whole spectrum of 
questions, fcom “who am I?” (in the Christian religion, a soul created by God and placed 
temporarily in the material world), through “why am I here?” (earning, through my beliefs and 
actions, an etemal spiritual life), right on to “how should I behave?” (following Christ’s teachings 
and, typically, by adopting strict gender, age and class roles), etc.
2 . 4 . 4 . 2  P r emo d e r n  con t ex t s  of real i ty e n g a g e me n t
In some senses, premodem people had little need to be reminded of their corporeal reality. Often 
life was cold, hungry, and uncomfortable, and activity was of the so-called “3D” variety: dirty, 
difficult and dangerous. Knee-deep in a muddy ditch, it is hard not to tmst its genuineness, nor 
that of any of the natural hazards that dominated premodem life. A person’s basic trust in the 
continuity of the world was similarly supported by the physical omnipresence of local 
communities. Day in, day out, year after year, the same faces met, talked, celebrated and 
oppressed each other in relatively unchanging surroundings, encouraging everyone’s faith in its 
reality.
In premodem times, an active engagement with the real world was demanded of individuals by 
personal trust relationships with their ‘kin’ (Giddens 1990, pplOl-111). It was often necessary to 
tmst your own physical well-being to your faith in the reliability of your fellow clan-members to 
fight on your behalf, for example (this is the strict but long-winded way of saying you had to trust 
your kin to look out for you). Tmst in this context was constant and reliable—an individual’s kin 
were to be tmsted because of who they were (i.e. kin members), rather than to any personal 
attributes of ‘tmstworthiness’. Friendships with non-kin were usually made with a view to gaining
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a strategic advantage over a common foe, and took the form of ‘alliances’, binding contracts of 
personal honour.
Similarly, religion offered another ‘stable’ trust environment. Solid, simple, unchanging and 
unchallenged power meant that, for most of the time at least, an individual had no cause not to 
trust the Church. Because the natural (and supernatural) world could be so unpredictable and 
threatening, trust in the Church was a powerful crutch for ontological security. In the case of 
Christianity, people trusted that performing a lifetime of God’s work would result in spiritual 
salvation. As I mentioned earlier, heaven help you if you didn’t.
All these ‘reality engagement’ contexts have been severely weakened by modernity:
Kin relationships are now flexible and negotiable—Mafia-style families are very much the 
exception to the rule. Most families are scattered geographically thanks to transport systems, 
though telecommunication systems help maintain some kinship relations (though in a way 
separated in space and time, as is modernity’s wont). Families are no longer tied together by blind 
mutual obligation; their members are accepted and trusted only for so long as they prove to be 
‘worthy’ of special treatment.
Religion, as we have noted, has generally been supplanted as a credible ‘knowledge system’ in the 
late modem west. Religious leaders or representatives may personally be deemed ‘trustworthy’, 
but this is now contingent on their personal behaviour. A few paragraphs ago I suggested that the 
religious supply of answers to existential questions were ‘reality-bracketing’ techniques. This is a 
debatable position, of course, and not one that Giddens explicitly takes. However, it seems to me 
that because these answers are supplied, they do not involve the same exploration—and 
therefore trust—of reality consistent with Giddens’ approach. On the other hand, this assertion 
implies a premodem moral vacuity—perhaps instead, religion’s ethical codes should be seen as a 
morally empowering guide through the questions of existential reality? (Giddens does not explore 
religion and society to any great extent, apparently because he was considering writing a whole 
book on the subject before his attention drifted elsewhere (Cassell 1993)
As implied earlier, premodem societies also helped to support ontological security through the 
concept of fate. This denied to a greater or lesser extent of the reality of firee will; morality was 
tied to destiny and events were explained in religious terms. A person’s future was to some 
degree “settled” at birth, leaving individuals to worry about their day to day lives in the local 
community. In a related way, personal identity in premodem societies was defined at birth. From 
the hereditary class or caste system to gender roles, there was relatively little doubt when it came 
to self-identity. You were who you appeared to be, full stop. As discussed earlier, fate is now 
abandoned, as are traditionally imposed notions of identity.
Finally, as discussed previously, modem communities and locales are now thoroughly penetrated 
and transformed by technology. We habitually travel to a myriad of places, meeting endless
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numbers of new people about whom we know nothing. Our sense of ‘reality of space’ is 
constantly threatened by this change, just as our bodies can become warm, comfortable, 
unnoticed vehicles of the mind^.
If premodem arenas of reality-bracketing and trust are effectively relics, how do late modem 
citizens live in the world?
2 . 4 . 4 . 3  Modern r e a l i t y - b r acke t i ng  t e c h n i q u e s
In the late modem, post-traditional west, reality-bracketing techniques have been transformed. 
Technology now serves to define our routines (Giddens 1990, ppll2-114). From the alarm clock 
that wakes us in the morning to the microwaved mug of hot milk that helps us sleep at night, our 
every waking moment is punctuated by our engagement with abstract systems. Our routines are 
no longer dictated by tradition but by the demands of the working environment; our day (that is, 
our space and time) is structured around extremely complex co-ordinated interactions with 
technology and with each other.
This regime of space and time structuring is often much more strict and demanding than its 
premodem equivalents—and at the same time is much more open to individual influence. Within 
an individual’s working day, there will be many things they ‘have to’ do and places to be at 
specific times—but there are many more routine habits that people choose to adopt for 
themselves. As technology advances, more and more possibilities are opening up for individuals 
to define their own routines—the option of telecommuting is one such development—but still, 
most of the time, people cling to certain elements of whatever routines help anchor them to 
reality.
A received routine is much ‘safer’ than a self-defined one, because the latter assumes some form 
of creative engagement with reality in order to establish it. Also, late modem routines are more 
likely to be broken up because of the ‘institutional refiexivity’ of the world—jobs regularly change 
or become redundant, new technology changes how things are done, etc. Existential questions 
are that much closer to us through late modem routines, or rather, routine is that bit less 
effective at bracketing them out. However, reflexively applied technology has produced 
(unconsciously and inadvertently) new techniques of protecting ourselves from facing reality. 
Giddens calls this the sequestration of experience (Giddens 1991, ppl49-180).
Giddens argues that in modernity, the reflexive application of technology has helped to ‘bracket 
o ff other aspects of our world that undermine either our need for a continuous, coherent future 
or our sense of a real, shared framework of existence. These include:
3 Giddens does not make this point at all, but it seems to me to follow from his analysis. Another 
debatable issue?
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T>irth, sickness and death. There was once a time when these hugely significant events were very 
much part of, if not every day experience, then unexceptional domestic experience. More infants were 
bom, became sick and died than in late modernity; adults died much younger; more people in 
general became sick, and when they were, remained so for longer. These events occurred more 
frequently, and did so in front of, as part of the very lives of, family and kin who were thereby 
constantly reminded of the finitude of their own existence. In late modernity, by contrast, apart 
from occurring with a reduced incidence, these events usually take place in the sanitised, alien 
environment of hospitals, far removed firom the familiar and routine surroundings of home. 
Effectively, premodem psychological links that were made between home and these existential 
questions have been eroded—birth, sickness and health are associated with the alien environment 
of hospitals, leaving home to be the realm of calm continuity.
‘Mental illness’ and criminality: In premodem and early modem times people with unusual 
conceptions of reality—the mentally ‘ill’—along with others who for whatever reason refused to 
obey social rules, were fully exposed to society as a whole. In premodem times, question of ‘what 
to do with the psychologically different’ was the realm of tradition and religions interpretation— 
both, along with poverty, were seen as afflictions that just happened to people, who therefore 
required the spiritual support. In modernity, the problem is more ‘open’ to lay opinion. In early 
modernity, mentally ‘HI’ people were regarded a strange curiosity, and criminals were not so much 
‘punished’ for the sake of it, as given strict ‘treatment’ to aid their ‘weak’ moral development. In 
late modernity, by contrast, the mentally ‘iU’ and criminals are more commonly ‘locked away’, 
thereby removing the question of ‘what to do’ from the minds of ordinary people.
Late modernity, then, has found new ways of shielding us firom existential questions that serve to 
feed our need for ontological security, but at the expense of suppressing avenues of moral 
development. In many respects the modem world can seem less than ‘real’ to people whose 
actions are increasingly defined by the abstract systems that surround them.
In this section, I have argued that, compared to premodem times, modernity is in many ways a 
more confusing and unsettling age in which to live. The human need for ontological security, a 
simple longing for security and predictability in the world, is under threat firom a variety of social 
forces, leading to a widely felt, diffused sense of angst about the modem world. In consequence, 
people are more likely to s tru ck  psychologically to maintain a grasp on what it means to live a 
f ulfilling  life in the real world.
In the following section, I discuss how humanity has, in response, developed three, potentially 
powerful ways of engaging with reality and its modem uncertainty. Rather than trying to suppress 
change and unpredictability, modem people are finding ways of embracing and thriving on it. In 
many ways, modem institutions are responding to this, in others they are failing: this is the 
gauntlet thrown down to the engineering establishment, who, as we shall see, can potentially play 
a critically important role.
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Summary:
• Fremodem trust was expressed in relatively stable and straightforward contexts that 
largely no longer exist
• Premodem routines were institutionalised in fixed traditional and religious rituals; 
modem routines are more open to individual definition and focus on abstract systems
• Because o f the ‘change-accelerating mechanisms’ o f modernity, the modem world is 
often quite removed from ‘down-to-earth’ contexts of reality
• Modem societies also tend to ‘protect? people firom exposure to aspects o f real life 
that emphasise individual finitude and moral dilemmas
•  These aspects o f modernity have led to an increased sense o f personal 
m eaninglessness% m
2 . 4 . 5  T r u s t  me,  I’m an e x p e r t  ( m o d e r n  c o n t e x t s  of ‘t r u s t ’)
There are three main new ways in which trust is expressed in late modernity, and the sustenance 
of each is vital for a creative engagement with the world. These intertwining ‘avenues’ of trust are 
both shaped by and in some ways made possible by, the pervasive integration of technology into 
our daily lives. This is not to underestimate, though, the capacity for human reflexive monitoring 
of action to shape the structures that, in tum, shape the individual. The modem world is very 
much the result of human beings reflexively coming to terms with, and moulding, technology, 
rather than simply the natural consequence of technology’s introduction.
In this section, the pure relationship, trust in abstract ystems and the reflexive project of the self—the three 
main reality engagement mechanisms of modem life—are introduced in tum. At first it seems 
that only the second of these is of relevance to us as engineers, but this would be to miss the 
whole picture: like the dimensions of modernity, these three mechanisms ‘feed’ in various ways 
off each other in mutually reinforcing ways.
2 . 4 . 5 . 1  The ideal  of t he  pure  r e l a t i onsh i p  Giddens  ( 1 9 9 1 ,  p p 8 7 - 9 8 )
It is a defining characteristic of late modem societies that individuals are primarily concemed 
with developing and sustaining meaningful personal relationships with selected others. These are 
completely different to the bulk of ‘kin’ and ‘friend’ tmst contexts of premodem ages. Rather 
than being alliances defined by birth, power, marriage contract and strategic interest, modem 
relationships tend towards the ‘pure relationship’ in which these extemal factors are unimportant.
The late modem ideal of the pure relationship has several elements:
• Firstly, pure relationships are not necessarily circumstantially ‘convenient’. Although many 
people may meet through common or complementary situations or through the selected
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 2.40
#criteria of a dating agency, this is not always, or even usually, the case. As mentioned above, 
kin do not qualify automatically as people to whom we are closest (but nor, necessarily, does 
kinship disqualify anyone in this respect).
Next, pure relationships are sustained for what they offer, not for what they ‘represent’— 
relationships are abandoned if they do not continuously fulfil each party. Although certain 
inertia may prolong unsatisfying relationships (which may be related to the sustenance of 
routine, as mentioned above), unrewarding relationships are no longer guaranteed to last.
Thirdly, the pure relationship has internally defined ‘rules’ that are continuously negotiated. 
Behaviour is reflexively modified in response to perceptions of the others’ wishes—asking 
“is this OK for you?” whether implicitly or explicitly, becomes central to the organisation of 
the pure relationship. Relationships are also reflexively organised around information from a 
variety of mediated experience, such as magazines, television etc.
Fourthly, the extemal anchors of situational necessity of premodem times are replaced in 
pure relationships by mutual commitment. This involves a recognition that the stresses of 
modem Hfe can lead to short-term unsatisfying spells which, if continued over the long term, 
could be grounds for dissolving the relationship—but also recognises that long term 
happiness is dependent on seeing through short term problems.
Fifth, the pure relationship is focussed on emotional and intellectual intimacy. These 
relationships contrast with ‘get-by’ relationships people have with some others, and into 
which pure relationships can lapse without ‘work’.
Points six and seven relate dicectly to the other two ‘active engagement with reaüty’, or tmst
contexts in the late modem world, and are therefore of great significance to us as engineers:
• The sixth point is that the pure relationship depends on a mutual tmst that must be 
constantly won. Personal tmst presumes an ‘opening out’ of each person to the other, 
because this is the only way that each can become convinced that the other bears no maHce 
towards her. As we have already seen, personal tmst is ‘tmst’ only when each puts herself on the 
line on the basis of their faith in the integrity of the other. ‘Opening out’ achieves this both by 
the reassuring nature of its verbal content, and by the psychological vulnerability that it 
involves.
• To build up personal tmst, an individual must be both trusting and trustworthy. To do this, a 
person must become convinced of (i.e. develop a faith in) the reliability of the other’s 
responses (reliabiUty being, of course, a central requirement for ontological security). This 
involves getting to know the other’s tme personaHty, because, personal idiosyncrasies and 
paradoxes aside, reHabiHty of response is effectively estabHshed through the unintentional
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 2.41
cross-examination that occurs during the ‘opening out’ process. Through face-to-face, 
instant-feedback situations, a sense of faith in personal integrity can slowly be established (or 
destroyed). Personal trust is developed by regular ‘open’ communication, and the first signs 
of misunderstanding and bad feeling ‘worked at until the problem is solved’.
• Finally, point seven notes that as a pure relationship develops, a common or ‘shared history’ 
develops. This comes back to issues of personal identity and existential reality. Previously, it 
was mentioned that ontologically secure people construct a coherent ‘narrative’ of 
themselves as a continuous being—as in where they went to college, why they went there 
and how they chose what to study, what happened to them while they were there, how those 
lessons affected their decision to take a job in such and such an area, etc. Among people 
sharing something approaching the pure relationship, this narrative tends to be shared. Long 
term close friends or partners often relate stories of their shared past to others as a form of 
double-act, each throwing in lines here and there, in the knowledge that the ‘thrust’ of the 
story (if not the detail) will not be contradicted. This can be compared with more emotionally 
distant people going through a similar experience over a protracted period.
2 . 4 . 5 . 2  Trus t  in a b s t r a c t  s y s t ems
The second way of engaging actively with reality is through tmst in abstract systems.
Abstract systems demand the trust of the user. By flicking a light switch, you are putting on the 
line your faith in the integrity and technical competence of whoever wired it up, as well as in the 
‘correctness’ of the knowledge system on which electrical systems are designed. If  you had 
watched the electrician installing the switch, and you understood how a switch should be 
correctly installed, then you would not need to trust her when later using it (though, unless you 
were a technical ‘expert’, you would still need to tmst the ‘correctness’ of electrical systems 
themselves). However, the electrician’s work is usually separated in space and time from you, and 
you are probably not a professor of electro-physics, so you must tmst yourself to this system 
even though you have never met the electrician who installed it, and you don’t really understand 
how the system works.
As we know, modernity is awash with such systems, and our lives are defined by our interaction 
with them. As Giddens points out by way of example, the array of abstract systems that 
confronts us when we simply drive a car is enormous. A tiny fraction of the abstract systems of 
road transport include the systems behind the mechanical integrity of the body of the car, the 
brakes, engine, various dials and gauges, electronics, seats etc., as well as the roads we drive on, 
petrol stations we fill up at, road signs, maps, other vehicles, and even buildings, aircraft and 
other objects which could theoretically fall into our path and into which we could collide.
The failure of any one of the thousands of road transport’s abstract systems could result in our 
death. And yet we unthinkingly tmst our lives to the designers and manufacturers of each 
component, despite having no acquaintance with them firom which to establish a faith in their
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personal integrity, or having anything but the most basic understanding about the correctness of 
the knowledge upon which they were designed and built Most of the time in fact, we are hardly 
even aware of what systems we are trusting our lives to. What do you know, for example, about 
the people and knowledge behind the several tonnes of material currendy suspended a few feet 
above your head?
In the introduction to trust and ontological security above, we were told that the opposite of (or 
absence of) trust is existential angst—an emotionally dull and fearful, unfocused sense of non- 
reality and distance from the everyday world (Giddens 1990, pplOO). Without any way of 
establishing faith in human integrity or the ‘correcmess’ of knowledge with regards to particular 
abstract systems, how can it be that people trust them at all? People are forced, through 
pragmatism, to trust without a conscious commitment of faith. This form of trust is not so much 
a Teap of faith’ as a “tacit acceptance that alternatives are foreclosed” (Giddens 1990, pp90). 
Giddens argues diat a lack of genuine trust in abstract systems in the modem world is one of the 
prime causes of the sense of helplessness and meaninglessness many feel in modem society. But 
nevertheless, people do tmst abstract systems to a large degree—we are not all emotionally 
dissociated fcom the world, after aU. There are several aspects of modem society that influence 
this:
The first of these is socialisation (Giddens 1990, pp89). Almost all people are exposed to some 
scientific teaching at some point in their school lives; this teaching is almost entirely positivistic, 
i.e., is spoken of as if there were not a shred of doubt about its ‘correctness’. O f course, most 
basic science is uncontroversial amongst scientists, but concepts of uncertainty, and of profound 
scientific ignorance and controversy (for example, environmental science or toxicology) are 
usually only introduced at quite a late stage of an extended technical education. This can have two 
effects: Firstly, people are given the impression that technical systems are reliable because they 
are understood, thereby helping them to have faith in the reliability of generic abstract systems. 
Secondly, this effect can potentially be undermined by the later discovery that scientific fallibility, 
especially regarding the interpretation or application of science, is as common as any other kind. 
Perhaps more damagingly, the actual integrity of the technical community in the eyes of the 
individual can be called into question for this reason.
Secondly, lay attitudes to science and technology are ambivalent in a way that is tme of all tmst 
relations. As we have noted, tmst presumes ignorance—but ignorance provides grounds for 
scepticism. Therefore grounds for technical scepticism should be seen in the wider context of the 
prevalence grounds for scepticism generally. The popular images of the ‘mad scientist’ or cold- 
hearted ‘boffin’ should be compared with those of greedy politicians, shark-like lawyers, 
hypocritical ‘tv-evalengists’ and ‘fat-cat’ businessmen. The more ‘closed’ a system appears from 
the outside, the more sceptical outsiders are likely to be (Giddens 1990, pp89-90).
Thirdly, people have some control over the extent of the tmst investment they make with 
particular abstract systems or groups of abstract systems, which to some degree is based on their
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perceived ‘risk assessment’. Often this control is partial or token, such is the pervasive nature of 
many of these systems. Someone fearful of road transport, for example, could use the train for 
much of the time—but it is unlikely that a modem life could be lived without periodic exposure 
to road transport. Fourth, there is an element of so-called ‘weak inductive knowledge’ about lay 
interaction with abstract systems—people gain faith in the reliability of something when it works 
well over and over again. Many elderly people may have thought that they would never trust their 
lives to an aircraft, for example, only to finally be convinced by the balance of comfort, 
convenience and statistical safety (Giddens 1990, pp90).
Finally, and, according to Giddens the most important, there are possibilities for what he terms 
the transformation of intimacf with respect to abstract systems. This is of particular relevance to 
experts and abstract systems, and results from the difference between the two. Trust, as was 
previously mentioned, stems firom a mutuality of experience (in basic trust, between infant and 
caretaker). Abstract systems are particularly bad at this—they typically provide feedback to 
people in abstract ways, either through simply working or not working, or through impersonal 
‘clues’, e.g. flashing lights or the invariably irritating “Abort, Retry, Fail?” People, however, are 
potentially very good at providing feedback—problems can be discussed, shared and worked 
through. Giddens contends that when people—experts—provide feedback on behalf of an 
abstract system, and a personal trust is built up between the expert and the system’s user, then 
that personal trust can he transposed by the user into trust for the system itself The organisational situations 
where experts and lay people meet, access points, are therefore of crucial importance to abstract 
systems and their proponents (Giddens 1990, ppll4-115).
For many abstract systems, access point interaction has long been one of the primary 
mechanisms of establishing the trust of the user. The medical profession is an example of this. 
Medical doctors are famously judged by their ‘bedside manner’, important when the patient has 
no way of knowing the extent of their technical competence (to some degree a function of 
integrity), or the ‘correctness’ of the research findings of the medical industry. By being open and 
friendly, a doctor can begin to form a relationship with a patient that in some ways begins to micror 
the pure relationship, and so build, to some degree, personal trust. This trust can be transferred 
to the treatment the doctor prescribes, assuaging the specific fears or the general angst that the 
patient might feel about the whole situation. O f course, if the patient has other reasons to have 
faith in a particular doctor or the medical profession generally, then a bedside manner is just one 
more of the elements that help support trust in medical abstract systems.
Interestingly, the bedside manner has echoes of the sustenance of the ‘natural attitude’ on behalf 
of the doctor—by remaining calm, relaxed and acting as if everything were ‘business as usual’, a 
doctor hopes to support the ontological security of the patient. Imagine a patient’s reaction if a 
doctor picked up his chart and gasped in horror at what she saw.
4 Giddens uses this term in a more general sense to refer to all of the ‘new’ trust contexts of 
modernity, though it seems especially appropriate here.
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Of course, experts have always been aware of this—in fact, it is every bit a part of being an 
expert. Sociologists call the behaviour of experts in fcont of lay people their jrontstage 
performance, as opposed to the more humanly frantic, stressed, unsure backstage behaviour that 
may occur when working in private (Giddens 1990, pp86). "While engaged in frontstage 
behaviour, experts usually take care to conceal the extent of their knowledge, answering questions 
in more general terms than they would in private. There are very good reasons for this—some 
expert work or judgements require intense concentration that might be impossible under public 
gaze, for example, or reference materials might be required, envelopes needed to scribble on etc. 
The upshot of this, though, is that the impression is intentionally given that everything is under 
control, even when control might not be complete (or, to bite the bullet, when control is 
completely lost).
So there is necessarily a conflict here. On the one hand, experts have good reason to (in fact, are 
almost socially obliged to) exhibit frontstage behaviour, delivering, with honesty and integrity, 
what are essentially reassuring platitudes about a given situation. But on the other hand, as was 
discussed earlier, the situations they must comment on are often anything but understood or 
controlled, because they involve science that has been selectively applied to complex specific 
situations. How can integrity and honesty be maintained in these conditions? If a doctor were 
truly honest, open and scientific, she would say something like, “the results of a relatively small 
number of probahlj well-designed and well-conducted (though inherently inconclusive) scientific 
experiments have suggested to a number of experts that taking this drug may help you in some way 
under certain conditions, and is furthermore unlikely to otherwise harm you in ways we can 
currently detect or understand, except in those many minor ways identified in clinical trials 
conducted over a maximum period of ten years”.
A patient’s ontological security is unlikely to be enhanced by this. How much better it would be 
for all if it were enough for a doctor to say, “In my opinion, you will be better off if you take this 
drug”. Personal trust in experts at access points is therefore as important for lay people as it is for 
experts.
However, years of institutionalised, well-intentioned denials of uncertainty and over-secretive 
backstage activity have returned to haunt the experts of late modernity. Rather than hear it from 
experts, lay people have had to piece together for themselves the real picture from widely 
circulated mediated experiences and from reading between the lines of mealy-mouthed official 
spokespeople. As a result, by trying to protect the ontological security of the lay public by 
maintaining a business-as-usual, no-problem attitude, the proponents of abstract systems have 
actually done the opposite. Lay people know aU is not straightforward, and when the people they 
trust mislead them with patronising and vague assurances of control, it is aU too easy to fear the 
worst. Along with a sense of betrayal (and often anger), comes the emotional numbness of 
existential angst (Giddens 1990, pp31).
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 2.45
2 . 4 . 5 . 3  The ref lexive proj ec t  of t he  sel f
The third trust environment of late modernity is related to the construction of a self-narrative 
mentioned earlier. To re-cap, people with a strong sense of the reality of Being readily integrate 
their actions into a coherent self-narrative that describes in a logical way what experiences and 
decisions in life have formed them into the person they are. OntologicaUy insecure people, by 
contrast, have more difficulty doing this—they are, to some extent, unsure of Svho’ they are. 
Premodem people had less of a problem with this, partly because of the relative non-negotiability 
of social roles.
If modernity’s abstract systems contributed to causing these problems, then they also provide the 
means of liberation from them. In a post-traditional world, all preconceived notions of identity 
are open to question—individuals can cherry-pick aspects of traditional notions of masculinity, 
say, while at the same time shunning others, borrowing yet others from other traditional cultures 
or from ‘pop culture’, or by simply making up their own. Abstract systems are essential to this 
process in many ways, though perhaps mainly through telecommunications systems: large 
amounts of information about other ways of life are made available through various media, and 
the actions of newsworthy ‘groundbreakers’ are filtered back reflexively into the lives of 
individuals.
Oprah Winfrey-style television chat shows are a good example of one such reflexive mechanism. 
Typically a host introduces the viewer and a studio audience to people with a particular 
situation—belief, problem, dress-sense, etc—that challenges in some way widely-held standards 
of behaviour. Examples of such situations include fourteen-year-old multiple mothers, or defiant 
unemployment benefit fraudsters etc. The whole idea is to entertain by stimulating discussion 
about the moral rights and wrongs of each issue, challenging all forms of received dogma. Each 
show becomes part of the mediated experience of those who watch it—and so in some way 
encourages each viewer to consider and develop their own outlook on ethical, social and political 
issues. All forms of mediated telecommunications serve, in effect to do this.
Mediated experience is unsatisfyingly one-way, though; personal identity can more interactively 
be explored by explicit or implicit self-analysis through ‘therapy’. This usually occurs amongst 
people who share near-pure relationships, during which one’s doubts, beliefs, preferences, 
prejudices and past actions can be discussed and analysed in an environment of trust, security and 
support (and, quite often, beer). Such discussions are very important encounters, because people 
take a leap of faith to ‘open up’ their conceptions of reality to the analysis and judgement of 
others. As such, they are highly ‘reflexive’, in that personal identity is continuously forged in the 
heat of discussion.
Through seeking out and weaving novel and interesting experiences and concepts into our 
everyday understanding of the world, we are effectively exploring the reality of the outside world 
and ourselves. We are actively trusting that an objective outside world exists, and that when we
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peek around the next comer there will be something, and more importantly not-Nothing, there. 
Through this self-exploration, we develop personal authenticity.
Facing up to reality can also mean exploring those things that prevent us from achieving self- 
fulfilment. With respect to abstract systems, it can involve attempting to unhook ourselves from 
anxious, forced-trust relationships.
To actively trust an abstract system for what it is (as opposed to transferred personal trust), we 
must have a faith in those responsible for that system and a faith in the correctness of the 
knowledge on which the system depends. These two, potentially independent, areas of faith can, 
potentially, be minutely examined and investigated by those wishing to free themselves of the 
angst of forced acceptance of them. If through assisted free-access to information a lay person 
can explore these areas to a their own satisfaction, then the degree of ‘bhnd trust’ in the situation 
can be reduced, giving people the power to make their own risk assessments about the degree to 
which they want to trust themselves to the system. Again, though, this carries with it risk as well 
as personal inconvenience—diffused angst about a system can give way to out and out fear when 
more is known (Giddens 1990, ppl39).
This too has long been implicitly recognised by experts, who have sometimes gone to great 
lengths to educate people about their systems and demonstrate trustworthiness through the 
upkeep and presentation of safety protocols, sponsoring local charities etc. Unfortunately, in their 
bid to maintain ontological security through the denial of uncertainty and the perpetuation of the 
illusion of total control, experts typically underestimate the sophistication of such lay people. 
Given the wide availability of information of late modernity and the support of similar-minded 
others, a concerned lay person can readily learn as much, if not more, about specific technologies 
or specific applied contexts than individual expert managers themselves. Clumsy attempts to 
‘educate’ the lay public about the complete safety of a system will therefore be dismissed as the 
patronising and insulting propaganda that it is—further destroying any attempt to develop faith, 
both personal and systemic.
Again this ties into the interaction of experts and the lay public at access points. Access points 
can therefore be forums of great opportunity to abstract systems and their organisations, because 
they can be avenues of help in overcoming social anxieties and in developing the trust that 
everyone would benefit from. Equally, access points can be the focus of enormous conflict and 
ill-feeling if these organisations cannot demonstrate their trustworthiness, or worse, succeed in 
demonstrating their manifest untrustworthiness.
2 . 4 . 5 . 4  The mutual ly- r e infor c ing con t ex t s  of t r u s t  in l a t e  modern i t y
Although what follows stretches a little what Giddens says on the matter, I think it is helpful to 
see the new trust contexts of modernity as mutuaUy-reinfordng in a parallel way to the
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institutional dimensions of modernity introduced earlier—capitalism, industrialism^ surveillance 
and military power. This is summarised in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Mutually reinforcing contexts of trust in late modernity
Effect of
Pure
Relationships
Trust in Abstract Systems
Reflexive Project of the 
Self
Trust in Abstract Systems
Transformation of personal 
trust at access points
Personal trust mechanisms 
maintained at a distance
Exploration of other ways Reappropriation of
of communicating and expertise provides potential 
‘getting on’ for active trust
Reflexive Project of the
Development of self- 
identity, essential for 
personal tmst
Gateway to global 
experiences from which to 
draw
This is helpful because the focus of our attention in our application of this analysis will inevitably 
focus on how engineering organisations can help develop lay trust in abstract systems. Table 2.2 
makes clear that this cannot be tackled in isolation of the wider concerns of people making sense 
of late modernity. For example, experts at access points without a clear idea of their self-identity 
(gained from their own ‘pure’ relationships and ‘reflexive project^ may have problems sustaining 
the reliability of response crucial for the development of personal trust with people.
Running through the table by way of summary, then: ‘pure’ relationships form a basic model of 
the ‘opening out’ process that the transformation of personal trust to trust in abstract systems 
can in some way follow from. The pure relationship is also important to the construction of a 
coherent self-narrative and moral outlook which are required to ensure personal constancy and 
reliability in the eyes of others.
Trusting abstract systems, meanwhile, is required to maintain pure relationships over distances, 
and also to take advantage of the myriad of mediated global experiences that the self can 
creatively employ to ‘build’ a self-identity.
Finally the ‘reflexive project of the self is a means of exploring new ways of communicating and 
relating with those with whom we have ‘pure’ relationships, as well as providing the means and 
motivation to actively engage with expertise when received wisdom is unsatisfying.
Summary:
• Modem trust contexts are the key to uad[erstanding^ ^^  &^ nature o f modem society
• Only by establishing extensive trust networks can an individual achieve personal 
authenticity
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•  There are three new m odem ^t^ mechanisms, each of which serve in differentways 
to root die individual in reah^
• Individuals explore their own reality and identic through *pure* relationships widi 
others
# Individuals can, indeed are forced to, engage with reality through trust relationships 
with abstract systems.
# The forced nature o f some trust relationships with abstract systems can be the cause
•  However, personal trust can be transposed onto ‘system* trust at access points. 
Access points are therefore of critical importance to abstract systems and their 
proponents.
• Individuals can create their own sense o f identity through engaging in a ‘reflexive 
project of the se lf, in which an understanding o f oneself can be attained through an 
eigiloration of reality
•  As part of this project, people may engage directty in the detail o f particular abstract 
systems to remove or modify the nature of forced trust
•  The pure relationship, trust in abstract systems aad the reflexive project of die self 
are
2 . 5  S u m m a r y  of  r e f l e x i v e  m e c h a n i s m s
The various elements of Giddens’ Modernity Thesis interlock to form a powerful, dynamic 
structure. In a move bom of an engineer’s brutal sense of expediency. Figure 2.5 represents the 
skeleton of Giddens’ reflexive mechanisms.
In this section I will suggest how Figure 2.5 can be used as a model with which to approach and 
understand a wide range of challenges raised by the modem world. I will introduce the diagram at 
some length, as it provides a suitable opportunity to summarise many of the concepts raised so 
far and how they fit together.
In the centre of Figure 2.5, a circle represents the human self, which contains a number of 
fundamental attributes, including:
• Consciousness: discursive consciousness, practical consciousness and subconsciousness (Giddens 
1984,pp40-45).
Practical consciousness gives rise to ‘the reflexive monitoring of action’—the human 
characteristic of being alert to, and being able to rationalise, changes in one’s 
surroundings and actions; discursive consciousness is our ability to describe and give 
‘rational’ accounts of them. Practical consciousness and discursive consciousness are
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closely linked, unlike subconsciousness, through which deep psychological needs are 
expressed, usually under conditions of stress.
Pychological andphysical needs (Giddens 1990, pp92-lll)
Without ontological security, you will recall, an individual’s sense of Being can 
become muddled, causing psychological angst. Much of Giddens’ analysis focuses 
on how the ‘trust environments’ of premodem societies were often more conducive 
to perpetuating a sense of continuous reality than are late modem ones. Change was 
slow and usually evolutionary, locations were jfirmly fixed in ‘time-space’, and 
kinship, tradition and religion were intergenerationally ‘constant’. However, thanks 
to the ‘change accelerating side-reactions of modernity’, late modem societies often 
leave people anxious and confused about ‘who’ they are, and in greater need of 
novel ‘trust environments’ with which to engage with the real world.
Human beings also have other psychological and physical needs.
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Figure 2.5: Reflexive mechanisms of modernity
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a sense of identity and values—which may he more or less firm ’ depending on the de^e ofpersonal 
authenticity attained through interaction with trust environments; (Giddens 1991, pp78-79)
The continuous battle (or its avoidance) of the late modem person to construct and 
maintain 'authenticity' in the face of accelerating change is a defining aspect of 
modem Hfe.
an appreciation of relevant social rules and resources {or ‘structure’) that restrict andjor empower 
action (Craib 1993).
To act in any way, people draw from the rules and resources they have acquired 
firom any number of systems (mostly at the level of practical consciousness). In 
novel situations, we ‘try on’ various rules firom different systems to find the most 
appropriate way to act. These rules and resources—structures—are intemalised by 
people who perpetuate them by theic actions. Structures are often quite dynamic and 
reflexive, depending on which system they refer to.
The self is continuously interacting with its environment in several different ways, as shown in 
Figure 2.5. One of the major ways is through being alert to changes in some aspect of the 
extemal world, represented by the box “dynamic real world”. A change might be perceived via 
some form of mediated experience (usually via an abstract system)—looking at a thermometer or 
reading a newspaper article, say.
The self ‘responds’ to a perceived change, consciously or otherwise, which results in some form 
of consequences. All perceived changes provoke some kind of reaction—ignoring a change 
should be construed as a reaction of a kind, because refusing to actively respond to a signal 
creates its own consequences—think of the car driver who ignores the low reading on his fuel 
gauge. The exact form the response might take is, of course, related to the above attributes of the 
self.
My hesitant use of the word ‘responds’ is due to the fact that Giddens explicitly sees action as a 
continuous process—we are always doing something, usually for complex reasons, and rarely in 
the ‘knee-jerk’ fashion to a specific response that Figure 2.5 might imply. Individuals are not 
computers; we are clever, alert, forward thinking conte??iplative, conscious people.
Figure 2.5 illustrates that there are several routes by which the intended and unintended 
consequences of individuals’ actions affect the world, and often return reflexively to affect them. 
These routes are numbered one to six on the diagram;
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2 . 5 . 1 . 1  (1)  and (2)  Adapta t i on  to ch a n g e ;  c e s s a t i o n  or mi t igat ion of 
ch a n g e
It may be within our power to take some action to adapt to an extemal change or to do 
something that stops or modifies the change itself. For example, after noticing a slight lowering 
of room temperature, we might put on an extra layer of clothing (adaptation) or switch on a 
heater (mitigation).
To avoid misunderstandings I do not wish to give the impression that I consider that people just 
mitigate or adapt to changes in their surroundings in direct response to them like Pavlovian dogs, 
as I am concerned Figure 2.5 might be interpreted. There is clearly some causal relationship, but 
it is complex and dominated by the infinitely variable aspects that comprise human personality. 
On the broadest possible level though, aU human action, be it artistic, physical, strategic or 
whatever, takes place within the context of an ever-changing physical environment and 
psychological state. An individual locked in an empty box, for example, will act in response to 
change, be it developing stiff limbs, having an idea, becoming depressed, etc.
For each cycle we take through loop 1 or 2—diat is, for each intended response to a particular 
change—we must also take a trip around loop 3, whether we are aware of it or (more usually) 
not.
2 . 5 . 1 . 2  (3) Ins t i t u t i onal ly  ref lexive un i n t en d ed  c o n s e q u e n c e s  of 
act ion
Human actions have always produced the unintended consequences that loop 3 illustrates; as 
Giddens emphasises, it is largely by this mechanism that social systems stay together at all (Cassell 
1993).
In premodem times, unintended consequences were largely localised. Eating meat, for example, 
could produce the consequences of supporting local meat farming, perpetuating social norms, 
imparting food poisoning, inducing heart disease, depleting local stock, etc. In late modernity, by 
contrast, these consequences are more far-reaching because of the nature of our abstract systems: 
it is as if the consequences are hugely magnified by the institutional dimensions of modernity 
themselves, as Figure 2.5 illustrates. So eating meat in late modernity can lead to a huge array of 
unintended consequences, such as supporting South American military regimes, perpetuating the 
global economic system, contributing to global warming, pesticide pollution, forest clearing, 
community displacement, biodiversity reduction and antibiotic resistance, spreading exotic 
diseases, etc.
As illustrated in Figure 2.5, it is also conceivable that some unintended consequences might have 
no traceable significance.
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The remaining loops in Figure 2.5 illustrate the importance of the individual in perpetuating and 
modifying the social systems of modernity.
2 . 5 . 1 . 3  (4)  ‘Di rec t ’ psychologica l  reflexlvl ty
Loop 4 illustrates the direct psychological reflexive effect that someone’s responses or action may 
have on them. Sticking a hand in a fire, for example, would hopefully cause a person to sincerely 
resolve never to do so again. This experience may well also have unintended consequences that 
may or may not be best thought of as going ‘through the mill’ of modernity before arcing back. 
For example, a person might become traumatised by the burnt hand experience, or become 
generally less adventurous and outgoing in character. At various points in life, this may be 
expressed through definite choices, and so generate further unexpected consequences.
Loop 4 will be familiar to corporate managers who feel obliged for one reason or another to 
ignore the environmental and social consequences of their actions, and yet are troubled each time 
such a decision must be taken.
2 . 5 . 1 . 4  (5)  Trus t  in t he  real  world
Late modem people cope with the change and dynamism of the modem world by engaging in 
three types of ‘trust relations’ with the real world (Giddens 1990, 1991). These three 
mechanisms—the pure relationship, trust in abstract systems and the reflexive project of the 
self—are mostly unique to modernity, and are the main ways in which modem people maintain 
and develop their sense of identity and authenticity in the face of modernity’s change. They are 
therefore of great importance for the dynamic upkeep of the structures that enable and constrain 
individuals’ action.
Taken together, loops (1) to (5) encapsulate Giddens’ outlook: It is the consciousness and 
‘clevemess’ of people that makes the world what it is, represented by the centrality of the agent in 
Figure 2.5. The agent is driven by psychological and physical needs, most importantly the need 
for ontological security, the means by which a relationship with the real world is maintained. 
Although social rules and resources (associated with the systems with which the individual is 
familiar) are in the individual’s head, they are, to that indimdual, effectively objective. They enable 
and constrain action, and are die means by which the individual can ‘make a difference’ to the 
world. Rules and resources comprise the ‘stmctural’ half of Structuration Theory, and are what 
differentiates it firom a social action theory.
Giddens su^ests that individual actions have unintended consequences that should be at the 
root of sociological study. As a sociologist, he concentrates on how these unintended 
consequences happen to perpetuate social systems, such as families, organisations and nation 
states, over particular reaches of time and space. The emphasis on context is important, because 
in late modernity particularly, change infiltrates every aspect of our day-to-day lives. These 
changes inevitably affect the rules and resources that structure our days, and it is only by constant
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reference to the real outside world, through various trust relations with it, that we can 
continuously construct a sense of identity and achieve personal authenticity.
To benefit most from Giddens’ work, we as engineers must be willing to see our own actions in 
terms of both the physical and social aspects of this perspective. Physical, in that much of the 
manufactured environment is a result of the unintended consequences of our actions. Social, in 
the sense that the way we deny responsibility for the unintended consequences of our actions 
invites contempt firom those seeking to make sense of the modem world.
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3 Engineering in a Dynamic Society
3. 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
In some ways, looking at the wider problems of modernity from Giddens’ perspective is 
reassuring. Which engineer wiU not feel a sense of shadenfreude to see it spelled out that 
government and other professions appear to be in similar trouble? Each has been fundamentally 
involved with the development of the nation state in its present form, though perhaps only 
engineers can legitimately lay claim to (be blamed for?) the development of all four ‘institutional 
dimensions’ of modernity:
Modem industrial engineering, Giddens points out, is rooted in a trading system that 
considerably predates it (Giddens 1990, pp55-63). It arguably stemmed from a sudden burst of 
population growth in Britain in the 1740s, which brought heavy domestic demand for food and 
clothing that supplemented the growing need from overseas colonies (Brown 1991). As early 
engineering entrepreneurs developed labour saving devices to increase productivity, so they 
pioneered new organisational systems, such as work centralisation in factories, that helped to 
transform capitalism through the institutionalisation of labour as a commodity (Giddens 1995, 
ppll9). Capitalism gave rise to industrial engineering, in other words, but industrial engineering 
reinvented capitalism. Engineering developments in transport and communications systems 
brought about the circumstances under which regional social activities could be monitored by an 
efficient ‘surveillance’ system—this, and the industrialisation of warfare, also enabled the 
development of a co-ordinated state military monopoly. Engineering is therefore at the heart of 
modernity, and its organisations have often intertwined with the state in ways that are not always 
clear. It is unsurprising therefore that the problems of government are usually inextricably linked 
with those of engineering, and vice versa.
In late modernity, both government and engineering (in common with the other professions) 
suffer growing challenges to their traditional authority and credibility. Whereas engineering’s early 
entrepreneurs were widely seen as heroic adventurers, battling to impose human order over 
tempestuous and unforgiving nature in the name of their country, today’s equivalents are largely 
anonymous corporate figures, their ingenuity and skill met by indifference and ingratitude. But as 
we have seen, similar achievements in the medical field are equally uncelebrated, as are the 
continuing efforts of legal and financial professionals in keeping modernity together. Professional 
institutions that were premised on the principle of trust based on strict internal regulation are 
becoming less relevant in the modem world. A professional’s word or expertise rarely carries 
with it the authoritative weight necessary to reassure or inspice—as Giddens (Giddens 1990, pp2) 
argues, this lack of trust in the face of fundamental change challenges the ontological security of 
ordinary people, resulting in the widespread confusion and personal meaninglessness that typifies 
modernity.
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Why is it that people trust authority and professional expertise less than in the past? Politicians, 
doctors and engineers have not fundamentally changed what they do over the past few decades, 
nor are they lesser people. Politicians still aspire to manage the forces that affect peoples’ lives, 
freeing us to get on with those lives. They seek to protect us from each other and hazardous 
aspects of the world, to weigh up the big issues and take decisions in the best interest of the 
collective whole. Medical doctors are still making huge advances in understanding and treating 
the ailments that have dogged humanity from the beginning; geneticists are on the verge of 
cracking the very code of life itself. Engineers, meanwhile, continue to create wealth and serve 
the public by applying evermore-ingenious technology to meet and develop consumer demands. 
Most are still visionaries with idealistic goals of banishing hunger, creating more with less, and 
building on the accomplishments and pride of humanity. Late modem people live twice as long 
as their ancestors, have an abundance of personal comforts and luxuries, mostly live in free, 
democratic systems that offer endless opportunities for personal fulfilment. So what is going 
wrong?
My presentation of Giddens’ work has alluded to several elements of the problem. These I will 
systematically spell out with reference to specific problems, not just of engineering, but of the 
other professions and government—as I will go on to argue, the problems of each have the same 
root and are mutually damaging.
3 . 1 . 1  Ear ly a n d  l a t e  m o d e r n i t y
In his Modernity Thesis, Giddens (1990) describes the social mechanisms of modernity by 
contrasting them to the simpler mechanisms of pre-modemity. This is useful insofar as it helps us 
to understand the way modernity works, but to understand the problems of engineering the 
question is a little subtler. The social systems at heart of contemporary problems stem not from 
medieval times but from the beginning of industrial capitalism, i.e. the nineteenth century to mid 
twentieth century. The contrast we require is not so much between premodemity and modernity 
as between early modernity and late modernity. (In his later work, (i.e. 1994 onwards) Giddens 
refers to ‘early and late’ modernity as ‘simple and reflexive’ modernity respectively).
How does this square with Giddens’ insistence on a definite discontinuity between premodemity 
and modernity? To make the point clear, Giddens (Giddens 1990, p4) sees one, non-evolutionary 
split between premodemity and modernity—the ‘mechanisms’ of each are entirely different, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. However, in simple modernity, these mechanisms had only just begun to 
affect the world, and the two paradigms, premodem and modem, largely co-existed. Late 
modernity, by contrast, is the recent, largely post-traditional period of ‘westem’ development, in 
which the unintended consequences of modernity’s mechanisms have penetrated every comer of 
the world, profoundly affecting the lives of everyone on Earth.
There are three significant ways in which the conditions of late modernity have changed from 
those of early modernity, each relating to the penetration of reflexive systems. These key
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differences are summarised in Table 3.1 and are suggested by Giddens’ Modernity Thesis. iVfy 
overall argument will he that the current malaise in institutional authority and credihility is a result of a continued 
institutional reliance on early modem institutional tystems that, because of fundamental changes in the social 
(tynamics of late modernity illustrated in Tahle 3.1, are no longer viable.
Table 3.1 The fundamental differences between early and late modernity
Early Modernity Late Modernity
Penetration of 
the reflexive...
.. .circulation of knowledge LOW HIGH
.. .interconnection of local and global systems LOW HIGH
.. .extent of the manufactured environment LOW HIGH
To argue this case, I will outline the significance of these factors throughout the development of 
modernity. Using British history as a reference, I wül discuss the significance of the social 
penetration of these three reflexive systems through three relatively distinct periods: the early 
modem period firom The Industrial Revolution of around 1760 to, say, 1850; a second early 
modem period from around 1850 to 1960 including the rest of the Victorian years and early 
twentieth century; and the late modem period from around 1960. As wiU become clear from the 
following discussion, early modernity must be considered in two, distinct ‘phases’ because of the 
particular significance of each to the development of late modernity.
My discussion of these two periods is confined to the experience of early modem Britain. This is 
instructive because Britain’s Industrial Revolution had a defining influence on the subsequent 
development of modernity world-wide, and its early history is uncomplicated by the relatively 
minor influence of foreign industrial practices. However, by the mid-nineteenth century the 
country was no longer the unchallenged technological and economic leader it had been, and it is 
less convincing to look to Britain in isolation to account for the socio-economic changes that 
shaped the modem world. Despite this, Victorian and early twentieth century Britain is 
nevertheless a fak example of a modem state beginning to taste the social upheaval that the 
mechanisms of modernity would later powerfully deliver. A similar outline of the intemational 
social history of modernity, though doubtless important and fascinating, is unfortunately beyond 
the scope of this work.
Table 3.2 presents a sum m ary of the main points of my argument. For each of the three reflexive 
systems that ‘cause’ the social changes I wish to identify, I have listed the major historical factors 
relevant to them along with a relative ‘grading’ of the influence of each factor during the three 
time periods. In the lower part of Table 3.2 are a similar list of the ‘consequential differences’ that 
result from these reflexive systems, and that form the basis of my subsequent comments on late 
modem institutional legitimacy and tmst.
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Table 3.2: Chronological summary of the influence of reflexive systems in British society
Early Modernity Late Modernity
Industrial Revolution 
-1760 -1851
Providential State 
-1851-1960 1960 — Present
^Causal’ Differences
Circulation of Knowledge
Literacy and Education LOW MEDIUM-HIGH VERY HIGH
Communications Technologies POOR GOOD ALL-PERVASrVE
State Censorship and Monopoly of 
Information
HIGH LOWER LITTLE
Transparency 
of State and Corporate Actions
NONE LITTLE
RAPIDLY
INCREASING
Elitist Domination TOTAL HIGH REDUCING
Interconnection of local' & ‘global’
Technology and socio-economics
LOW MEDIUM-HIGH
GLOBAL
INTEGRATION
Politics
LOW-MEDIUM HIGH
GLOBAL
INTEGRATION
Manufactured Environment
Pollution LOCAL LOCAL LOCAL & GLOBAL
Technological Risk
LOCAL
LOCAL-  
LOCAL & GLOBAL
LOCAL & GLOBAL
Resource Depletion LOCAL LOCAL LOCAL & GLOBAL
‘Consequential’ Differences
Success of Command-Control
(Overcoming unintended 
consequences )
HIGH HIGH LOW
Social Values WELL DEFINED, 
ALMOST STATIC
WELL DEFINED, 
SLOW MOVING
DIVERSE, DYNAMIC
Extent of the Tublic Sphere’ 
(Control of social construction)
NARROW
Establishment & 
Radical Elite
NARROW
Establishment & 
Radical Elite
BROAD
None— 
communications media?
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Early Modernity Late Modernity
Industrial Revolution 
-1760-1851
Providential State 
-1851-1960 1960 — Present
Range of Tife Political Issues’ LOW INCREASING VERY HIGH
Institutionalised Expression of Tife 
Political Issues’
NONE FAIR LOW
Institutional legitimacy and Trust LOW GOOD-FAIR LOW
3 . 2 T h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  t h e  s o c i a l  p e n e t r a t i o n  
of  r e f l e x i v e  s y s t e m s  d u r i n g  t h e  B r i t i s h  
I n d u s t r i a l  R e v o l u t i o n  ( 1 7 6 0 - 1 8 5 0 )
3 . 2 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
Although Giddens (Giddens 1990, ppl) puts the beginning of modernity somewhat earlier, in the 
seventeenth century, it was in the 1760s that the full excitement of the developing industrial 
economy began to register (Langford, pp427). During the British Industrial Revolution, political 
and socio-economic life was characterised by tension between the established ruling aristocracy, 
the existing lower orders’ and the destabilising effect of the emergence of a powerful middle- 
class, bom of the fruits of industrial capitalism and sympathetic to elements of both groups.
On the one hand, the new middle class people generally agreed with much of the popular 
discontent regarding the absolute domination of state power by the landed class—as they accrued 
more allocative resources, middle class people desired to overcome the traditional authoritative resources 
of the aristocracy and assume more formal political power to which they felt entitled. On the 
other, they often shared the aristocratic fear that conceding to working class demands for the 
widening of political influence, particularly Chartist demands for universal male suffrage, could 
lead to the undermining of private property and the labour contract as the basis for social 
organisation and so threaten their social advantage. During the this first phase of early modernity 
there was a struggle between the established classes for the support of the new middle class, a 
struggle that the aristocracy finally won with the crushing of the Chartist movement in 1848. 
Some historians believe that this event signified the final consolidation of the capitalist state and 
was the point at which the legitimacy of private property in Britain was no longer seriously in 
doubt (Saville 1994).
3 . 2 . 2  Th e  r e f l ex i ve  c i r c u l a t i o n  of k n o w l e d g e
At the onset of modernity, the extent of reflexive knowledge circulation was low. This was true in 
several senses:
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Communication was difficult per se because of an undeveloped communications 
infrastructure, a problem common to all.
At the onset of the Industrial Revolution, the transport infrastructure in Britain was minimal. For 
most of this period, the only way messages could be transferred from one place to another was 
by road, which remained difficult despite the improvements brought by the new national 
turnpike system that reduced the journey time from London to Edinburgh from a fortnight in 
1745 to 36 hours in 1830 (Harvie 1993, pp481). Due to sheer practicality, most people could only 
communicate with their neighbours during this time, though the situation gradually began to 
change with the development of the railway network from 1830 and the institutionalisation of the 
penny post in 1840 (Morgan 1993, pp701).
For several reasons, including limited literacy and access to education, the tendency of 
the ruling elite to strictly control the availability of state ‘surveillance’ information, and 
the heavy censorship of working class newspapers, few people could gain access to 
relevant information about the forces that influenced their lives, limiting informed 
discussion of such things to a privileged minority.
Until as late as the end of the nineteenth century, there was no state system of education (Gregg 
1964, p228). What minimal private education there was for working class children was not 
subject to government standards or inspections, and was often run by people “whose only 
qualification for this employment was their unfitness for every other” (Gregg 1964, p228). As a 
result, as Gregg observes, very little of anything was learnt
Although government intelligence during the Industrial Revolution was quite limited by late 
modem standards, what there was obviously nevertheless formed the basis of state policy (and 
state power (Giddens 1995 ppl74)), and was unavailable to any but the ruling aristocracy. Not 
content with hoarding its own information, the ruling class actively sought to suppress the 
ckculation of working class ideas by several means: The laws of libel, sedition and blasphemy 
were rigorously enforced to restrict the producers of ‘unwelcome’ publications. All newspapers 
were heavily taxed, as were the advertisements they carried and the paper upon which they were 
printed, putting publications beyond the financial reach of most working class people (Gregg 
1964, pp268). Much less vigorously enforced were the laws of setdement, which requked the 
compulsory residence in the parish of birth of anyone not owning a house worth a certain, 
relatively high, sum (Langford in Morgan 1993, pp435). By seeking to suppress working class 
movement and communication, the aristocracy intended, among other things, to stop the 
ckculation of knowledge that could lead to popular discontent at the widening social inequalities.
A long history of aristocratic rule minimised the incentive to pay attention to matters of 
political importance about which most people had no influence.
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Because non-aristocratic people were long accustomed to the dominance of an exclusive and 
almost impenetrable ‘public sphere’, they were not culturally disposed to take an interest in 
important social issues other than those that directly affected them. Saville for example points out 
that (Saville 1994 p41, p53):
Throughout the eighteenth century and down to 1832 the landed aristocracy in the House of Lords, and 
their sons and relatives and gentry in the Commons, gathered to themselves all the political and 
administrative offices of government and the country in general.. .The Diplomatic Service remained an 
aristocratic preserve for the rest of the century and beyond.
Within the working classes, who had little enough opportunity to gain access to power through 
the accumulation of business capital, there was little point in a political or economic education if 
they were almost surely to be denied the opportunity to use that knowledge.
3 . 2 . 3  Th e  r e f l ex i v e  I n t e r c o n n e c t i o n  of  l ocal  a n d  g l o b a l  s o c i a l
s y s t e m s
Between 1760 and 1850, the reflexive interconnection of local and global systems was low. Since 
most things that affected people’s lives were of local origin, this was particularly significant for 
maintaining all-important ontological security.
Technological advances were mostly indigenously created and locally managed and 
financed. Social changes brought about by the introduction of new technology, though 
often sweeping and revolutionary, were unmistakably of local origin and fitted into an 
existing structure of aristocratic and middle-class domination.
The technological advances introduced during the early Industrial Revolution sought to ease 
problems that were fairly clear to aU on a local level. For example, a burgeoning population soon 
brought about food shortages that were somewhat eased by improved agricultural methods— 
both the problem and attempted solution were local and transparent. Bizarre technology was not 
suddenly imposed on working class people for reasons that were unknown to them.
Similarly, the middle-classes had begun to expand and exhibit considerable disdain for lower 
classes since at least the process of land enclosure began in the sixteenth century, when the 
tenants of gentry landlords came to dominate the agrarian world (Langford 1993, pp431). 
Giddens notes that the development of the factory had more to do with the ‘perceived need to 
discipline wage-labour by submitting workers to direct means of surveillance’ than was due to 
technical considerations (Giddens 1995, ppl24). From a working class perspective, the Industrial 
Revolution was not so revolutionary in that it simply exacerbated principles of oppression 
previously established.
In the same way poor transport and communications inhibited the reflexive circulation of 
information, so they inhibited the larger interconnection of local and global systems. The 
products of each region, for example, were destined to remain in local hands because it was
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practically difficult to transport them, and co-ordinate their distribution, in distant ones. Because 
of these limitations, most trading was conducted on a relatively small scale and few social systems 
other than the state or Church had the resources to establish much influence outside their 
immediate spheres of action. Part of the reason local and global systems were separated was the 
abundance of protective trade barriers that effectively minimised inter-regional trade to mutually 
exclusive goods and materials.
Foreign political influences on the events of 1760-1850 were of greater significance, but 
remained quite remote.
Political activities in other countries, particularly France, did have a significant effect on the daily 
lives of British people. Revolutionary France inspired much political protest, and the government 
often responded directly: for example at the height of revolutionary fervour in 1789, Pitt raised 
newspaper taxes in a bid to stifle Radical writings (G re^ 1964, pp268). The American colonies 
also had a key influence in the development of the Lancashire cotton industry, which was 
supported by the slave trade until its abolition in 1834 (Morgan 1993, pp701). However, for a 
variety of the reasons already mentioned, the influence of global political events on British 
localities was small.
Of course, the lack of interconnection of local and global systems also had implications for the 
degree of knowledge circulation. There was little incentive to consider non-local events given that 
they had a minimal impact on the lives of most people.
3 . 2 . 4  Th e  r e f l ex i ve  e x t e n t  of  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e d  e n v i r o n m e n t
Although strictly a subset of the interconnection of local and global systems, the reflexive extent 
of the physical manufactured environment is of such key importance to the late modem world 
that it deserves to be distinguished firom interpenetrating global and local social systems. I am an 
engineer, after all.
In early modernity, the impact of human activity on the manufactured environment was 
low and strictly limited to local considerations. This meant that many inherent problems 
associated with human development could be externalised or ignored.
Air pollution firom coal burning, for example, was recognised as a political problem surprisingly 
early. Coal was first prohibited from use in London in 1273 (a law that was apparently ignored), 
and in 1648, a baker is recorded as being ordered to erect a chimney “so high as to convey the 
smoake clear of the topps of the houses”. Further proposals to deal with localised air pollution in 
London were ignored in 1661 and 1819 (NSCA 1997, pp61).
Similarly, resource depletion remained a local issue—if on a larger scale—rather than a global 
issue. Of most concern to the industrial developers during this time was the diminishing amount 
of wood available for fuel and construction purposes. Resource limitations were overcome by
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technical innovations—wood was, often with some technical difficulty—replaced by coal and 
iron (Brown 1991), just as the limited availability of sour milk for textile treatment led to the 
development of chemical bleaches (Brown 1991). In 1798, T.R. Malthus’s Essay on Population first 
projected the issue of resource scarcity into the public sphere (Morgan 1994, pp699)
The health risks posed by early industrialisation were severe but ignored by industrialists and the 
state alike. As Gregg puts it (Gregg 1964, pp66):
...the condition of British towns and the public-health record remained shocking. There was probably a 
deterioration in the early nineteenth century, as fresh people crowded in on the inadequate accommodation 
provided ly existing towns. Then would go up hurriedly the back-to-back houses supplied ly  the speculative 
builders for the new factory hands. Then cellars and garrets were filled beyond capacity. Then dirt and 
vermin and disease spread rapidly. It was not until the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century that 
these conations were officially described in the pages of Government Reports, and not until 1848 that an 
A ct ofparliament assumed responsibilityfor health of the nation.
It is unlikely that at any point was the infinite capacity of the Earth to absorb pollution or to 
provide resources was ever raised as an issue, and, given the relatively tiny extent of industrial 
development by 1850, the air, land and oceans probably were effectively endless pollution sinks 
and resource sources.
3 . 2 . 5  Th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  e x t e n t  of  t h e  p e n e t r a t i o n  of
r e f l ex i ve  s y s t e m s
The relatively minimal extent of the penetration of reflexive systems had several consequences 
for Britain during this period:
The lack of knowledge circulation and extemal influence, combined with a strong 
attachment to locality, tradition and religion, meant that social values were relatively 
stable and predictable. Therefore, state and middle class elites could more readily 
forecast potential markets and public reaction to events and developments.
As new ideas and points of view were uncommon, most people, including most elites, looked to 
the Church and tradition for their moral guidance. Social values—including the definition of 
what things were considered ‘fair’ and ‘righti, ‘appropriate’ or ‘good’ were relatively static, 
homogenous, unsophisticated and predictable. The Christian values of the time served further to 
legitimise the dominance of the elite classes by encouraging subservience, loyalty and obedience 
in the face of glaring social iniquity. Referring to aristocratic abuses of power, nepotism and 
election-rigging, Saville notes that throughout the eighteenth century, the Church continued to 
enjoy a ‘privileged place within [this] framework of corruption’, and as ‘a branch of the 
aristocracy’, it colluded in much of the inequality of early industrial Britain (Saville 1994, p43).
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Because of this, and the practical and cultural difficulties of disseminating news and ideas, critics 
of the establishment were at a considerable disadvantage when it came to garnering support for 
their cause. For example, Mary WoUstonecraft’s A  Vindication of the Rights of Woman, published in 
1792, argued that femininity was a construct and demanded an end to the double-standards of 
female and male rights and opportunities—double-standards whose institutionalisation would get 
much worse in Victorian Britain before they improved. However, merely conveying this message 
to the ordinary people of early modernity proved to be an enormous task for tibose later elites 
who sympathised witia WoUstonecraft’s message. Once delivered, new ideas were often ignored 
in favour of deference to traditional practices and the teachings of the Church. The low 
circulation of knowledge and information meant that once raised, new ideas were just as quickly 
forgotten.
Because the preferences, needs and behaviour of early modem people were largely predictable, 
command-control policies of the elite stood every chance of being successful Elites could quite 
effectively develop social programmes or create contexts of social interaction in the knowledge 
that the people for whom they were designed would act in specific, anticipated ways. Most early 
modem industrial work environments, for example, involved highly prescriptive elite direction 
over the actions of ordinary workers, who, like cogwheels, could be relied upon to perform 
specific functions.
Largely as a result of unassailable dominance over information and communication, the 
state elite was readily able to ‘construct* or ‘define* what the goals of society were—and 
then to accept credit for attaining those goals. Similarly, since institutional refiexivity was 
low, the state could readily externalise and respond to unintended consequences of 
action, and then claim success for overcoming them.
The degree of knowledge and idea circulation affects the degree of state control over:
• The definition of what is to count as political;
• The definition of practices, programmes and polices that are in the ‘general interest’;
• The ‘firaming’ of history in relation to current (and future) events.
In each of these cases, the greater the circulation of knowledge, the weaker the state’s dominance
(Giddens 1995).
The daily lives of most workers during the Industrial Revolution were at most only ambivalently 
improved by their new social circumstances. Hours were long and hard, conditions dangerous— 
aU in the name of furthering the glory of the state, and, in the case of early modem Britain, the 
Empire. The grim realities of early modernity—the slums, poverty, localised pollution and 
hunger—were easily ignored as extemal changes that were not directly relevant to the state’s 
objectives.
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Engineers took advantage of this situation in early modernity—when Brunei was commissioned 
to build a bridge or tunnel linking two hitherto mutually inaccessible places, there was rarely any 
question of whether the project was, according to the values of the time, a good idea. The 
benefits were clear and simple, and defined by the state: increased trade and surveillance 
opportunities, increased labour flexibility, increased speed of potential military mobilisation, 
enhanced sense of state unity and national pride, etc.
O f course, even then, things were never quite that simple. Reflexive adaptation to contemporary 
problems had profound unintended consequences for the subsequent development of modernity. 
Some of these might now be construed to be beneficial, others not—what is certain is that they 
were often barely within active control. Even in early modernity, civil leaders had to ride the 
juggernaut to some extent—only then, the juggernaut was a comparative sleepy, village street 
parade.
For example, in the late eighteenth century, increased demand for land resources caused food 
shortages and increased the cost of wood, the major source of primary energy at the time. 
Reflexively, more food began to be imported, advances in agricultural techniques were more 
widely adopted, and more industries—boosted by the demand firom domestic and intemational 
regions—began burning more coal. Historian Richard Wilkinson has argued that flooding 
problems associated with mining were the main driving force for the development of Watt’s 
steam engine—which was later to promote trade further through its adaptation into steam trains, 
thereby relieving the canals of the major burden of freight transport. Improved transportation 
meant that local fields could be freed of the burden of food production and turned to production 
of other materials, and so on (Brown 1991).
Paradoxically, economic theory in the early days of British industrialisation was dominated by 
Adam Smith’s ‘invisible-hand’ philosophy, which insisted upon minimal state interference at 
exactly the time when, in theory at least, such interference could have been most effective. 
Perhaps partially as a result of this inattention, reflexivity often lead events in early modernity in 
ways that clearly foreshadowed what was to come. Although our institutions may often have 
developed in a logical, evolutionary way, for example, they were equally often lead by the 
reflexive consequences of their previous actions.
Another historian, W.H. Greenleaf, gives an interesting example of this (Marr, 1995, pp60). From 
1819 to 1847 in Britain, a series of statutes ultimately banned the employment of children under 
nine years old in certain factories. Since until then there had been no pressing need to register 
peoples’ births, it proved difficult to tell, as Andrew Marr puts it, “which rickety urchin was eight 
and which was nine”. Not only did this statute unexpectedly give rise to institutions to correct 
this, but in the meantime raised the problem of how existing children could be identified as being 
legally employable. This fuelled concern about who should be recognised as a medical doctor— 
and so was a major driving force behind the establishment of formal medical qualifications. This 
precedent was no doubt in fcont of the minds of those who later established formal qualifications
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for engineering when faced with the similar question of who should be permitted to authorise 
and check technical work.
The banning of young children firom factories also had another profound social consequence of 
relevance to engineering. Before industrialisation, most work—agriculture and textiles, mainly— 
was performed at home by so-called cottage industries. The roles of men and women were 
typically differentiated but labour was essentially shared; for example, men wove while women 
spun and dyed the yam, unmarried children performing the housework chores (Haralambos and 
Holbom, 1991, pp545). With the advent of factories, the whole family unit was initially 
transplanted to the new worlqplace, until, of course, the Factories Acts that prohibited children 
from working there. Sociologist Ann Oakley has argued that since the child-care role fell to 
women, women were increasingly forced into leave the factories and into domestic dependence 
on their husbands. Subsequent legal changes consolidated this situation, and the ‘tradition’ of the 
home as a woman’s ‘place’ subsequently became further entrenched in Victorian ideology 
(Oakley, 1974). Today, engineering management remains similarly diluted of valuable rules and 
resources.
‘Life political* issues, though narrow in scope, were not given legitimate expression, 
leading to considerable civil unrest
In his later work, Giddens (Giddens 1994) introduces the concept of ‘life politics’, referring to 
those areas of public affairs that touch the lives of ordinary people, as opposed to the day-to-day 
politics of Westminster or town halls that can often be somewhat abstract or distant from 
individual experience. In this first period of early modernity, because of the lack of penetration of 
reflexive systems through society, the main ‘Hfe poHtical’ issues were quite limited in scope and 
were focussed mainly on better pay and working conditions.
The consequences of the lack of legitimate expression of ‘life poHtical’ issues was constant 
agitation, despite the practical limitations raised by poor communications. Riots were common 
and in most respects tolerated—no doubt, suggests Langford, they were seen as a ‘necessary if 
regrettable safety valve’ (Langford 1993, pp433). In some towns, riots were a predictable feature 
of every election, serving as the medium of poHtical expression for the disenfiranchised. Riots 
were only forcefuHy dispersed by the state after the beginning of the French Revolution 
(Langford 1993, pp434).
It was left to educated poHtical radicals, not just to organise and fight a case for working class 
people, but to define and develop their specific demands. The state and employers heavily 
suppressed trade union activity, particularly between 1829-34. By the 1840s, a whole range of 
grievances were channelled into demands for the Charter, which to the masses meant the famous 
Six Points; universal adult manhood suffrage; annual parHaments; vote by baUot; equal electoral 
districts; aboHtion of the property quaHfication for the MPs; and the payment of MPs (Gregg 
1964 pp206). In 1848, the state and the middle classes forcefuUy destroyed the Charter
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movement, after much middle class sympathy had been shattered by the violent rhetoric of some 
Chartist sections (SaviUe 1994, pp68-79).
3 . 2 . 6  T r u s t  d u r i n g  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  Rev o l u t i o n
For Giddens, trust in existential reality plays a key role in understanding why societies stay 
together and why individuals perpetuate them over generations (Giddens 1991). Before looking 
at the role of trust during the Industrial Revolution, here is a quick re-cap of the essential points 
of Giddens’ understanding of trust:
3 . 2 . 6 . 1  Giddens  and t r u s t — a r e - cap
Giddens believes that societies exist and are perpetuated by the actions of individuals who are 
constantly in need of reassurance as to the existence of a real, objective reality (Giddens 1991). 
People alternatively engage in routine-based ‘reality-bracketing’ activities that shelter them from 
the immediate consideration of the dilemma of existence versus ‘the void’, and ‘reality-engaging’ 
or ‘trust’ activities through which they creatively ‘experiment’ with the world and develop their 
sense of identity as an authentic person in a real, objective world.
Premodem tmst was based on the predictability and reliability of specific localities, family 
relationships and traditional and religious knowledge. Non-familial interpersonal relationships 
were typically defined by traditional authority, strategic allegiances and social position, and had 
less to do with personal attributes as such. In premodem times, existential dread was invoked by 
the fear of human physical violence, the wrath of nature, religious exclusion and/or malicious 
magic (Giddens 1990, ppl02).
During modernity, by contrast, the traditional existential anchors of the past are lost. Instead, 
faith in the world must be sustained by developing:
• personal tmst in people by nurturing something approaching the ideal of the pure 
relationship in which tmst is constandy ‘eamed’—existential reality is sustained 
through the reliability of specific human personalities in the face of change;
• tmst in abstract systems—essential in late modernity in order to live from one 
minute to the next, but difficult because of the complexity and lack of reciprocity of 
most systems;
• a reflexive project of the self, in which personal identity and authenticity is 
constmcted by continuous active exploration of some aspects of the dynamic real 
world.
Existential dread remains from human physical violence particularly through industrialised war; 
additionally, modem people have reason to dread the reflexive unintended consequences of 
action and personal meaninglessness (Giddens 1990, p p l02).
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3 . 2 . 7  T r u s t  d u r i n g  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  Re v o l u t i o n
The Industrial Revolution doubdess brought with it enormous changes to the lives of millions, 
and the appalling working conditions of many of the early poor houses and factories alienating 
and disorientating in the extreme. Caught up in such change, many people must have felt the 
despair and angst of a shattered ontological security. However, the dominant focus on the local, 
the predictable, the religious and the traditional meant that for most people, psychological trust in 
the existence of a real object world was surely rooted in premodem tmst.
On the whole, people could be sure of the continuity of their locality, albeit often changed by the 
enterprise of local entrepreneurs. Families usually stayed and worked together in one place, which 
up until around 1830 was often the home rather than a factory (Brown 1991). Religion and 
tradition, as we have seen, continued to dominate people’s values and social outlook.
By contrast, the conditions for the ‘modem contexts of reality engagement’, or modem tmst, 
were undeveloped. Because of widespread traditional and religious dominance and lack of 
knowledge circulation, the required focus on the ‘self demanded by the pure relationship and 
reflexive project of the self seems largely absent.
However, when working class people did attempt to engage with the real world in a modem 
sense, much of what they could see on the political side would have induced a mixed reaction. 
Since elites could apparently keep on top of the unintended consequences of action and 
dominate the social constmction of political affairs there was every reason to believe that the 
country was safe in their hands. ‘Life political’ issues such as pay and working conditions were, 
however, not adequately channelled, and the resulting widespread civil unrest could not have 
been helpful in developing tmst.
In the more ‘modem’ factory environment, these contexts of tmst were more relevant, at least 
between the workers themselves. The personal tmst between workers in often-dangerous 
conditions had to be eamed because individuals routinely ‘put themselves on the line’ on the 
basis of their faith in another. Although, as Joyce (1980) points out, ordinary lives in this period 
were not well documented, it is inconceivable that co-workers did not discuss work-related issues 
that helped them to constmct a coherent understanding of the reality of the (quite alien) factory 
setting (Joyce 1980 pp94).
The necessity of tmst in abstract systems, however, quickly arose in this period. With reference to 
Joyce’s point above, who is to say to what degree ordinary people authentically tmsted the new 
abstract systems of early modernity? There are, however, several factors that may have affected 
this:
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Firstly, for all the consequences of limited knowledge circulation and reflexive system 
interconnection discussed above, working class people (the vast majority of the population) were 
less inclined, as has previously been discussed to doubt the abilities of the higher classes.
Second the factory unit itself, however alien, proved to be a stable microcosm based on 
personalities rather than technology. Joyce emphasises that it was the face-to-face nature of the 
interaction between worker and employer that formed the basis of the relationship between 
them. Speaking of Victorian factories, Joyce writes (Joyce 1980, pp94):
Intent on maintaining their own version of the workers’ ‘independence’ intact, yet also sensitive to the 
sensitivities of the operative, the employers were averse to trespassing on self-respect ly  ostentatious and 
demeaning patronage. The extent of the employers’ domination of the factory neighbourhood can hardly he 
exa^erated. The paternalism that gave hegemony form was most effective on a face-to-face basis, and the 
pre-bureaucratic factory of the North was its most effective vehicle. The inculcation of subordination set the 
highest premium on the elite’s influence over the totality of operative experience. Though never corrrplete, this 
capacity to delimit the horizons ofpeople’s lives meant that the factory worker ‘knew his place’: the ties of 
dependency and hierarchy were everywhere apparent, and deference seemed to be the natural exchange for 
paternalism. Thus the emphasis tpon territoy and localism was quite central to the success of paternalism.
The factory and its neighbourhood reinforced the solidarity and totality ofplace, and made the identification 
of master and operative possible.
Authentic personal trust it may not have been, but the employer-worker tie was usually on a 
personal level and to whatever degree lent coherence and humanity that could be transposed 
onto the mechanised abstract system.
Thirdly, and perhaps most profound, was the all-pervasive ethos of Enlightenment culture that 
insisted that scientific knowledge was beyond doubt and destined ultimately to lead to the rule of 
mankind as Gods on Earth. As Leo Marx puts it (Marx 1993, pp 15,21);
During the [Industrial T^volution] the mamfacturing realm had been represented in popular discourse \y 
images of the latest mechanical inventions: watermill, cotton gin, power loom, spinning jenny, locomotive 
railroad (“train of cars”), telegraph or factory. The tangible, manifestly practical character of these 
artefacts. ..represented the innovative means of arriving at a socially or politically defined goal. ..Thus the 
locomotive. ..was routinely depicted as the driving force of history. The stunning advances of Western science 
and the practical arts seemingly confirmed that epistemological faith, and with it the corresponding belief 
that henceforth the course of history necessarily would lead to enhanced human well-being.
The social preoccupation with ‘progress^ remained throughout early modernity, and was 
particularly emphasised (if somewhat redefined) by Marxian therory and, in Britain, the Fabian 
society of 1880s that served to broaden the outlook of the British left (Matthew 1993 pp569).
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The crucial importance of this point is that abstract systems and their products were the tangible 
evidence of a knowledge system that was being put forward by the ruling elite as a better basis on 
which to direct society than religion and tradition. In much of early modernity, the old certainties 
of tradition and religion were slowly being replaced by the new certainties of scientific knowledge 
and the fruits thereof. Therefore, ontological security in the future was tremendously supported 
by the knowledge that, regardless of the contemporary cost, the future was going to be much 
better.
3 . 2 . 8  T r u s t  a n d  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n s
Professional people are those that employ esoteric abstract systems on behalf of lay people and in 
the public good in a relatively autonomous and self-regulating way (Barker 1983, ppl36). Since 
before the onset of modernity, ‘professionals’ have enjoyed a high social position on the basis of 
shouldering this responsibility. However, only since the onset of modernity has esoteric technical 
knowledge been used as an all-encompassing alternative to religious and traditional dogma. 
Therefore, although the role of the professions in society has remained relatively unchanged for 
centuries, the significance of their claims and the actual extent of their abilities has hugely 
increased. By tracing the development of the authoritative claims and tangible successes of the 
professions in the context of their changing wider social significance through modernity, we 
arrive at a powerful critique of theic role in late modernity.
Through the Industrial Revolution, professional people had more in common with their 
premodem counterparts than their modem ones. That is, the skills they professed to have, the 
way they chose to conduct themselves and their efficacy in any respect were almost entirely 
unregulated and based instead upon social hierarchy. Ordinary people were quite independent of 
modem abstract systems, the exceptions perhaps being the immediate workplace and the 
financial system.
The banking professions were the earliest to warrant ‘professional’ status in the modem sense— 
after 1688, the banking and taxation system in Britain were ‘tmstworthy’ enough for private 
investors willingly to loan money to the government (which itself could therefore be considered a 
‘trustworthy’ institution in this context) (Saville 1994, pp8). The Bank of England, founded in 
1694, has since generally proved reliable to act as the comerstone of financial integrity and 
reliability.
However, throughout most of the Industrial Revolution, virtuous and/or competent medical 
practitioners, legal attomeys, teachers and engineers mbbed shoulders with their dishonest 
and/or incompetent contemporaries. Since the degree of knowledge circulation was low, this 
situation could continue unchecked—wealthier people had more access to information and so 
could seek out the most highly thought-of practitioners. Those who could just about afford the 
services of a professional person were at the mercy of the individual they happened to approach, 
with no effective means of judging personal reliability or disseminating perceived incompetence. 
Nevertheless, the professions continued to rank among the highest of the middle orders of
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society (Checkland 1964 pp294). This is no doubt due in part to the traditional deference shown 
to social ‘superiors’ that was independent of personal attributes.
3 . 2 . 9  S u m m a r y
In summary then, we can say that during the Industrial Revolution most people sustained their 
ontological security through actively trusting in the world in a ‘premodem sense’, that is through 
locality, family, tradition and religion. The factory environment helped to develop tmst as a 
dynamic experience of mutual-disclosure and something to be ‘eamed’, rather than as a given 
right—a feature that perhaps was applicable more to colleague than authority relationships. 
However, the personal nature of the relationship between employer and employee permitted the 
‘transposing’ of tmst from the person to that of the abstract system—though how often this 
actually occurred can only be guessed. And although the means for understanding the happenings 
of the public sphere were limited, the results of ‘paying attention’ were ambivalent—seemingly 
effective public guidance and direction on the one hand, denial of the expression of ‘life political’ 
issues on the other.
In the midst of this confusion and widespread ignorance, the commodification of labour was 
instituted—an outcome of the profoundest consequence for the future of the human 
development.
3 . 3  T h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  t h e  s o c i a l  p e n e t r a t i o n
of  r e f l e x i v e  s y s t e m s  d u r i n g  t h e  V i c t o r i a n  
y e a r s  a n d  e a r l y  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y  ( 1 8 5 0 -  
1 9 6 0 )
3 . 3 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the twenty-five years following the Great Exhibition in 1851, Britain and much of Europe 
experienced the arrival of the ‘second phase’ of early modernity with a hugely optimistic period in 
which new national identities were forged. Britain’s economy boomed and Empire expanded; 
industrial developments multiplied around the nation and were exchanged internationally; 
medical discoveries, dvil works and social reforms palpably improved the quality of life and 
material standard of living of the majority. Social reform continued, and as the Victorian era 
closed, Britain had endured a lengthy period of economic depression without the social turmoil 
that had accompanied earlier hard times—instead, as the many failures of Victorian enterprise 
became evermore apparent, the cultural mood became one typified by uncertainty and uneasiness 
(Gregg 1964 pp544). State paternalism expanded throughout the period including the two World 
Wars, but by the 1950s, as I will describe, reflexive systems had penetrated society to such an 
extent that the popular disenchantment with Victorian institutions was almost inevitable.
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3 . 3 . 2  T h e  r e f l ex i v e  c i r c u l a t i o n  of k n o w l e d g e
During this second phase of early modernity, the extent of reflexive knowledge circulation 
increased rapidly, in several different ways:
The communication infrastructure gradually expanded, diversified and became more 
accessible.
In 1870, just some forty years after the first introduction of the railway, 13,600 miles of track 
criss-crossed the country; travel became recreational even for the working class by the 1880s 
(G re^  1964, pp301; Matthew 1993, pp540). The telegraph was developed in the US in 1844, the 
introduction to Britain of which enabled Gladstone to address the voters of the 1868 election 
directly via their newly untaxed morning newspaper (Giddens 1995, ppl90; Matthew 1993, 
pp551). Although newspaper circulation continued to rapidly increase, it was not until well into 
the twentieth century that telephone, radio and, after 1950 television, penetrated the social fabric 
of the country.
Through out this period a gradual transformation took place in which more people could 
gain greater access to more information about external and distanciated events that 
affected their lives.
After a number of Victorian reforms, bogged down by debate over religious education. Acts in 
1876 and 1880 finally introduced compulsory school attendance for five to thirteen-year-olds. By 
the turn of the century, illiteracy had virtually been eliminated (Gregg p507-538), though 
education remained highly elitist—even after the Second World War, only 5% of people went on 
to higher education of any kind (Morgan 1993, pp645). Throughout, class structures remained an 
impediment to communication; for example, Morgan asserts that the failure of commanding 
officers to communicate effectively with the rank and file infantrymen caused fatal losses 
throughout the First World War (Morgan 1993, pp585).
Other forums for information exchange also developed and expanded during this time. Trade 
Unions or Friendly Societies were often effectively self-help groups, intended to ensure that 
specialist knowledge circulated among members (Matthew, 1993, pp538). The Institute of Civil 
Engineers was established in 1818 with this aim specifically in mind (Watson, 1982).
Information that had previously been unavailable to all but the ruling elite gradually became more 
widely known, directly triggering social reflexivity. The 1851 census, for example, caused a public 
dispute when it revealed that the population was far more secular than had been thought, 
boosting the claim of non-AngHcans for greater political representation and attention (Matthew, 
1993, pp 521). Similarly, when the social reports of 1890 and 1900 entered the growing public 
sphere, people were shocked to discover that 30% of people lived in ‘poverty’—leading directiy 
to political pressure that precipitated into the five legislative milestones of the welfare state
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between 1907 and 1911 (Matthew, 1993, pp575). ‘Gallup’ polls, imported from the late 1940s, 
massively increased the reflexive nature of social knowledge.
From the ‘incorporation* of skilled workers into the legal framework in the 1850s to the 
extension of the political franchise to 21 million people in 1918, there was a much greater 
incentive for greater numbers of people to pay attention to public affairs (Harvie, 1993, 
pp514).
Gradually over the period, broadening individual power increased the impetus to ‘tune in’ to the 
affairs of the outside world. Again, the incentive to engage with remote events was often vague 
since the political influence of individuals remained class-dependent, sex-dependent and 
logistically limited, and the information available anyway was often crudely manipulated by the 
state, particularly during wartime (Morgan, 1993, pp584).
3 . 3 . 3  T h e  r e f l ex i ve  i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n  of  local  a n d  g l o b a l  s o c i a l
s y s t e m s
From around 1850 onwards, technological and socio-economic events in Britain began to 
be dominated by foreign influences. This transformation, however, was quite sporadic 
and patchy: the interconnection of local and global began to become apparent in many 
contexts, but long remained absent in others. The result was a complex mixture of 
revolutionary change ameliorated by parochial power-bases.
Local entrepreneurs and politicians, for example, initiated much civil development, taking 
advantage of Westminster’s growing involvement with matters of Empire in the last third of the 
nineteenth century (Matthew, 1993, pp559). In Birmingham, Joseph Chamberlain built a national 
reputation by ‘gassing and watering and lighting and paving’ his city (Marr, 1995, pp61). British 
cities competed with each other to demonstrate their initiative and resourcefulness in civil 
development: Glaswegians, for example, took great pride in the fact that theirs was the first city 
in the post-Roman world to pipe water to its homes (Marr, 1995, pp61). Civil developers were 
very often ‘personalities’ that local people could pass in the street or meet in person at public 
gatherings.
However much local change might have seemed to be locally generated, it was very much 
influenced by developments elsewhere.' By the 1850s, the US, Germany, France and Russia were 
all substantial industrial powers, and most technological advances, such as those in the chemical, 
automobile and electricity industries, were imported. The social effects of the re-organisation of 
the country as an industrial economy were enormous, in many senses. For example, by 1901, 
80% of the population lived in urban areas. In 1868, 80% of food had been home-produced—by 
1901, the majority was imported (Matthew, 1993, pp529). During this time, ‘uncontrollable and 
distant forces’ governed rural communities (Matthew, 1993, pp534).
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British politics in the Victorian years and early twentieth century was highly influenced 
by global events.
As the Empire expanded, British politicians not only had to deal with matters of Empire in 
Canada, the West Indies, India, Burma, Hong Kong, Malaya, Australia and New Zealand and 
much of Africa including Egypt, the Sudan, Nigeria, Rhodesia and South Africa, as well as many 
other places, but also had a strategic role to play within the Machiavellian world of European 
politics. Events throughout the world had great significance for the day-to-day lives of ordinary 
British people, who, until well into the twentieth century, became increasingly accustomed to 
observing their futures slide away in unwanted directions. The British had little influence over the 
events that led to a World War that would kill 750,000-1,000,000 and wound 2,500,000 of them 
(Parker 1993, pp248, Matthew 1993, pp580, Morgan 1993, pp586), and to a second thirty years 
later. After the Second World War, Britain’s grand imperial role was simply swamped by the 
wider transformations of the world (Morgan 1993, pp594), and much of the twentieth century 
was subsequently spent readjusting to this fact.
3 , 3 . 4  The  r e f l ex i ve  e x t e n t  of  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e d  e n v i r o n m e n t
Throughout the period, the impact of human activity on the manufactured environment 
remained relatively low and (apparently) still limited to local considerations. 
Consequently, many inherent problems associated with human development continued 
to be externalised or ignored.
During the two periods of early modernity identified here, the population of the UK rose from 8 
million to 51 million (Gregg, 1964, pp592) and energy use per person increased by a similar 
factor (Jackson, 1996, pp27). Although this pattern was matched in most Western countries, and 
despite the rapid industrialisation of many areas over the planet, no connection was made 
between local and global pollution.
How much this was due to the lack of the existence of such a connection, and how much due to 
both the facts that no-one was looking for one and that instruments may not have been 
technically capable of detecting one, is unknown. The result, however, was that pollution 
remained a local political issue, albeit on an ever-increasing scale—the squalor and environmental 
decay of areas like Jarrow and Merthyr Tydfil was well documented in the 1920s, for example.
The end of the Second World War gave birth to the atomic bomb, perhaps the first recognised 
universally-relevant manufactured hazard of the rapidly globalising world. Throughout the 
closing years of early modernity, global politics readjusted to this powerful new reality.
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3 . 3 . 5  The  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e  p e n e t r a t i o n  of
r e f l ex i ve  s y s t e m s
The gradually increasing extent of the penetration of reflexive systems in the lives of the people 
had hugely complex and often contradictory consequences for Britain during this period. Some 
of the major themes include:
Despite flourishing information circulation, a limited and politically skewed picture of 
the outside world dominated the expanding public sphere, and social values remained 
relatively stable and predictable throughout the Victorian years and into the twentieth 
century. Therefore, state and middle class elites could still effectively forecast potential 
markets and public reaction to events and developments.
Religious and traditional values, though rapidly declining in the twentieth century, remained 
dominant in the Victorian era. As (Gregg, 1964 p541) puts it:
...the Victorians knew tittle of inner or outward conflict; they had neither spiritual nor worldly doubt as to 
the rightness of things: ‘God’s in his heaven—A ll’s right with the worldl’ was a statement of fact.
As a result, even by the 1930s, Morgan asserts that the social and political hierarchy in Britain had 
changed very little—“the prestige of Parliament, of the law courts, of a highly stratified 
educational system.. .all remained as high as ever” (Morgan, 1993, pp614).
The gap between elite ideas and the influence of tradition on the masses was often great. 
Matthew notes, for example, that resistance to socialist ideas made the working class the despair 
of some middle class intellectuals (Matthew, 1993, pp539). The reliability of people to act in 
predictable ways, and the relative independence of many national abstract systems meant that 
command-control types of management were often quite effective at achieving desired results 
without the effort being overwhelmed by unintended consequences. In both World Wars, for 
example, the state became a ‘juggemaut of centralisation’, which, following the Second World 
War particularly, profoundly influenced peacetime policy (Morgan, 1993, pp627). The Beveridge 
Report of 1942, for example, appealed to both moods of social inclusion and state centralisation 
when it proposed ‘cradle to grave’ provision of state protection including unemployment 
insurance, maternity benefits, health insurance, old age pensions and death benefits (Morgan, 
1993, pp628).
Although other viewpoints were increasingly being heard, the state was still able to 
dominate the social construction of political policy, thereby maintaining a picture of 
control over unintended consequences of action, accepting credit for the positive and 
externalising the negative.
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The wide unease felt on the eve of the First World War, for example, was effectively dispelled by 
Lloyd George’s declaration that British involvement was justified as a crusade on behalf of the 
‘little-five-foot-five nations’ of Europe—a direct and highly successful appeal to the predictable 
Christian morality of the majority (Morgan, 1993, pp584). This ‘firaming’ of the war proved to last 
throughout despite the appalling losses and conditions of battie.
By contrast, the Second World War was constructed as a social issue by a complex mix of 
popular anti-German feeling, anti-govemment feeling following the handling of the depression 
and the public dispute between the ‘men of appeasement and Churchill’s supporters—all of 
which lead to a resigned public acceptance of war that led, rather than followed, the official state 
position (Morgan, 1993, pp622). However, Churchill’s ability to successfully manipulate the 
humiliation of Dunkirk into a triumph of British ingenuity and bravery leaves little doubt as to 
the unchallenged dominance of the government to define issues.
Because of the dominance of external technical, socio-economic and political factors on Britain 
during this period, the country became increasingly reactive rather than proactive in its dealings 
on the world stage. At the beginning of the twentieth century, government focus gradually 
changed from aUowing domestic issues to look after themselves while taking an active role 
internationally, to the reverse situation.
‘Life political* issues remained quite narrow in scope, and were more adequately 
channelled through legitimised political systems.
Following the riots and unease of the Chartist years, the state and middle classes used the 
prosperous quiet of the boom years of 1850-1870 to begin the gradual process of ‘incorporation’ 
into ‘political society’. At first, this was seen as a strategic move designed to ward off future 
trouble. Harvie quotes the following fcom a young middle class manufacturer in 1848 (Harvie 
1993, pp503):
Unless some concession he made to these masses, and unless all classes strive earnestly to keep them fed, 
first or last there will he a convulsion; hut I  believe the bestpolitical method of preventing it is by the middle 
class sympathising with the operatives, and giving themselves power to oppose their unjust claims by helping 
in those which are reasonable.
Soon, however. Chartist demands no longer seemed so threatening, and articulate members of 
the working class gained expression through the Liberal Party during this boom (Matthew 1993, 
pp525). Many social reforms continued, and the ‘life politics’ of most people gradually (though 
unequally) became adequately expressed through the extension of representative democratic 
procedures—people had enough exposure to circulating knowledge to understand the issues 
underlying the elections, and representatives had a relatively narrow and homogenous range of 
voter issues to deal with. For all the information about the world that people were newly exposed
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to, the electorate was overwhelmingly concerned with working conditions, pay and benefits. As 
previously mentioned, the riots commonly associated with past depressions were absent from the 
declining British economy of the late 1800s.
3 . 3 . 6  T r u s t  d u r i n g  t h e  Vi c t o r i a n  y e a r s  a n d  e a r l y  t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y
The conditions underlying ‘premodem’ trust environments during this period, then, dissipated 
sporadically throughout. The rapid growth of urban areas undermined traditional family 
connections and ties with the land itself. Religious beliefs remained powerful, though the 
established Churches themselves actually lost power—‘the Church did not so much lose the big 
towns; it never had them’, as one clergyman put it (Matthew 1993, pp541).
Perhaps curiously, many icons of traditional life permeated a culture that found itself increasingly 
distant from them in reality. Romanticised country landscapes regularly appeared in Victorian 
works of art. The Monarchy, and later, the BBC, were cherished as reassuring national symbols of 
heritage, continuity and certainty (Morgan 1993, pp630). From the 1870s, working class men 
flocked in massive numbers to watch football matches, which, according to Matthew, were 
organised over ‘seasons’ that gave the urban working man something of the wider perspective of 
time familiar to his agricultural counterpart (Matthew 1993, pp539). Other aspects of city life— 
middle class gardens, for example—expressed nostalgia for the lost ontological security of former 
rural lives. As the discussion on local civic development suggested, the modem world was often 
introduced to local environments via existing local power bases, familiarity and personality 
cushioning the impact of novelty and uncertainty.
Modem ‘trust environments’, meanwhile, began to acquire more significance as the period 
progressed.
As society became more urbanised, new personal ties bound individuals together. Although 
traditional reverence for class largely remained, people (of similar backgrounds at least) 
increasingly trusted each other in the ‘modem’ sense—through dialogue, mutual disclosure and 
‘opening out’. Friendly societies, clubs and associations grew along with the circulation of 
knowledge and ideas via the new mass media. As working people became conscious of their role 
in the wider world, the extension of political enfranchisement was a suitable way of expressing 
‘life political’ issues.
While aid and protection was one thing, politicians on aU sides remained fearful of further 
empowering the general public, perhaps with due cause from their perspective. Education was 
often perfunctory, and, with limited circulation of knowledge, most people were ill-informed and 
ignorant of the wider world. In 1904, the patronising views of Leonard Hobhouse on ‘man-in- 
the-street’ were not entirely groundless (G re^ 1964, p 545).
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[The man-in-the-street] is now the typical representative of public opinion, and the man-in-the-street means 
the man who is hurrying from his home to his office, or to a place of amusement. ..the man who has not 
time to think and will not take the trouble to do so i f  he has the time. He is the faithful reflex of the 
popular sheet and the shouting newsboy. ..To this new public opinion of the streets and the tramcars it is 
useless to appeal in terms of reason; it has not time to put two ends of an arÿiment together; it has hardy 
the patience to receive a single idea, much less to hold two in the mind and compare them.
Nor did many working class people particularly want to be empowered beyond political 
enfranchisement: working class supporters warmed to the approach of Lord Randolph Churchill, 
who in 1880 appealed for the ruling elite to ‘trust in the people’. Checkland comments that 
Churchill (Checkland 1964, pp379-380):
did not mean trust a newly educated, close reasoning, and highly responsible people to consider the issues 
confronting the nation; he meant rather that the old confidence in the aristocracy and the commonality 
should be revived.
Even the radical liberals, while calling on the workers to improve themselves, accepted the 
middle-class leadership of society (Checkland 1964, pp380).
3 . 3 . 7  T r u s t  in t h e  p r o f e s s i o n s
As knowledge circulation slowly increased at the beginning of the Victorian years, a trend for the 
formation of learned societies began to gather pace. The Law Society was founded at the turn of 
the nineteenth century and gained a Royal Charter in 1845 (Law Society 1998). Partly inspired by 
similar institutions on the continent of Europe such as the Tonts et Chaussées in Paris, pardy as a 
result of a series of boiler explosions, partly to encourage the pooling of experience and partly, no 
doubt, as an attempt to climb the social ladder, the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) was 
founded in 1818 and was awarded its Charter a decade later (Chrimes 1996). The British Medical 
Association, founded as the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association in 1832, lobbied for a 
regulatory body, the General Medical Council, that came about as late as 1858 (British Medical 
Association, 1998). Many other similar associations were established around this time. It was well 
into the 1850s and beyond that these many of these associations achieved the extended 
membership and organisational maturity that we associate them with today (Chrimes 1996).
A key feature of these associations was that fuU membership was often only offered to practismg 
members of a given profession, thereby distancing aristocratic ‘hobbyists’ (Chrimes 1996). They 
were self-regulating, and from the beginning conscious of the importance of an ethical code of 
conduct. Partly in response to the failure of engineering institutions to keep up with more 
academically grounded foreign—particularly German—competition, the ICE first 
institutionalised entrance qualifications between 1889 and 1914 (Chrimes 1996).
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 3.24
In short, in the second phase of early modernity, professional people readjusted themselves to 
the new realities of the Victorian age. They recognised that a privileged heritage was unlikely to 
maintain public faith in the application of burgeoning abstract systems, and so marginalised the 
part-time men of leisure. They recognised the ethical responsibilities that their autonomous use 
of esoteric knowledge on behalf of others gave them and strove to work fcom a strict set of 
guiding moral principles, barring the dishonest and ensuring technical competence. They 
encouraged and facilitated empicical and academic research, shifting their claim to social standing 
from traditional hierarchy to the tangible rewards of Enlightenment progress. Capturing the 
Positivist mood of many at the time (Checkland 1964, pp380) (initially stemming perhaps from 
Hegel and Marx rather than Darwin), scientists and the professions were the vanguard of a 
rational, inevitable, evolutionary journey along the road of history.
As if to underline this point, it was during this period that some of the greatest and most socially 
accessible successes of applied abstract systems were made. In 1849, William Budd linked 
typhoid fever to water polluted by sewage, and in throughout the 1850s, the ‘sanitary question’ 
was wrestled with by professionals and civic leaders in Britain (Kelly 1997, pp5). In the 1860s, 
Louis Pasteur experimented with microbes and vaccines. In the 1890s, drinking water supplies 
were treated with chlorine, and medical and engineering societies battled over who should decide 
issues of public health (Kelly 1997, pp5). The march of professional science was solid and 
impressive.
With this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the state became increasingly paternalistic regarding 
public welfare. Although the Victorians valued self-help and individual initiative, state social 
reforms continued to focus on reforms that would improve the lives of ordinary people, and, by 
extension, broaden the roles of professionals in society: The Factory Acts of 1848 and 1864; the 
Education Act of 1870; The Public Health Act of 1875; (Checkland 1964, pp379), to name just a 
few, contributed to the institutionalisation of the professional as the trustworthy helper of the 
ordinary person, guardian of the simple and innocent from the complex and malevolent. Later, 
particularly after the Second World War, the ‘Providential State’ paradigm hugely extended this 
situation.
In this context, then, the jealous guarding of the knowledge underlying abstract systems by 
professional groups was entirely in keeping with the social values of the rime. By keeping private 
theic experience, professionals could discourage the unqualified from operating in their fields and 
remain on the vanguard of social ‘progress’. But in doing so, the professions were also able to 
‘constmct’ their own success and reflexively redefine theic purpose on the strengths of these 
successes. Failures were easily covered or ignored by groups that could control the flow of 
information outwards. The unintended consequences of ‘progress’ could be therefore effectively 
externalised in this way, and command-control ventures declared an unambiguous ‘success’. The 
environmental and social misery of many working class areas was not constructed as a 
fundamental part of industrial capitalism by anyone other than the marginalised Marxists—rather.
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it was a quite separate problem to be dealt with by the state, for which credit could be claimed for 
the least success.
By keeping a tight control on the circulation of information, some professionals could also 
ensure that the major route of lay exposure to their fields was via face-to-face interaction at so- 
called ‘access points’. The nature of the medical profession meant that the lay person’s main 
experience of medical matters was via a local doctor, often a well-known and highly respected 
figure for traditional reasons. The complex mixture of ‘premodem’ and ‘modem’ trust contexts 
probably did not hinder the transposition of personal tmst in the doctor himself into tmst for the 
abstract systems of the medical sector as a whole. Perhaps a similar transposition took place in 
the case of personal tmst in popular local civic leaders such as Joseph Chamberlain onto the 
engineering abstract systems that they championed?
Trust in Victorian and eariy twentieth century professionals, then, was influenced by a number of 
contemporary social conditions, explored earlier, including:
• a remaining traditional deference for authority;
• the increasingly important (but still relatively minor) role of abstract systems in 
everyday life;
• the relatively simple and accessible nature of abstract systems—bridges, 
development of vaccines etc;
• the often local focus of abstract system application and interaction;
• the positivist sense of Enlightenment ‘progress’
• the exclusivity of technical information and issue constmction;
• an emphasis on face-to-face ‘access point’ interaction with the lay public.
3 . 3 . 8  S u m m a r y
For most of the Victorian era, premodem and modem contexts of tmst intertwined to produce a 
situation which, despite economic problems firom 1870, seems to have been relatively stable. 
Pauline G re ^  states that (G re^  1964, p 540):
Security, certainty, a unity shtzped ly authority, continued to characterise the life of Britain until almost the 
end of the nineteenth century. It ran through all rvalks of life. Socially there was a hierarchy from the 
Queen downward. In private life the family constituted a similar unity, graded from father downward. In 
religion the Victorian recognised the authority of God the King and Father, and, whether he was High 
Church, Low Church or Chapel, continued to regard Sundry as a day devoted to reUgious observation on 
which churchgoing or chapelgoing was both a social obligation and a spiritual necessity. In political and 
economic cffairs the expected parallelfrom the State downward was becoming increasingly apt as the State 
assumed more functions. ..
It was during this period that professional institutions transformed themselves into ‘tmstworthy’ 
organisations in the modem sense, based on the values and logistical possibilities of the time. As
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a result, their expanding social role in the more paternal policies of government enhanced a 
prestige that grew with each new spectacular construction or medical breakthrough.
However, after the death of Queen Victoria in 1901, the public mood became more uncertain. As 
modernity developed, the social consequences of increased knowledge circulation and interaction 
of local and global reflexive systems slowly eroded the more traditional aspects of existential 
trust. As the following quote from Pauline Gregg suggests, late modernity, still two World Wars 
away, was nevertheless on the horizon (G re^  1964, pp540-545):
Butperhaps nothing contributed to the Jailing optimism of the turn of the century more than the feeling that 
even where they had been most conscious of virtue the Victorians had not conspicuously succeeded. Neither 
the Empire nor democracy was proving quite such a good thing as it had seemed.. .Spiritually, men were at 
a loss. Churchgoing had ceased to be an accepted duty or even a social obligation. But the breakdown of the 
concept of religion as the Victorians had understood it had been followed ly the erection of no commonly 
accepted spiritual value.
Nevertheless, the modem deal was struck: expertise sequestered lay experience of key elements 
of existence, such as birth, death, social development, etc—an in retum, lay people could enjoy 
the benefits brought by the widespread application of abstract systems. The patemal social role 
of professionals in the face of the development of abstract systems was cast.
3 . 4  T h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  t h e  s o c i a l  p e n e t r a t i o n
of  r e f l e x i v e  s y s t e m s  in l a t e  m o d e r n i t y  
(1 9 6 0 - P r e s e n t )
3 . 4 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
From around the 1960s onwards, the late modem world has become overwhelmed by abstract 
systems, many of which facilitate time-space distanciation, disembedding of social relations and 
institutional reflexivity. The main causes of time-space distanciation—financial systems and 
transport/communications systems—have multiplied in scope and depth immeasurably. The 
whole planet is an interconnected system operating around a common time-base and common 
framework of history. Remaining pockets of premodem societies are continuously buffeted by 
the fall-out of modem action all around them. Local environments are bombarded by global 
systems—any comer shop is an eclectic gathering of global artefacts of which any Victorian 
collector would be proud; similarly, the most local of symbols, events or practices can be 
duplicated and dispersed all over the world. The resulting institutional reflexivity occurs on a 
massive scale—actions produce huge numbers of side-effects that ripple chaotically through the 
global system, changes that, by altering the way individuals act in a habitual way, tid ie r yet more 
social change. The late modem world is an endlessly dynamic, fascinating, unstable place to live.
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Post-Empire, Britain is just one of many liberal-democratic states in an ever-expanding world 
community of ‘developed’ nations seemingly chronically engaged with institutional introspection 
in the face of widespread public disenchantment, cynicism and apathy. From the US black civil 
rights movement in the 1950s onwards, a large number of extended social protests challenged the 
legitimacy of conventional political processes and social structures. The women’s movement, 
Vietnam protests, Paris student riots, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, environmental 
movement and many other public campaigns reflect a fundamental dissatisfaction with the role 
of the individual in modem political representation. This has arisen as a natural development of 
the Enlightenment principles that underpin modernity:
3 . 4 . 2  T h e  r e f l ex i v e  c i r c u l a t i o n  of k n o w l e d g e
During late modernity, the extent of reflexive knowledge circulation increased rapidly, in a 
number of senses:
The communications infrastructure is almost fully globally integrated.
Giddens (1995, ppl89) illustrates the difference between the speed of communications in early 
and late modernity by noting that while news of the death of George Washington in Alexandria 
in 1799 was first published seven days later in New York, one account that estimates that in 
1963, 70% of the US population knew of President Kennedy’s death within half an hour of the 
event.
Access to a vast amount of information is readily available to practically every literate 
person in the western world, and a large fraction of those in the developing world. 
Information about the world is generated and exchanged on a massive scale.
With a highly educated population evermore engaged in office-based employment, an increasing 
fraction of people have habitual access to information systems. Internet connections are available 
at most public libraries with just a small charge to the user. International transport is well within 
the grasp of all but the very poorest, and international holidays so common that new ‘cultural 
colonies’ are developing in various places around the world.
Particularly with the ascendance of neo-classical economics from the late 1970s, information has 
been prized as the main ingredient of efficient capitalism. As state restrictions on the 
development of free trade have been dismantled by a number of international agreements and by 
national legislation, the. market’s thirst for information has doubtless fuelled many of the 
improvements in information technology.
As more and more information is demanded of companies, the same is true of government 
departments, charities and all those entrusted with the funds of others. Government agencies 
publish copious amounts of information that in former times would have been hoarded by the 
state and stricdy controlled.
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Because of the complexity of everyday life, it is increasingly important for individuals to 
‘pay attention* to some aspect of the outside world in order to maintain a grip on its 
reality. Often, this includes exploring previously unavailable technical information.
As premodem modes of reality engagement have lost their significance in the late modem world, 
so modem forms have gained in importance. Of these, the reflexive project of the self demands 
that individuals ‘keep in touch’ with some aspects of the world to prevent the complex and 
dynamic nature of modernity firom completely becoming incoherent. As a result, there is a 
powerful incentive to ‘tune in’ and make use of information systems and self-help groups—a 
force countered by the same complexity and dynamism that encourages us to ‘tune out* and seek 
out the ‘safe’ reality bracketing techniques of routine. Individuals in late modernity therefore 
engage in a constant stru^le to use circulating knowledge despite the ease and attractiveness of 
ignoring it.
The extent and accessibility of communications systems is such that it is relatively easy for any 
individual to become an ‘expert’ in practically any field they wish. A motivated lay person 
concemed about, say, potential emissions firom a proposed local waste incinerator, will not 
remain ignorant of the social and technical issues for long. Through a large number of national 
and international associations or self-help groups, extensive technical introductions, points of 
view, anecdotes, etc are available in abundance. The Internet is becoming a powerful medium for 
such information exchange. Although many Internet sites contain little more than copious 
quantities of anxiety-inspired vitriolic rhetoric, there are others that facilitate the serious exchange 
of technical information and considered philosophical debate. In the case of dioxins as with 
many others, so much credible technical information is fireely available on the Internet that it is 
quite conceivable that large numbers of lay people are better informed than many of the 
conventionally-trained experts responsible for decision-making. In the medical field, as Giddens 
describes (Giddens 1991, ppl40-141), unsatisfied patients can quickly acquire considerable 
expertise about their specific complaint though contacts with feUow sufferers, alternative 
practitioners etc. After lengthy, self-directed ‘re-skilling’, individuals are in a position to balance 
these conflicting sources of information to decide what to do for themselves—a decision that will 
be based on the degree of trust and sense of credibility they detect in each source.
In late modernity, then, the ‘public sphere’—that is, those people actively engaged in issues of 
political debate—has expanded to include the vast majority. That is not to say that most people 
are conscious of or interested in all aspects of conventional politics. However, most individuals, 
either through their working environment, domestic situation, moral compulsion etc, take an 
interest in some aspect of political life. This perhaps controversial point is elaborated under the 
discussion of ‘life politics’ below.
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3 . 4 . 3  Th e  r e f l ex i ve  i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n  of l oca l  a n d  g l o b a l  s o c i a l
s y s t e m s
In late modernity, local and global technological, socio-economic and political systems 
profoundly interpenetrate each other.
This is true of almost all abstract systems in modernity. For example, practically all manufactured 
items are subject to international competition, from the most complex chemical plants to the 
simplest domestic produce. Local farmers, say, must compete with food produced under a variety 
of conditions, regulated under international law, around the world. Food must pass safety 
standards strongly influenced by the World Health Organisation in Geneva, and adapt to 
specifications agreed under the World Trade Organisation. Markets are subject to fluctuations in 
global culinary fashions, international economies, the conclusions of ongoing dietary research, 
international health scares, animal rights campaigns etc. At the same time, local products can 
themselves be profoundly influential on a global scale.
National economies themselves are tightly interwoven, a collapse in one region tri^ering knock- 
on effects around the globe. Often these links are chaotic, the causes of economic failure 
impossible to fully analyse, and the consequences equally impossible to predict. For example, the 
1998 collapse of the Russian Rouble, triggered by a controversial mix of factors including 
corporate corruption, administrative incompetence, and a similar Asian currency collapse, caused 
analysts to contemplate the possibility of a full-scale global recession (Economist 1998). Similarly, 
local and national politics, culture, art, sport, etc. are evermore dominated by external, globalised 
developments.
3 . 4 . 4  T h e  r e f l ex i ve  e x t e n t  of  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e d  e n v i r o n m e n t
In late modernity, the manufactured environment has expanded to such a degree that the 
ecological finitude of the planet has massive reflexive repercussions on the lives of 
everyone.
The traditional ‘dilute and disperse’ philosophy for environmental pollution had been effective 
throughout early modernity—environmental problems were identified as such only when dilute 
and disperse failed to be efficient enough, producing smoky cities or murky rivers. Solutions, 
unsurprisingly, centred on how better to disperse the pollutant into the infinite environment 
(Jackson 1996). Rachael Carson’s Silent Spring brought to public attention the link between 
industrial activity and environmental damage on anything but the most localised scale (Carson 
1962). By today’s standards, the actual significance of industrialisation on the environment in 
1962 was tiny—the scale of activity has increased enormously, but the externalisation of the 
unintended consequences of development, established before significant reflexive effects 
occurred, remain largely unchanged.
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Late modernity suffers from all the local problems traditionally associated with industrial 
development, but also from profound new ones. Global environmental threats such as ozone 
depletion and global warming are exacerbated by any release of contributory substances, whether 
dilute or concentrated, whether released in China, New York or Tanzania (Kelly 1997). The 
accumulation of large quantities of artificial substances in many environmental media has 
produced concerns over the limits of scientific knowledge regarding the consequences of such 
complex mixtures on human health or the environment—limits that are inherent and 
fundamental to late modernity.
Similarly, the massive scale of industrial development, soon to be multiplied by huge population 
increases in the developing world, raise very real fears about the future availability of essential 
resources including fuels, food and materials.
The global nature of so many of our technological systems has also raised the spectre of global 
annihilation from a variety of causes. The severity of the ‘Spanish Flu’ epidemic that killed 40-50 
million people around 1918 (Parker 1993) was directly attributable to modem transport systems, 
and was arguably the first such example. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 chilled everyone; the 
nuclear accidents at Three-Mile Island in the US and Chernobyl in the USSR hinted at what may 
lay ahead. A sudden and comprehensive collapse of the global financial system could be equally 
apocalyptic, as could the negative effects of the Greenhouse Effect, ozone depletion (CFC 
refrigerants are still in use in much of the developing world), rogue genetically modified 
organisms, etc. In late modernity, every localised war brings with it the fear of escalation to a 
scale that could readily dwarf those that have gone before.
3 . 4 . 5  The  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  e x t e n t  of  t h e  p e n e t r a t i o n  of
r e f l ex i v e  s y s t e m s
The shortcomings of centralised authority have become starldy illuminated and are 
diversely ‘framed* to appeal to changing social values
For a variety of reasons, command-control developments or policies are less successful than in 
the past. Although most obvious in terms of governmental macroeconomic paradigms, this is 
true of almost all attempts to mobilise sizeable resources to achieve a significant social goal. This 
results from:
• the scale of influence
Due to new material and logistical possibilities opened up by a combination of abstract systems, 
the extent of influence of many wielders of ‘command-control’ authority is often immense. For 
example, the decision of OPEC (Oil Producing and Exporting Countries) in 1973 to restrict 
supply and increase prices of oü to the West by 250%, directly affected the daily activities of 
hundreds of millions of people (Lowe 1988). Practically all significant policy or investment 
decisions made by a modem government or multinational corporation will involve huge amounts
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of human and material resources. This apparently positive fact is a problem in the context of the 
following features of late modernity.
• the compkxity ofy  stem interaction
As the OPEC example showed, in late modernity, all major decisions unleash a barrage of 
unintended consequences (loop (3) on Figure 2.5). The large increases in oil prices tri^ered a 
major, worldwide economic depression that forced Western nations to reconsider their fuel- 
supply options. By 1982, consumption of OPEC oil had reduced to such an extent that 
production and prices were forced down—but the first extensive research into the large-scale 
viability of renewable resources had been launched (Parker 1993, pp321). The ‘oil crisis’ therefore 
affected many social systems including the world economy, the Arab-Israeh conflict, the 
environmental movement, transport systems, domestic routines, etc.
Similarly, the interconnection of local and global systems means that any significant new 
commercial product or government policy in one part of the world will very quickly reflexively 
and chaotically influence a very large number of global human social relations. The development 
of the male impotence pill Viagpa is one of very many that will affect the lives of ordinary 
people—and national regulators, underground marketeers, general practitioners, welfare budget 
accountants, etc—around the world.
• increased transparency
A  culture of organisational accountability, driven by several factors including the 
telecom m unications revolution, increased demand for investment data, and (arguably) a 
widespread lack of social trust, has given rise to a situation in which individual and corporate 
actions are much more transparent than in the past. As a result, it is becoming evermore difficult 
to conceal or cover-up ethically dubious behaviour. In combination with other late modem 
developments such as forensic science and the growth of investigative journalism, this had led to 
what John Elkington calls an CK-ray environment’ or the ‘corporate goldfish bowl’ (EUdngton 
1997).
In 1998, US President Clinton learned to his cost just how powerful this ‘X-ray’ environment has 
become. Not only was he exposed in his attempt to conceal a wide variety of misdemeanours 
through the deployment of a number of novel abstract systems including video surveillance 
cameras, concealed microphone ‘bu^Jug’, telephone tracing, DNA testing, etc, but the whole 
process, including his personal denials and subsequent admissions of guilt and ‘serial grovelling’, 
were televised live into hundreds of millions of homes around the world. The report of his 
prosecutor. Judge Kenneth Starr, that detailed the case against Clinton, was released on the 
Internet and read by millions at the same time as Clinton himself (Marr and Miller 1998). While 
the comprehensiveness and transparency of Clinton’s prosecution was definitively late modem, 
his offences were certainly not.
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• the reflexive monitoring of action and shifting social values 
In late modernity, perhaps as a result of the influence of industrial capitalism and the rejection of 
tradition, people are strongly attuned to adapting to new ways of approaching particular 
problems in the face of changing conditions. The reflexive monitoring of action of late modem 
citizens is endlessly ingenious and resourceful, as millions of ‘clever’ people find new ways of 
extracting what they want from the environment around them. As a result, new schemes 
introduced to achieve specific goals by depending on people to act in predictable, ‘rational’ ways 
are quite likely to fail Attempts to reduce road congestion via a radio appeal encouraging road 
users to take an altemative route might fail, for example, because large numbers anticipate that 
others will use the altemative route because of the radio appeal, therefore leaving the original route 
clearer for them.
On more important issues, the social values that underlie our significant decisions are shifting as 
knowledge and ideas circulate. Whereas early modem social values were strongly influenced by 
the Church and tradition and were therefore relatively stable, late modem social values are more 
dynamic and based upon a reflexive engagement with circulating knowledge and the necessity to 
develop personal authenticity through the different mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3. This 
dynamism gives rise to heterogeneity and unpredictability—the bane of command-control 
policies and projects.
On the whole, what can broadly be considered to be ‘materialistic’ values still predominate in late 
modernity. However, there is substantial empirical evidence that this situation is changing.
In 1990 for example, sociologist R. Inglehart, published a study based on intemational survey 
data that showed that values in western societies are becoming increasingly post-materialistic 
(Inglehart 1990). His interpretation of this data—that post-materialism is a luxury indulged in by 
the materially secure—is challenged, however, by a number of other studies showing similar 
results fcom developing world countries (e.g. Dunlap 1997). An interpretation of this data fcom 
the perspective of Giddens’ Modernity Thesis is, I believe, much more convincing than 
Inglehart’s: as the effects of the change-accelerating mechanisms of modernity penetrate every 
locality on the planet, it has become almost universally true that individual identity is not received 
unchallenged from tradition, as was mostly the case in the past A t the turn of the millennium, the 
world is increasinfff populated by people who mustface constructing their own identity and authenticity in a rapidly 
changing environment. It is often by recognising and taking responsibility for one’s own actions that 
individuals live a meaningful, active role in the world rather than being passively swept along by 
the stmctural forces they perpetuate in their day-to-day lives. For many, this will involve a 
rejection of an empty, materialistic outlook in favour of more ‘meaningful’ post-materialistic 
values.
The increasing rejection of materialistic values is therefore one of many factors that will 
complicate all forms of centralised control based on the anticipation of individual action.
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• openness of issue framing
Perhaps as a result of the modem nature of the reflexive monitoring of action and shifting social 
values, the state and powerful organisations no longer have a monopoly over how their actions 
are ‘framed’ or constructed as social issues. Some Western governments, for example, portrayed 
the 1991 Gulf War as a bid to liberate the innocent Kuwaiti people from a pugnacious a^ressor. 
However, other perspectives immediately circulated in world’s media, and the most widely held 
‘framing’ of the War soon became that it was a response to the Iraqi threat to the security of 
Western oil supplies. This is in direct contrast to the success of Lloyd George’s ‘standing up for 
the five-foot-five nations’ framing of the First World War.
So-called ‘media frames’ are organising devices that journalists use to help to make sense of issues 
or events and thereby inject them with meaning (Hannigan 1995, pp61). Various groups often 
compete in a ‘contest over meaning’ to ‘sell’ their particular preferred images, arguments and 
story lines to journalists and editors. Gamson and Modigliani (in Hannigan 1995) identify five 
framing devices, metaphors, exemplars (i.e. historical examples from which lessons are drawn), 
catchphrases, depictions and visual images, and three reasoning devices', roots, consequences and 
appeals to moral principle. Competing groups and media companies alike use these devices to 
present a coherent narrative to the public. It is simple to imagine how various sides of a 
dispute—the Gulf War, say—might use these devices to present their cases.
In this way, competing groups can appeal to different social values when presenting a 
construction of the actions of powerful authorities—since any development or policy can 
potentially be ‘spun’ by the adoption of an altemative definition of success, all command-control 
actions can be deemed to be ‘failures’ in some ways that may be more ‘important’ to many 
people.
Although access to the media is unequal and somewhat arbitrary, and although media framing of 
an event is sometimes readily decoded and ignored by the public (Hannigan 1995, pp61), issue 
framing is an important factor in establishing the effectiveness of established authority in ways 
that these authorities are only just beginning to understand. This will be elaborated in a 
subsequent Chapter.
The limitations of the bases of professional authority have similarly been exposed:
In late modernity, not only are active command-control polices and developments likely to go 
awry, but several factors are further undermining die patemal role of the professions. These 
factors are discussed in Chapter 4. In summary, they include:
• the failure of science to understand the risks of the manufactured environment
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In Victorian times, science aided technical development where it could, and simply strove to do 
so where it could not. In late modernity, science underpins and leads almost all technological 
developments and strategic decision-making. The inherent failure of science to understand 
certain crucial aspects of real world, mainly those relating to the impact of industrial technology 
on the manufactured environment and the human body, completely undermines ‘expert’ 
authority based upon it.
The important point to recognise here is that this scientific shortcoming is absolutely 
fundamental and will never be overcome by more research. As change in late modernity 
accelerates, an infinite number of novel contexts of action make known scientific facts, with all 
their accompanying qualifications and assumptions, mere orientation posts.
• the development of high consequence risks
Rather than simply helping people to a better life by overcoming nature, industrial capitalism 
continuously threatens the safety and security of people. These threats are often the anonymous, 
unintended consequences of diverse human activities, and inspire fear because they interfere with 
complex systems about which science knows little.
Some high consequence risks, such as nuclear weapons, are intrinsically so by design. More 
commonly, high consequence risks are the result of the widespread distribution of abstract 
systems that, because of the limited nature of the scientific understanding of the manufactured 
environment and the effects of that environment on the human body, may acquire great 
significance if found to be harmful.
Rikhardsson and Welford express the issue this way (Rikhardsson and Welford 1997):
The basic problem is that scientists can only base their conclusions on evidence at hand. I f  some evidence 
comes ahng that ‘proves’ the opposite of what has become accepted wisdom because of more accurate 
measurements or some unforeseen relationships or effects surfacing, then scientists change their claims. But 
this reliance on scientific evidence as facts as an approach to environmental problems is ckarly inadequate 
given the irreversibility of most of them and the potential seriousness of the effects on individuals and society. 
Admitting in ten years’ time that minuscule doses ofplastic softeners do seem to affect human reproduction 
cfter all will not help people unable to have children due to the effects of these substances.
• the failure of the ‘providential state’
Following logically firom these is the failure of the state and professions to protect people from 
the risks that industrial capitalism has created. Since state and professional decisions are based on 
scientific risk-benefit assessments, and most such assessments are flawed due to intrinsically 
inadequate scientific knowledge, then the legitimacy of the decision-maker is undermined. In the 
real world, the providential state must rely on scientifically trained consultants to inform decisions 
based on judgements of what science there is available. Not only does the providential state no 
longer have the communicative dominance to credibly claim to protect the people from the
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hazards of the manufactured environment—it is even less able to actually do so. However, this 
has not stopped the state and professionals firom attempting to perpetuate the concept of the 
providential state. The following quote illustrates well the tragic inadequacy of the Victorian 
patemal outlook in late modernity (Rikhardsson and Welford 1997):
Spokesmen from the scientific community often assure the public that there is nothing to fear. The 
greenhouse effect is often said to mean little changes in global climate that m il be beneficial rather than 
harmful However, i f  scientists can notforesee the weatherfor the nextfew dcys, the public asks, how can 
they claim knowing anything certain about the long term effects of human behaviour on the climate of the 
world as a whole?
As late modernity progresses, new combinations of circumstances are crated by its dynamism, 
uncertainties multiply, scientific ignorance becomes relatively more profound and publicly 
perceived risks increase. By perpetuating the providential state paradigm, the state and 
professionals are increasingly shouldering a responsibility that they cannot hope to live up to. As 
Beck notes, (Beck 1995, pp2):
The social explosiveness of har^rds develops its own political momentum: risks consciously taken must be 
socially answered for, as thy endanger the lives of everyone and stand in open contradiction to the state’s 
institutionalisedpledges of scfety and welfare.
‘Life political* issues dominate and ate denied adequate expression
In contrast to early modernity, late modem people have much wider concems than simply those 
relating to working conditions and ‘emancipatory’ politics. Because of the widespread social 
penetration of reflexive systems and the constant introduction of new abstract systems, 
individuals must continuously make judgements about important personal and social issues that 
in the past were mostly made on their behalf. In late modernity, pressing ‘Ufe political’ questions 
confront everyone-, examples include:
• Should I buy genetically modified food? Similarly, should I buy beef, e^ s , milk, etc?
• How will I look after my increasingly elderly parents? Should I encourage them to 
move into a residential home, or should I nurse them myself?
• Should I restrict my child’s exposure to television in some way? If so, how?
• To what extent should I consider ethics when investing in the stockmarket, buying 
consumer products, travelling to foreign countries etc?
• Should I abort my pregnancy if an amniocentesis tells me I am carrying a Down’s 
Syndrome child?
• Should offer my organs for donation after my death?
• I have cancer. Should I undergo chemotherapy?
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In addition to such immediate personal questions, a combination of the massively increased 
scope of political contexts, the multiple nature of issue framing and the increased need of 
individuals to engage with the real world to establish trust in its reality has created a situation in 
which important political issues are not being adequately addressed and individuals do not feel 
politically enfranchised.
Take, for example, the introduction of the mobile phone. Many immediate political issues of an 
administrative nature arose from the introduction of the mobile—licensing, network regulation, 
specifications of transmitting towers, etc. that were dealt with by central government. Many other 
issues also arose that, because of the multiple nature of issue framing in late modernity, might in 
the past have been ignored. Some of these have been addressed by the state—but all remain the 
focus of intense frustration and concern for many people. Such questions include:
• Could the intense electromagnetic waves in a handset cause brain damage after 
extended use over many years? If so, who would take responsibility? In this event, 
should mobile phones be banned—or should they carry health warnings and left up 
to the user to take the risk?
• Similarly, could the high-powered transmission towers that are currently multiplying 
over the landscape cause damage to the human body or the manufactured 
environment? In the face of considerable uncertainty, is it wise to permit their 
erection next to primary schools or residential areas? Who should carry the 
responsibility for this decision?
• What would be the social consequence of a sudden, immediate ban on mobile 
telephones, or of a comprehensive failure of a network?—Could this reflexively 
tri^er other systems to collapse? Could mobile phones potentially become yet 
another high-consequence risk in this respect?
• Should mobiles be used in cars? on trains? in pubs? in restaurants? in theatres? Who 
should decide? Should restaurateurs be permitted to use devices that scramble 
mobile phone signals? Is there a free-speech issue? Public nuisance issue?
• What responsibilities should mobile telephone manufactures have for the 
environmental impact of the manufacture, use and disposal of their products? On 
what criteria should they balance altemative options? Who should decide?
• How might mobile phones affect the logistical possibilities for crimiual offences?— 
should pre-emptive legislation be considered?
• How will the widespread use of mobile phones change the character of day-to-day 
social interaction? Where is the information revolution taking us? What is around 
the comer? Should those concemed about such possible change have any influence 
at all, or should future direction be left to the research and development 
departments of multinational corporations?
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This far from comprehensive list—for just one of many thousands of new products or changes 
that will alter the day-to-day lives of millions— illustrates the kinds of life political questions that 
increasingly concern ordinary people. Because of the reflexive penetration of abstract systems in 
late modernity, increased knowledge circulation etc., individuals are often in possession of all the 
information required to arrive at a balanced value judgement about them. You are probably a lay 
person with regard to mobile telephone technology and national politics, but no doubt as you 
read the above points, you immediately formed an initial opinion on them based on your own 
values and experience. And in all probability, you do not feel particularly strongly about mobile 
phones, and reluctantly allow such issues to be someone else’s problem—unless you are directly 
affected by something you consider unjust.
Many people by do feel passionate about some aspects of the real world, and are very frustrated 
when their particular framing of issues do not appear to be fairly considered. Public protests such 
as environmental campaigns directed against particular developments can be seen in part as 
attempts by the politically disenfranchised to propel altemative framings of issue into the ‘public 
sphere’ of potentially interested members of the public. Through publicity stunts, Greenpeace, 
for example, have been very successful at attracting public attention to altemative perspectives of 
issues that would not otherwise considered by existing political systems.
For example, Greenpeace questioned the social legitimacy of a powerful and self-perpetuating 
chlorine industry given that environmentally-benign altematives for many applications have been 
developed. Chlorine was originally the best-known solution to a specific technical problem, they 
argued; now those rich from selling and promoting chlorine use their power to defend the status 
quo and their own financial interests at the expense of the environment. Which is more 
important—the commercial interests of the chlorine industry or “everyone’s” wish for a cleaner 
Earth? Regardless of the merits of this argument one way or another, Greenpeace successfully 
raised a political question that would not have been raised in conventional political debate.
In fact, so successful are protest groups at propelling particular framings of issues into the public 
sphere that the framing favoured by conventional authorities often fails to be heard.
3 . 4 . 6  T r u s t  in l a t e  m o d e r n i t y
In late modernity, premodem forms of trust environment are rare. By contrast, modem trust 
contexts are the main anchors the self has to an objective reality.
Of these, the sustenance of relationships that approach the ideal of the pure relationship is perhaps 
the most obvious. Almost everyone maintains a cluster of close friends, colleagues or 
acquaiutances with whom they discuss their points of view, anxieties, worries about the future, 
etc in an environment of mutual trust and exploration. In late modernity, whole industries have 
developed to feed the need for aspiring to pure relationships. Pubs, restaurants, bars, coffee 
shops, etc have replaced the Church as a primary source of existential anchoring. Discussing
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important issues with firiends, often in such environments, is an essential component of living an 
authentic life.
The pure relationship is an important factor in the second modem tmst context, the reflexive 
project of the self. Through discussions with others and access to information, individuals can, as 
discussed earlier, tmst in flie real world by exploring it and attaching ‘meaning’ to some aspect of 
it. The massive growth in self-help groups, NGOs, etc is just one indicator of this phenomenon.
Both these tmst contexts can be greatly facilitated by tmsting in the third trust context, tmst in 
abstract systems—both, for example, are greatly enhanced by telecommunications systems. As 
discussed above, this can often be difficult because tmst is based on the mutuality of 
experience—mutuality being something that abstract systems are not particularly good at. With 
such potential for devastating side effects, it is often difficult to maintain an authentic faith in 
abstract systems.
The scope for the transformation of intimacy in late modernity remains high, but for different 
reasons than in the Victorian era. Whereas then the transposition of personal tmst into tmst for 
abstract systems was made possible by the local nature of abstract systems and their champions, 
in late modernity, other abstract systems such as television or air transport can be used to link 
personal and system tmst.
For example, hundreds of millions of computer users are dependent on Microsoft’s ‘Windows’ 
operating system for their personal computing requirements. The company, the most highly 
capitalised in the world, would be anonymous without the high personal media profile of its 
founder and CEO, Bill Gates. Mr Gates’ demeanour, personality and values are well known to 
anyone with a television or radio, and doubtless influence many people’s faith (or lack thereof) in 
Microsoft’s systems. As discussed above, late modernity is characterised by individuals placing 
their tmst in abstract systems not as an authentic ‘leap of faith’ but as a troubled recognition that 
the altematives are largely foreclosed.
Perhaps most damagingly for modem abstract systems and their proponents, particularly 
professionals, is that the promised Enlightenment goal of a better world through the application 
of reason has been lost. ‘Progress’ is more often used with irony than in the early modem sense. 
Covering a conference in 1979, a science and technology correspondent firom the New York 
Times observed that, “whatever their disagreements, the participants agreed that a mood of 
pessimism is overtaking and may have already displaced the old optimistic view of history as a 
steady and cumulative expansion of human power, the idea of inevitable progress bom of the 
scientific and industrial revolutions and dominant in the nineteenth century and for at least the 
first half of this century”. Such pessimism, he wrote, “is fed by growing doubts about society’s 
ability to rein in the seemingly runaway forces of technology.. .’’(Segal 1994, ppl).
y
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In late modernity, ‘history’, as the poet John Masefield put it, is ‘just one damn thing after 
another’ (Solomon 1995). As ambassadors of science and technology, the prestige of professional 
people has suffered greatly as a result of the failure to deliver the Enlightenment’s promised land.
It is in the context of all of the above that we should understand the current problems of the 
state, the professions, and engineering itself.
3 . 4 . 7  T r u s t  in t h e  p r o f e s s i o n s
The late modem world, then, has seen the paternalistic role of the state and professions 
undermined by the logical extension of the principles of modernity itself. Where once issues 
could be uncontroversially defined and addressed in the knowledge that the side-effects of action 
would probably be minor and ignored, now this is not the case. Where once science and 
technology played a leading role in enhancing people’s lives, now it has an ambivalent role, 
threatening as much as enriching. Where once professionals had exclusive access to esoteric 
information and could use that knowledge in whatever way they considered to be ‘in the interest 
of the client’, now the client has access to much of that knowledge and has very specific views 
about what actions are or are not in his or her interest. Former, secretive, professional closed- 
shops now have their business scattered around the world’s media, there for anyone to see— 
second opinions have become public debates. But however much the paternal role of the state 
and professions has become untenable, these groups have nevertheless continued to act true to 
theic Victorian past.
Face-to-face encounters with lay people still account for much of the ‘transposition’ of personal 
trust to system tmst (the transformation of intimacy), though mainly in the medical field, and 
even then to a lesser extent than in the past Urban medical practices often have a high turnover 
of general practitioners limiting the degree of trust than can build up in the patient-doctor 
relationship. Similarly, the more informed the patient ftom other sources, the less likely he or she 
is to unquestioningly take an individual doctor at his word. Engineers meanwhile have much less 
face-to-face exposure to the general public, which may explain why engineering managers are far 
more reluctant to be open and ftank with the public than are doctors.
The ju^emaut of modernity is an exhilarating place to live. It is a world of endemic change and 
dynamism, of exciting achievements, cosmopolitanism and looming catastrophe. Despite its 
anarchic feel, it is a world of widespread enlightenment—more people know more about the 
structures and forces that influence their lives than ever before, despite today’s much greater 
complexity. In fact, understanding these structures is at the very heart o f being able to live an 
authentic existence in late modernity—it is through constantly monitoring relevant change and 
exploring its implications with each other that we attach existential meaning to it. Iti other words, the 
more we know about the real world, uncon o^rtable as that might be, the easier it is to accept its objective reality. It 
is this that leads to what I consider to be the fundamental misconception at the root of the lack 
of public trust in the state and professions—the professionals’ dilemma of ontological security:
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3 . 4 . 8  P r o f e s s i o n a l s ’ d i l e m ma  of o n t o l o g i c a l  s e c u r i t y
Professional people are correct in their belief that the public needs to be reassured by 
professional expertise. The ethical basis of many of the Victorian institutions such as the ICE is 
potentially much more important now than then, mainly because modem society is much more 
dependent on the abstract systems that professional people utilise on our behalf. It would very 
much be in the interests of lay people to feel able to tmst professionals—as Francis Fukuyama 
has pointed out, the tangible penalties of a lack of tmst: legal costs, more contact time required, 
etc—impose a kind of ‘tax’ on society that no one would choose to pay (Fukuyama 1995, pp28). 
More important than economic considerations is the role that professionals play in maintaining 
the ontological security of the public. By being calming, assured, rocks of reliability, professionals 
should be a major anchoring point for our confidence in the continuity of the future.
Partly because of the historical basis for their position in sodety, professionals still see it as their role to 
sustain public ontological security bty hiding unpalatable facts about the nature of late modernity. However, 
in world so dominated by information exchange, suspicion of expertise and the need to 
understand reality, professional people are increasingly pressurised to show their hand—some 
sections of the public need to see the unpalatable facts to sustain their ontological security. This, then, is the 
professions’ dilemma: whether to tell reassuring half-tmths or worrying whole tmths. The 
dilemma is implicitly recognised by professionals themselves as the following quote ftom a recent 
report by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) illustrates:
Moreover there are increasing pressures on government and industry to inform people about risks to which 
they may be exposed. New information may suggest grounds for concern about the scfety or environmental 
impact of an industrial plant, or that a medicine has hitherto unknown dangers. In such cases, 
governments, regulators or companies are often faced with conflicting goals, because they typically wish to 
warn the public about a risk while at the same time offering reassurance that it is tolerable and under 
adequate control (RCEP 1998).
The professionals’ dilemma of ontological security is such a problem because there has been no 
alternative to the providential state paradigm. However, in the next Chapter I wiU argue that the 
conditions for such a new paradigm do exist; they are a natural development of the very forces— 
information circulation, refiexivity, and the extension of life politics—that have brought down 
the present one.
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 3.41
4  R e a l i g n i n g  E n g i n e e r i n g
4 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the previous chapter, I highlighted the divergent trajectories of institutional engineering and 
late modernity as a whole over the past three or four decades. Whereas the latter is now clearly 
dominated by the unintended consequences of social action, uncontrolled institutional refiexivity 
and personal adaptation to the realities of profound uncertainty, the former seems more reluctant 
to emerge from its clearly untenable role as paternal guardian of the people. In this chapter, I 
examine the issues that engineering must resolve if it is to realign itself with these wider social 
changes, and to reassert itself as a self-evidently beneficial force.
In the following sections, I introduce in general terms Giddens’ proposed principles for how 
western society might adapt more harmoniously to late modernity. Much of this adaptation is 
refiexively occurring already—to some degree, Giddens is merely describing what he considers to 
be the more valuable techniques people (individually and, largely unintentionally, collectively) are 
using to modify their behaviour in the face of their changing circumstances. Examining the 
problems of engineering in light of these principles suggests to me four key issues that might 
assist the engineering establishment in its self-examination. These I subsequently explore with 
reference to five case studies drawn from my experience with WS Atkins Consultants.
4 . 1 . 1  Ove rv i ew of G i d d e n s ’ p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  l a t e  m o d e r n  l iving
As late modernity ages, it seems likely that an increasing number of life-political questions will 
trouble the public sphere. Each new technological development, each new sweeping change 
brought about by institutional refiexivity, will multiply the problems of living in the real world for 
every individual. Proliferating self-help groups wiU continue to aid individuals to circulate 
information and perspectives on the world, but until those wielding decision-m aking power 
seriously consider these perspectives, they seem destined to continue to be expressed through 
non-conventional means. Working under the present paradigm, the state simply does not have 
the resources to address the life-political concerns of everyone, and so will continue to be 
overwhelmed by competing cries for attention while simultaneously attempting to react to global 
events from its own paternalist perspective. The actions of government will therefore seem less 
and less legitimate, and individuals will continue to look elsewhere for advice, leadership and 
political inspiration.
Giddens proposes that a new role for the state could follow from an emerging new paradigm of 
democracy itself—what he calls dialogic democracy, and that others have termed discursive or 
deliberative democracy. Dialogic democracy, Giddens suggests, is akeady firmly embodied in 
many aspects of the late modem world, where it has quietly unseated traditional organisational 
norms (Giddens 1994, ppl04-133). However, this is not a call to revolution. Dialogic democracy
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is complementary to many established forms of representative democracy, and indeed helps to oil 
its machinery. The relationship between dialogic and representative democratic principles is 
already complex and dynamic.
As I have mentioned in earlier discussions of the family unit, the domestic arena is one such 
example of dialogic democracy in action. Family roles are not predetermined and trust is not 
given automatically. For a family to stay together in the face of disparate individual 
circumstances, members must now actively choose to act in ways that perpetuate the continuity 
of the group— otherwise the group may simply dissolve. This involves placing an active trust in 
other family members to behave in such ways, at least partly because in late modernity we spend 
large tracts of time apart on a day-to-day basis. Active trust is built on faith in the integrity of 
each other built over years of face-to-face contact, and particularly through dialogue. Families are 
usually organised around reflexive rules agreed upon through dialogic democratic principles (as 
well as the implicit rules of practical consciousness)—rather than dictated by a traditional 
patriarchal figure. Often unintentionally, many families agree codes of conduct, including rights 
and responsibilities, which bind the unit together by active trust.
Similarly in the commercial sphere, the complexity of the real world has demanded that 
companies increasingly employ dialogic democracy in their internal organisation in order to 
remain competitive. Responsibility and decision-making authority must necessarily be delegated 
widely to respond effectively to increasingly novel and reflexive situations. Those that insist upon 
relying on traditional and established top-down solutions to problems run the risk of failing to 
understand the scope of change affecting theic business environment. Referring back to 
Whittington’s ‘pool’ of rules and resources, such companies are limiting themselves only to those 
management options derivable ftom the limited structures understood by a small number of 
similarly educated and experienced executives. Through the more widespread use of internal 
dialogic democracy, more spontaneous decisions are being made at the front line of business 
operations. Corporate positions are less ‘empty raincoats’, as Charles Handy would put it— 
fimctions awaiting an anonymous body to fill them—but flexible and responsive, fluid-like in 
their requirement for individuals to creatively fill gaps that suddenly open, and to actively open 
new gaps that lead somewhere (Handy 1994). Instead of sheltering employees from the stormy 
outside world, companies increasingly provide the means by which employees are liberated— 
empowering them to explore the real world in a way that facilitates an active trust in the world 
and the ontological security and personal fulfilment that that can provide.
A further area of late modem life in which dialogic democracy is thriving is found in the 
preponderance of ‘public sphere’ organisations that now permeate western nations. Over the past 
few decades, literally hundreds of thousands of such groups have appeared, each aimed at 
facilitating like-minded people to exchange ideas and experiences about specific issues or 
problems around the world; living with people afflicted by a particular disease, for example, or 
coping with alcohol addiction, or recovering from a traumatic incident. Others look to more 
general issues, such as the way in which modernity interacts with the environment, or how the
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medical sector relates to patients. By dividing labour and particularly by making use of electronic 
communications media, these groups quickly acquire the skills and knowledge to understand and 
explore their specific issue with greater thoroughness and in greater depth than could ever have 
been possible in the past.
Active trust often pervades these groups, because in some ways they are built on principles 
similar to those of ideal, personal, ‘pure’ relationships—unlike domestic or work situations, there 
are no external structural forces keeping them together; they are sustained only for the rewards 
they deliver to each individual. These groups are not always particularly democratic in themselves 
(some are actively antidemocratic), nor are the methods they often employ to further their aims. 
But they do further dialogic democracy by forcing particular issues into the discursive sphere that 
would otherwise have passed unnoticed and possibly dealt with in a ‘traditional’ way.
Dialogic democracy, then, is steadily becoming institutionalised as an organising principle in areas 
of high refiexivity and complexity. It assumes a fair degree of autonomy and trust, since constant 
surveillance undermines and stifles effective reflexive responses to new situations. Trust is 
nurtured through the (ideally face-to-face) interactions that occur during an ongoing dialogic 
democratic relationship between people—it therefore develops hand-in-hand with dialogic 
democracy. Encouraging dialogic democracy therefore, says Giddens, is the way to regenerate 
social trust.
The focus of the state and powerful organisations, Giddens implies, should be to create and 
nurture the conditions whereby the complex ingenuity of the public sphere can be mobilised and 
given responsibility to deal with the complex issues that affect our everyday lives. Individual 
rights and autonomy, understood in the light of mutually manufactured risk, foster collective 
responsibility and social trust—and so legitimise the power of the centre.
Life political issues, the focus of the public sphere, should increasingly find institutionalised 
expression through mechanisms of generative politics:, the politics of finding ways of making things 
happen through increasing the autonomy and responsibility of the individual. The principles of 
generative politics are summarised by Giddens as (Giddens 1994, pp93):
• cultivating the circumstances whereby desired outcomes can be achieved from the 
bottom-up rather than the top-down;
• creating the conditions under which active trust can be developed—which includes 
taking a ‘leap of faith’ on all sides;
• where possible, giving responsibility and autonomy to those affected by programmes or 
developments;
• generating resources that enhance autonomy—helping people to help themselves;
• decentralising power, as a necessary consequence of the bottom-up movement of 
information and the increase of personal autonomy.
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In some circumstances, generative politics simply involves nurturing the circumstances under 
which individuals can be liberated from the prescriptive or oppressive demands or actions of 
those wielding power. Organisations should be made more accountable for the unintended (but 
foreseeable) consequences of their actions on others; individuals should be free to decide which 
social systems or organisations they wish to support or trust their lives to. If it were no more than 
this, however, ‘generative’ politics would have nothing particularly constructive about it at all—it 
would simply be a neoliberal manifesto.
To me, generative politics’ real potential is in harnessing the ideas, energy and nascent discursive 
democratic rules of a society of clever, educated and connected people in order to understand 
and find solutions to the infinitely complex life political issues that confront it. The disparate 
nature of the public sphere ensures that all political discussions will constantly be enriched by 
individuals considering public issues in the context of their own skills and experience— 
enlightening new metaphors and perspectives will continuously and refiexively stim ulate the 
terms of the debate. What may emerge from this social pooling of experience, concerns, ideas, 
rules and resources, could be a system of monumental refiexivity which in some ways begins to 
parallel the financial market—in its complexity, its power to mobilise the ingenuity and creativity 
of millions of clever people, in its inclusiveness (most complex issues reduce to fundam ental 
value judgements about which esoteric knowledge is largely irrelevant) and, regrettably, in its 
unfairness (Tike every other aspect of social life, rules and resources are distributed unevenly). In 
some ways, reflexive dialogue in the public sphere could be to democracy what financial 
information is to capitalism.
Major political decisions made against a backdrop of inclusive, extensive and reflexive public 
dialogue will not only carry with them the potential for enhanced political legitimacy that comes 
from the extension of participation, but will also be likely to be better decisions. Such decisions will 
take into account the multiple ‘framings’ and life political issues that many people will see in 
them, legitimising the perspectives of those who would otherwise feel the need to express 
themselves in less democratic ways. Decisions will be less likely to be taken in complete 
ignorance of their potential unintended consequences, since individuals from all walks of Hfe will 
be able to contribute their opinion on how each decision might affect them. Individuals might 
not necessarily be accurate in their assessment of how they would react to change—but the very 
process of an inclusive and sympathetic reflexive deliberative approach to tackling major, 
universal problems might persuade some to consider more carefully their social responsibilities in 
such circumstances.
4 . 1 . 2  Appl yi ng G i d d e n s ’ p r i n c i p l e s  t o  e n g i n e e r i n g
Giddens’ arguments for the ‘renewal of social democracy’ naturally focus on the future role of 
the state, and how, through institutionalising dialogic democratic principles by means of 
generative politics, Hfe poHtical issues might be addressed. His influence on the development of a 
coherent ‘Third Way’ ideology for modem ‘centre-left’ governments is profound and high
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profile, and involves him in the broadest range of political thought (Giddens 1998). But his 
approach is of relevance beyond consideration of the ideological role of the state—it also 
provides the principles for other modem organisations to reassert their own relevance and 
identity in the late modem world. In the rest of this chapter, I wiU look at how engineering 
organisations and institutions might do so.
As the previous chapter discussed, engineering is affected by many of the problems that are 
generic to late modernity: chronic public confusion and disorientation in a dynamic world of 
accelerating local and global change; a growing sense of personal meaninglessness; cynicism and 
pessimism about the ability and motives of those asserting the authority to act in the public good, 
etc. As I argued, engineering contributes to its own problems in a variety of ways. Pulling no 
punches at this point, these ways include:
• being unable to control its own increasingly powerful technologies— creating a whole 
range of new hazards, many of which may have devastating consequences;
• denying this lack of control and belittling those who express concem about it;
•  being weU rewarded for industrial successes—but absolving itself of responsibility for its 
failures and for the foreseeable unintended consequences of its actions;
• perpetuating closed, opaque and defensive organisations in a world of increasing 
information exchange and institutional transparency;
• failing to deliver an unambiguously better world—part of the implicit hargain’ of 
ontological security that was struck at the onset of the Enlightenment that saw tradition 
and religion ultimately largely abandoned;
• often, refusing even to concede the reality of the ambivalent nature of industrial 
development;
• creating esoteric abstract systems that further entrench expert dependency—while doing 
nothing to help lay people develop authentic faith or trust in either those systems or its 
organisations;
• denying the ability and possibility of lay people to make value judgements on technical 
matters—arrogantly and patronisingly declaring things ‘safe’, ‘good’, ‘near enough’, ‘clean 
enough’, ‘suitable’, ‘in the interests o f—on their behalf;
• denying the existence and significance of the profound areas of scientific ignorance and 
uncertainty that underlie most technical and strategic decisions in late modernity;
• refusing to see the world from anything other than what is typically a narrow,
white/male/western/ engineering-degree/establishment viewpoint—denying the
rationality of those who do otherwise, and using their considerable economic, legal and 
political power to ensure their view predominates;
• refusing to recognise the fundamental social changes that have occurred over at least the 
past twenty or thirty years that have undermined the legitimacy of many previously- 
established institutional norms.
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4 . 2  F o u r  p r o b l e m a t i c  i s s u e s
a n d  t h e i r  i l l u s t r a t i v e  c a s e  s t u d i e s
Underlying these points, I propose, are four problematic issues that engineers could fruitfully 
approach in the context of dialogic democracy and generative politics. I illustrate each of these 
areas by referring to case studies based on my experience of WS Atkins Consultants Ltd, 
presented in full in Volume 2.
Each case study is written in a way that provides examples of many of the aspects of this 
application of Giddens’ social theory including:
• the problems arising from using traditional engineering approaches in late modem 
societies;
• the impact of the ‘change accelerating mechanisms’ of modernity on traditional societies;
• the way in which certain social systems are perpetuated as a result of the unintended 
consequences of action;
• the range of life political questions raised by modem institutional refiexivity;
• each of the four problematic issues identified below.
4 . 2 . 1  C a s e  s t u d y  s u m m a r i e s
At this point, the reader may wish to familiarise him/herself with the full case studies presented 
in Volume 2. Altematively, summaries of these case studies are presented here:
4 . 2 . 1 . 1  Case s tudy A: The fu t u r e  of pho t oco n v e r s i o n  t e c h n o l o g i e s
In 1994, ETSU (formally known as the Energy Technology Support Unit, a government agency 
responsible for commissioning studies required to inform energy policy decisions) conducted a 
wide-ranging appraisal of the United kingdom’s future utilisation, demand and supply of 
renewable energy. This included a review of photoconversion processes that create fuel and/or 
electricity directly from sunlight without a thermal intermediate step. From the results of a 
preliminary feasibility study, ETSU decided to investigate current commercial interests in the 
following technologies which were considered to have prospects for successful development at 
around three to four times the present cost of electricity (well-established photovoltaic 
technologies and laboratory technologies were excluded from this study):
• electricity generation by electrochemical photovoltaic cells;
• hydrogen generation by photosynthetic bacteria, blue-green algae etc on an effluent or
other waste biomass substrate;
• photoelectrolysis for the production of hydrogen
This study was to identify the industries/companies with interests in photoconversion 
technologies and determine their particular interests and goals for developing these techniques.
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However, on finding no such industrial interest in photoconversion technologies, ETSU decided 
to concentrate its financial support on more commercially mature renewable energies, leaving 
longer-term renewable energy researchers to complete for funding with theoretical scientists. In 
this case study, I highlight some of the issues raised by this decision.
4 . 2 . 1 . 2  Case  s t udy B: A hea t  plant  for  Holic
Contracted by the European Commission to conduct a techno-economic feasibility study into a 
new heat plant for the Slovak town of Holic, I discuss in this case study how the questions raised 
by this proposal go much deeper than those ostensibly considered pivotal. As a district heat- 
dependent town separated from its heat plant by the recent border cleaving the former 
Czechoslovakia, Holic is a typical example of a local community whose fortunes are dictated 
from distanciated locations according to the political, corporate and parochial agendas of those 
with greater transformative capacity than its own citizens. Utterly removed ftom the processes 
affecting their lives, the people of this formerly quiet, ignored mining town have been abruptly 
introduced to the power of late modem institutional refiexivity, centuries of relative local 
autonomy swept away by the stroke of a cartographer’s pen.
How might ordinary people begin to regain control over their own future, rather than have it 
dictated to them by distant organisations in the name of technology? What are the consequences 
for engineering of using a series of technical studies to address a fundamentally social problem?
4 . 2 . 1 . 3  Case s tudy C: The Plant  Ma n a g e r ’s di lemma
This case study briefly describes issues resulting ftom my experience as an assistant to the Plant 
Manager of a small hydrolysed vegetable protein (HVP) processing company, that I refer to as 
Graiyco. HVP is found in many processed foods and, on account of its texture, colour and taste, 
is one of the main constituents in gravy browning. The case study describes how I, as a naïve and 
trusting young engineer, potentially exposed the small manufacturing company to damaging 
media attention by disclosing to a group of local people the fact that a potential carcinogen 
(3-MCPD) was being produced as a process by-product. I presumed that since the company was 
going to some lengths to remove the toxin from the product it company was acting in a highly 
responsible manner and would be seen by aU to be doing so. I did so in ignorance of the lack of 
trust that so many in society have in technical proclamations of safety in matters of toxicology.
After years of dreading being accused of exposing and ruining Grayyco, I reflect on what the 
actions of the company’s Plant Manager might reasonably have been expected to be, given the 
limited power the company has over its own destiny.
4 . 2 . 1 . 4  Case s tudy D: Mercury in dent a l  amalgam
Mercury has been designated a Red List substance by the European Union, indicating that it is 
considered to be one of the most toxic generally occurring pollutants, and intended for 
elimination from the environment. In its metallic (elemental) form, small amounts of mercury are 
thought to be relatively harmless to mammals, hence its continued widespread use in dentistry. A
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report prepared by WS Atkins for HMIP (now the Environment Agency), of which I was a team 
member, found that one of the most significant sources of mercury pollution in the United 
Kingdom is the dental amalgam industry: several tonnes of mercury enter the sewerage system 
from dental surgeries each year.
Concem about the environmental effects of mercury from dental surgeries is recent; health 
worries about the possible effect of metallic mercury ingestion from surgeries are not. ‘Amalgam- 
related illness’ is a condition many people believe is caused by exposure to mercury through 
dental amalgam. The alleged symptoms are wide-ranging and non-specific, and could easily be 
attributed to a number of alternative causes. The American Dental Association (ADA) flatly 
denies that the condition exists, and states that mercury amalgam has an ‘indisputable’ safety 
record. In this case study, I highlight some of the issues arising from governments’ and dental 
associations’ stance on the use of mercury in dental amalgam.
4 . 2 . 1 . 5  Case s tudy E: The role of eng i nee r i ng  c ons u l t anc y
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1985), followed by Renn et al (1995), have produced a useful 
conceptualisation of the nature of engineering problems (Figure 4.1). This is described more fuHy 
in Volume 2, but in general terms the authors propose that it is useful to conceive three types of 
‘technical’ decision:
• those of low technical uncertainty and in which the consequences of failure are relatively 
minor are typical of ‘traditional engineering and science’; these include most of the 
questions we first think of as the day-to-day problems of engineers, such as material 
selection, conventional mechanical engineering etc, and are decisions based on technical 
expertise;
• those of high technical uncertainty and/or high decision ‘profundity’ are typically those 
that interest the public sphere—national primary energy supply fuel selection, for 
example, or alternative cancer treatments. These are ostensibly technical issues that rely 
heavily on the decision-maker’s worldview and values;
• in between are those issues that contain significant elements of both technical expertise 
and value judgements. Typically, they involve questions that have a fair degree of 
technical uncertainty and/or have fairly profound consequences. Such issues may be of 
interest to the public sphere, but they are usually entrusted to the experience of a 
decision-maker. The authors say that such decisions are typical of the role o f consultancy.
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Figure 4.1: Taxonomy of modem engineering decisions (After Funtowicz and Ravetz, 
1985 and Renn et al, 1995)
In exploring the role of engineering consultancy, then, I do not necessarily mean engineering 
consultancy companies as such. Rather, I am referring to this latter area of decision-making, the 
grey area between issues of vital importance to the public sphere and those that relate to 
‘traditional engineering’. However, given the recent tendency of large companies to contract out 
such issues specifically to designated consultancy companies, and given the fact that I am writing 
from experience of a consultancy company, for convenience I will refer to ‘engineering 
consultancy’ as if it were a branch of professional engineering that specialised specifically in such 
matters. O f course, however, all engineering companies must cope with such matters from time 
to time.
I consider the role of engineering consultancy as a specific case study because, working with a 
large such company in WS Atkins, I was deeply involved in understanding and exploring the 
relationship between the company and the client through the way projects were commissioned. 
In some cases, clients’ requirements are specific and prescriptive, and the consultant’s role is 
passive. In others, clients are only vaguely aware of the ways in which they require help and what 
form that help might take. Because of the changes in late modernity and the corresponding 
challenges to engineering I wish to highlight in this work, I believe that the relationship between 
‘engineering consultancy’ and ‘traditional engineering’ is of crucial importance, as the former 
increasingly takes the lead in guiding the latter through a world focused more on trust and 
judgement than on technical expertise.
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4 . 2 . 2  Fo u r  p r o b l e m a t i c  a r e a s  of m o d e r n  e n g i n e e r i n g —
s u m m a r i e s
4 . 2 . 2 . 1  Op e n n e s s  and ident i ty
Engineering organisations’ closed public image, narrow philosophical outlook and entrenched 
defensiveness are surely symptoms of a lack of self-confidence and confused (institutional) 
identity—common problems for most people in the late modem world. Many of these issues 
could potentially be addressed if engineering organisations ‘opened up’ to the rest of society and, 
mirroring individuals’ need to establish a firm understanding of the real ‘outside world’, 
refiexively engaged in exploratory discussions of their role with the public sphere. By listening to 
the whole spectrum of worldviews, issue framings and life political issues that die public associate 
with engineering, engineering organisations will be infinitely better placed to direct their work in 
more universally appreciated ways. Equally importantiy, it is through reflexive dialogue, rather 
than public relations campaigns, that engineering organisations might effectively begin to take to 
others their crucial perspectives on the nature of their work. The rewards of such discussion 
could potentially be great—the issues underlying vitriolic disputes that precipitate around specific 
developments might instead be explored calmly in a low-pressure and constructive environment. 
Such discussions would naturally be wide ranging, and would include consideration of all of the 
following areas.
4 . 2 . 2 . 2  Social  r e spons i b i l i t y
The vast social and material ‘transformative capacity’ wielded by engineering organisation 
executives is seldom recognised by those executives, since most do not consider the major 
unintended consequences of their businesses to be attributable to them. As I have previously 
argued, this situation is no longer tenable because of the dominant effect such consequences have 
on society as a whole. Inevitably, an important part of late modernity’s social regeneration will be 
to explore the ways in which powerful groups of all kinds affect the lives of others, and to what 
extent various parties should reasonably be held morally (if not legally) responsible for which 
events. Through continuous and reflexive discussion, clear new understandings may be reached 
between individuals and groups on their relative rights and responsibilities in a dynamic world— 
preparing the ground for each to consider seriously how they might best become considerate 
neighbours.
4 . 2 . 2 . 3  Technical  aut hor i t y
One of the major issues that haunts constructive discussions between technically trained and lay 
people is that of the nature and role of scientific expertise in social decision-making. This most 
controversial of debates is at the heart of many of the antagonistic battles that engineering 
organisations have undertaken with the public sphere in recent decades. Both engineers and lay 
people stand to profit enormously firom seriously considering each other’s perspectives on this 
point. By recognising both the strengths and limitations of scientific knowledge, all can begin to 
have a more conciliatory approach to the wider questions the debate raises.
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4 . 2 . 2 . 4  Direct ion and p r o g r e s s
With the ‘change accelerating side-effects’ of modernity increasingly dominating the political 
agenda, a large number of people believe that a continued faith in social ‘progress’ is nostalgic 
and naïve. As more and more social and physical systems become globally connected, the 
frequently bizarre consequences of reflexive interaction seem to point to a random and 
directionless fiiture. If  we accept that there is no remotely viable way to remove reflexive systems 
from modem society (other than, perhaps, a totalitarian revolution along the lines of Cambodia’s 
Pol Pot), is there any way of ‘harnessing’ the power of refiexivity to provide long-needed 
direction to the juggernaut? Giddens hints that there may be—if he is right, engineering’s social 
re-ascendance might lie in its ability to help society do so.
4 . 2 . 3  O p e n n e s s  a n d  i d e n t i t y
As we have seen from previous chapters, prior to late modernity an individual’s self-identity was 
largely circumstantially prescribed. As with the caste system still prevalent, if illegal, in modem 
India, a person’s sense of ‘who they were’ was usually non-negotiable and therefore a non-issue. 
Only with the development of late modernity has this certainty been smashed—identity is now 
much more malleable and open to self-definition. As we can see from Figure 2.5, a late modem 
person’s sense of self is strongly influenced by two main ‘groups’ of reflexive systems: their 
‘trust’ environments, in which they seek to develop and maintain a sense of existential reality in 
the face of change, and ‘modernity’ itself, which ‘accelerates’ change by ‘magnifying’ the 
unintended consequences of human action via time-space distanciation, disembedding social 
relations and institutional refiexivity. In late modernity, each individual’s identity is the product of 
the dynamic interchange of these two ‘groups’.
Although Giddens avoids it, it becomes necessary in the present context to examine the role of 
identity at an institutional level. Giddens is careful not to draw parallels between the 
psychological needs and motivations of individuals and organisations’ need for direction and 
meaning, perhaps to avoid confusing the fact that a major theme of his work is that social 
organisation is the unintended result of a large number of individuals making personal decisions 
for personal reasons. However, it is common that an executive body will act explicitly on behalf 
of an organisation as a whole as if  that organisation was a single, consistent ‘self capable of 
independently thinking and arguing. For example, an executive representing Boots the Chemist 
would be expected to act in a considerably different manner in many contexts to another 
representing The Body Shop—differences that extend to adapting thought and behaviour in a 
way commensurate with the individual’s understanding of the identity and purpose of each 
company. Many companies go to great lengths to ensure that their employees share certain 
concepts about the meaning and identity of the group as a whole. Again, Whittington’s pool of 
rules and resources is helpful here—it is difficult to imagine corporate executives being 
particularly adept at forging a coherent and authentic identity for their organisation if as private 
individuals this is lacking.
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Both premodem and many early modem institutions were dominated by tradition and were 
relatively consistent in their ways. Religious organisations, for example, were largely static in their 
practices and outlook, this being a positive feature—providing continuity and predictability, 
thereby supporting ontological security (See 2.4.4.2). When changes in religious practice did 
occur, it was typically during periods of significant political and/or social upheaval that subsided 
to leave altemafive, dogmatically observed ‘traditional’ ways of life. In a slightly more dynamic 
way, early modem institutions such as factories, the Victorian ‘traditional’ family and the 
Professional Institutions themselves were part of what we now consider a slowly developing 
social scene.
This stability meant that the ‘purpose’ or goal of these organisations was seldom problematic. 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, workers’ unions, for example, had a clear reason for 
being since the ‘working class’ employee was unambiguously identified and, on the whole, poorly 
treated by middle-class employers. Concurrendy, engineering companies contributed to a clear 
improvement of civic utilities and infcastmcture, pushing forward the dream of a more 
universally prosperous future for all. In late modernity, institutional identity is much less 
straightforward, for several reasons:
• as with individuals, organisations must constantly and refiexively re-invent themselves in 
response to the techno-economic dynamism of the world. For example, many of 
yesterday’s bulk-chemical suppliers are today’s speciality chemical suppliers and/or 
biochemical engineers;
• rapidly developing social values also mean that traditional ‘reasons for corporate being’, 
such as ‘to increase shareholder value’ or ‘to supply electricity’ must be re-examined 
and/or qualified by additional new culturally influenced parameters such as Svhilst 
minimising extraneous emissions’, etc.— failing to notice these changes can be hugely 
damaging, as I shall discuss;
• since the idea of ‘progress’ as something intrinsically good is now largely rejected by the 
public, companies must think more carefully about where their current lines of business 
may ultimately be leading them;
• because of the nature of the ‘corporate goldfish bowl’, increased knowledge circulation 
and competing sources of issue framing, companies must have a clear idea of what they 
are doing and why they are doing it to maintain credibility when publicly challenged;
As with individuals, ‘authentic’ corporate identity needs to be slowly constructed through 
reflexive engagement with the real word, using the principles of dialogic democracy and, where 
possible, generative politics. In practical terms, this means ‘opening up’ the discussion regarding 
the nature of the organisation to the public sphere. As the British monarchy is finding, for 
example, the more open an organisation is to reflexive debate in the public sphere, the more 
accepted and understood it becomes in the public eye.
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Engineering organisations often appear defensive when challenged to ‘open up’ to the public. 
Most, pressed by regulatory bodies and financial institutions, have reluctantly begun to reveal 
more details about their corporate activities. Traditionally, engineering companies, like most other 
companies, have been reluctant to disclose more information about their activities than was 
thought necessary—in the past, investors relied on financial statistics, reports on management 
personalities and characteristics and external market conditions to inform investment decisions. 
However, with the increasing social influence of post-materialistic values and the growing legal 
costs associated with environmental liability, only the foolhardy now invest in companies in 
ignorance of their degree of ‘exposure’ and attitudes towards such matters. To attract new capital, 
business must continue to feed the institutional need not just for financial data, but for detailed 
environmental and, increasingly, ethical information too.
Most organisations are keen to present a professional and trustworthy face to the outside world, 
and do not shrink firom an opportunity to ‘educate’ the public on how they view both their 
business and their wider social and environmental responsibilities. But very few have made 
serious attempts to engage the public sphere in open and reflexive debate about the life political 
issues that arise firom their activities. As a result, engineering organisations typically see their own 
actions firom a narrow and predictable perspective, and comprehensively fail to see how others 
might reasonably view their actions differently. Consequently reflexive information disclosure 
and public participation are seen as unnecessary, time-consuming exercises that are likely to 
generate problems without obvious possibility of solving any. It is as if such organisations 
believe that if only the public was to understand what miracles they achieve, then all would be well. 
And because the public is scientifically ignorant, then technical concepts must be explained in 
patronising, child-like terms.
By way of example of a typical engineering organisation’s approach to open-up to the public. 
Table 4.1 below describes part of a recent big-budget advertising campaign for BNFL (British 
Nuclear Fuels Limited). Along side is the slightly more considered approach of Monsanto, a 
biotechnology company well accustomed, like BNFL, to public controversy. My purpose here is 
not to criticise opposing corporate marketing strategies; rather, I would su res t that such 
advertising approaches are indicative of general attitudes that engineering organisations typically 
adopt when speaking to a lay audience.
Table 4.1: Engineering organisations’ advertising approaches to the public
BNFL (BNFL 1997) Monsanto (Monsanto 1998)
Picture: A burnt match on a shiny convex surface
Headline: If this was used nuclear fuel, we could make it 
bum again.
Sample Text: Suppose you could take the ashes of a used 
matchstick and somehow turn them into a new matchstick, 
to bum again. You’d be burning the same fuel, thus
Picture: Starded-looking baby
Headline: If it weren’t for science, her life expectancy 
would be 41 years.
Sample Text: .. .with each new scientific breakthrough, 
there is always concem. Is it safe? Is it ethical? Should it be 
trusted? Perhaps it is human nature to distrust new scientific
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BNFL (BNFL 1997) Monsanto (Monsanto 1998)
increasing the life of your fuel reserves. And suppose that 
when you did this, 97% of the ashes could somehow be 
used to make the new matchsticks. At BNFL, this is 
precisely what we do with nuclear fuel. Because instead of 
somehow, we have know-how.
At our Thorp recycling plant at Sellafield, used uranium fuel 
that has been burned in reactors arrives in huge shielded 
steel flasks. The used fuel assemblies — bundles of fuel rods 
constructed rather like a packet of spaghetti -  are taken 
apart behind concrete walls and the metal-clad fuel rods are 
then chopped up and dissolved in nitric acid.
[...etc ...]
To learn more about what we do, and how we do it, come 
to see us at the Sellafield Visitors Centre in Cumbria, or 
write to Corporate Communications [address] or visit us at 
[web address].
advances, just because diey are new.
A recent example, plant biotechnology, is currently (and 
righdy) the object of such scrutiny. At Monsanto, we believe 
plant biotechnology produces better crops, like potatoes, 
soybeans and com. These require less pesticide application, 
conserving scarce resources and reducing cost to both the 
farmer and the environment.
[...etc ...]
We hope you will welcome biotechnology when you know 
the facts. Please ask for a leaflet at your local supermarket, 
write to us, call [nvimber] or visit our website at [web 
address].
In ‘government health waming’-style box:
We urge you not just to accept our word on plant 
biotechnology. Contact Greenpeace at [number and web 
address], or Food for Our Future at [web address].
Table 4.1 would give a sociologist or linguistic philosopher much material to work with, but I 
wish only to draw attention to a limited number of its features:
The BNFL advertisement seems to be an almost desperate plea for public sympathy. Nuclear 
reprocessing is presented as an almost magical process, the very existence of which the reader is 
encouraged to share the company’s child-like wonder at. The steel flasks are ‘huge’ (presumably 
intended to inspire awe), but the fuel rods are like a packet of spaghetti (a simile doubtless 
intended to make the rods sound less threatening—who could worry about something that looks 
like pasta?). BNFL actually speaks as if to a child, utterly patronising the same people who will 
turn the page of their newspaper to read about a whole range of complex political and socio­
economic issues. It does not hint at the limitations of the matchstick analogy, makes no reference 
at all to those with alternative points of view on nuclear reprocessing, and does not address any 
of the criticisms laid at it by them—it is as if BNFL would have the reader forget or ignore that 
there is controversy at all.
Since almost no one in late modernity can fail to be aware of the existence of such controversy, it 
is difficult to see what such an approach is designed to achieve other than to reinforce, through 
symbolic representation alone, incredible notions of technical certainty, control and expert 
paternalism. This can surely do little to enhance the ontological security of the reader—it is being 
implied by those responsible for nuclear power that reprocessing is magical and problem-free— 
but everyone knows it is not. BNFL is therefore obliging the public to see through its own rhetoric, 
lest they live in an unreal, fantasy land. Rather than helping to establish trustworthiness, BNFL is 
presenting itself as a company whose words must be carefully scrutinised and actively seen-
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through on the basis of previous experience. This approach can therefore invoke the opposite of 
trust—the creeping, sinking, sickening feeling of existential angst.
Monsanto’s approach to the public is far from open, but it takes a number of positive steps 
forward from the more traditional attitude of engineering organisations. Its argument begins 
badly, rather ironically jibing at the undisceming nature of public distrust in new scientific 
advances—distrust the company itself has done much to enhance over the previous few years. 
How ludicrous we all must be, to be suspicious of Monsanto bearing new ways of transforming 
our lives that few but the company want, the implications of which are unknown, and for which 
Monsanto wiU shrug off responsibility anyway!
However, the company at least recognises that its point of view is just that. Its case for plant 
biotechnology is made in simple English and in largely uncontroversial statements. It ignores 
mention of the arguments levelled against it, but in a curiously disarming way, points the reader 
directly at its most vocal opponents and urges that we listen to their arguments too. Not only is 
this disarmingly magnanimous in itself, but it enhances the ontological security of the reader by 
recognising the reader’s reality—as with BNFL, most people are aware that biotechnology (not 
‘genetic engineering’, of course) is a contested public good. ‘We know that you know that there is 
more to this issue than this’, Monsanto appears to be saying, ‘but rather than spend our money 
presenting a spin on someone else’s view that you would naturally be suspicious of, we’d prefer 
you contact them yourself.
Monsanto could go much further. By failing openly and honestly to engage with public concerns 
about the life political issues generated by their actions, engineering organisations are forfeiting 
the opportunity to ensure that their ‘framing’ of these issues, that often have much merit, become 
part of the wider public understanding of them. Simply stating a position is not enough—that 
position must be refiexively argued (the word ‘refiexively’ implying that points are constructively 
developed rather than dogmatically defended) with others honestly attempting to make sense of 
the world around them. More importantly than that, engaging the public sphere must be with a 
preparedness to actually modify and develop an outlook, not just to persuade others of the 
validity of one’s own—something Monsanto may do weU to recognise.
The recent history of the oil company Shell has been widely discussed in the public sphere, and 
the company has suffered badly firom a number of public relations disasters. The literature on 
Shell’s involvement in a series of controversies— continuing business in Apartheid-divided South 
Africa, abuses of the Ogoni people in Nigeria that culminated in the state execution of writer 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and others, and the Brent Spar incident—is enormous, and I do not wish to 
elaborate these issues again here. What is particularly interesting, though, is the new approach 
Shell has developed to try to prevent similar events happening again.
Each of these cases arguably revolved around ethical issues upon which the company’s 
management took ad-hoc stances (that would have ordinarily delivered the greatest corporate
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gains, by the by). The problems the company actually faced resulted from the fact tiiat when its 
ethical positions were considered against those of environmental and human rights campaigners 
in the public sphere. Shell’s were considered by most to be inauthentic and inappropriate.
In the case of South Africa, Shell argued that its refusal to co-operate with ANC demands for 
economic sanctions was ethically justified because it employed a large number of ethnically 
diverse people under exemplary fair and just employment conditions, and consistently made clear 
its opposition to Apartheid by way of advertising ‘statements’ supporting the democratic 
movement. In Nigeria, Shell argued that given die large time scale to develop a significant oil 
production infrastructure, widespread poverty and the instability of government, the ethical high- 
ground was to argue for human rights while continuing with wealth generation that would be 
likely to outlast a temporary political regime. With Brent Spar, Shell ‘framed’ the issue of the 
disposal of the redundant North Sea oil platform as being one of finding the least 
environmentally damaging option for that one platform—opponents, after several damaging false 
starts, eventually managed to ‘reframe’ the issue into one of whether companies should be 
permitted to design and use equipment that can only ultimately be discarded into the sea.
In each of these cases. Shell has subsequently spent a great deal of time and money trying to re­
establish its tattered reputation. Part of this process, significantly, has involved finding novel ways 
of incorporating the public sphere into the technical decision-making process—the ultimate fate 
of Brent Spar, for example, was decided after a tortuous and hugely expensive consultation 
exercise (Shell International 1998a). Because of this expense, what lasting legacy this event may 
have on the future of engineering organisations’ approach to the public is unclear.
However, equally significant is that Shell has implicitly realised that adopting a convenient ethical 
stance on an ad hoc basis is counterproductive, and that its best policy is to stimulate debate in 
the public sphere about the way in which multinational companies affect the life political issues 
of people throughout the world. The company has issued a *values’ report in which it invites the 
reader to “participate with us in the global debate about the role and responsibilities of business” 
(Shell International 1998a). As part of this document, a number of corporate ethical dilemmas are 
printed on individual postcards that the reader is invited to complete and return. On its Internet 
website, public views are posted on a large number of pages dedicated to particular issues relating 
to each dilemma, and the (largely sceptical) public have begun to exchange forthright positions 
on the issues, the company, the process itself, and crucially, each others’ positions (Shell 
International 1998b). Examples of the issues presented in these “Tell Shell” cards are presented 
in Table 4.2.
It is easy to be cynical about the motives behind such an exercise—cynicism after aU pervades so 
many of our experiences of corporate culture, and is itself an expression of the intense lack of 
institutional trust definitive of modem life described in section 2.4.5. If, for example. Shell simply 
selectively lifts sections of text and reproduces them as evidence of public support for a 
management decision, then it wiU be rightly condemned and the process brought into disrepute.
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This would be a shame, because the principle of Shell’s long-term strategy here is sound: by 
taking steps to foster the public sphere deliberation of ethical issues that are relevant to everyone 
engaged in the real world. Shell is taking the initiative from the pressure groups that would 
otherwise use more negative methods to achieve the same thing.
This is, of course, just one small shuffle in the right direction—only a small fraction of people 
will see its values report or visit its website, and fewer still will feel compelled to participate. Shell 
must respond refiexively to alternative ‘framings’ of their ‘Tell Shell’ cards—as they stand, they 
present only a number of Shell-centric perspectives. The range of life political issues raised by 
Shell’s activities go much wider than this, and include questions on the nature of fossil fuel 
consumption and renewable energy research, how it might seek to minimise its impact on 
indigenous peoples etc.
Drawing on some of the themes developed by Giddens in his discussion of the ‘pure 
relationship’, we can see that some of principles of reflexive self-examination and disclosure that 
help individuals construct authentic identities may be relevant in some way at an institutional 
level when the goal in mind is similar. Briefly, Giddens’ principles on the ideal of the pure 
relationship between individuals may be adapted to be read that (Giddens 1991, pp88-98):
• ties between organisations and the public sphere should be free-floating and not 
necessarily circumstantially convenient—there is no hierarchy of individuals or 
groups that should or should not be refiexively engaged with. People should be 
listened to on the merits of their argument, not their political power, because the 
more open and inclusive the debate, the richer that debate;
• discussion should be sustained for what it delivers to each party, not for what the act 
of discussion represents. Formats of debate should be refiexively examined to ensure 
that they are serving their purpose, otherwise participants may become cynical and 
disillusioned;
• the rules of interaction and debate should be internally and refiexively defined, not 
imposed by one party—asking “is this OK for you?” should become a central 
organising principle.
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Table 4.2; Example ‘Tell Shell* Reply Cards
shareholder value vs social investment
Companies must strike a balance between providing the financial returns that shareholders rightly expect and investing 
money in the social fabric of the countries and communities in which they operate. How would you do this?
economic muscle and political influence
Under what circumstances, if any should a major company use its economic power to deliver, or at least influence, political 
change—especially in nations with undemocratic governments and poor human rights records? Undoubtedly companies 
can be a major force for good—but should an un-elected body impose its wül on a country?
go in or stay out?
Multinational companies may have to decide whether or not to do business with a developing country where bribery and 
corruption are commonplace and there is little regard for environmental issues:
should you go in and expose yourself to the criticism that you are willing to engage in business with such a government?
should you stay out and deny the country and its communities the economic benefits your presence would bring—and 
indeed the financial returns your shareholders might expect from such an opportunity?
what would be the basis for your moral stand for either option?
islands of wealth
When multinational enterprises operate in developing countries, they bring with them new jobs and greatly increased 
prosperity. Unfortunately, this often creates ‘islands of wealth’ where a small but significant number of local people are paid 
considerably more than the rest of the population. In turn, this can lead to inequalities and tensions. How can companies
react to this question?
Would you pay local employees at international rates in the belief that wealth will spread to the wider community? 
Would you pay local rates and face accusations of exploitation and double-standards? 
when is a fee a bribe?
Most people agree that the giving and receiving of bribes is morally unacceptable and undermines economic and political 
freedom. But at what point does a consultancy fee—for example paid to an influential intermediary for negotiating a major 
piece of additional business—become a bribe? The company cotald take various forms of action. What would you do?
view the contract as big enough so that it could afford to pay the intermediary a sum equivalent to small percentage of the 
total contract value and leave it up to him to decide how best to use the money
try to put the intermediary on a retainer—in other words, engage him on a short term contract to work for the company
try to draw up a contract detailing what the consultancy fee may or may not be used for
another course of action
the high price of health, safety and environmental standards
Multinational enterprises often work with state run companies as joint venture partners. In poorer nations, however, 
economic pressures may force authorities to adopt lower Health, Safety and Environment standards than those practices in 
the developed world. Multinationals can take various courses of action, for instance:
accept the lower standards and the possible accusation of operating double standards
make a stand for higher standards even though the country’s economy cannot afford them?
pull out of the deal altogether and let another company make the decision?
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• interaction should be backed by a mutual commitment to make the relationship 
work—ultimatums and threats to withdraw co-operation are power games that 
seriously damage trust;
• mutual trust must constantly be won—it can never be taken for granted. Authentic 
trust occurs when one party takes a Teap of faith’ on the basis of their faith in the 
reliability of another (that is to actually put something at risk)—engineering 
organisations must be willing to take a leap of faith in the public sphere if they hope 
for the same in return;
• trust therefore develops through a reliability of response that is the result of an 
authentic identity—engineering organisations must be dependable with respect to 
their ‘trust-sustaining’ activities;
• engineering organisations and the public sphere should aim to develop a ‘shared 
history’ of the relationship between them—efforts should be made to ensure that as 
far as possible, each party’s framing of discussions is similar. This implies much 
reflexive discussion on what the discussion is really about
Guided by such principles, engineering organisations should not only begin to understand the 
public better—they will also become more self-aware, focused and targeted organisations.
4. 2 . 3 . 1  i s s u e s  of o p e n n e s s  and ref lexive i dent i ty in t he  c a s e  s t u d i e s
Case study A) The future o f photoconversion technologies
There are three main groups of people who might benefit firom openly and refiexively re­
examining their collective identities in this study: the photoconversion researchers, the funding 
agencies, and ETSU (at the time commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry to 
appraise the future of energy usage in the UK). These are considered in turn:
My study found that most photoconversion researchers themselves had little sense of unity of 
purpose or had in any way a ‘collective identity’. Most researchers were specialists of such 
ontologicaUy diverse areas as photobiology, solid-state physics or supra-molecular chemistry, and 
who, often by chance, had found their work leading them towards potential application in solar 
energy technologies. Nevertheless, a major annual international conference and a nascent 
association of photoconversion researchers was slowly beginning to lend momentum to the 
concept of photoconversion as an significant, multidisciplinary field tackling a hugely important 
problem—the storage and supply of clean energy to displace the use of polluting fossil fuels. 
While some individuals appeared to enjoy the idea of battling alone and against the odds to save 
humanity’s future, many others bemoaned the lack of institutional support in terms of funding, as 
well as the lack of prestige and profile that they believed denied their laboratories the throughput 
of motivated and talented research assistants their work deserved.
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In my opinion, photoconversion researchers have much to gain from uniting around their 
common purpose rather than exclusively identifying with their respective ontological peers. The 
search for a long-term solution to humanity’s energy problem is a noble and vital one, made 
more fascinating by its need for multidisciplinary understanding and cross-fertilisation. A united 
and vociferous institution of photoconversion researchers would do much to argue this case and 
to raise the profile of all. This would facilitate the engagement of public sphere debate in matters 
of future energy supply and the role of photoconversion, doing much both to encourage the 
public debate on the future of fossil fuel usage (thereby helping the public grasp the realities 
involved), and possibly yielding public support for increased research resources. Before this can 
happen, however, photoconversion researchers must ask themselves where their authentic 
identity lies on an individual level—are they at heart purely scientists, out to uncover what is 
there for the joy of knowing? Or are they motivated by being part of humanity’s intelligent 
response to the social over-dependence on fossil fuels? Such reflexive debate, publicly and 
privately, would be to everyone’s benefit.
Next, existing funding institutions must also refiexively adapt to the changing world: One 
researcher describes how a funding body rejected a research proposal containing the words ‘solar 
cells’ only to subsequently accept it when the term ‘photodetector’ was substituted instead. The 
funding body concerned had a firm idea of its remit—solid-state physics, perhaps—and was 
rightly concerned to maintain focus and identity. However, for many years it was almost 
impossible for photoconversion researchers to obtain funding for their work without resorting to 
such surreptitious and ridiculous games with a wide variety of financial sources. Funding bodies 
did not recognise photoconversion as a valid and important research activity in its own right, 
possibly because theic own reasons for being were inflexible and dogmatically defended. Unless 
steps are taken within the funding agencies to increase institutional refiexivity and therefore their 
response time to changes in the outside world, then more such frustrating and damaging 
unintended barriers to research can be expected.
Finally, ETSU must examine its role in perpetuating the paternalistic paradigm of the providential 
state. By denying discussion of Professor Hill’s proposal for an open competition to find a ‘black 
box’ in which to store electrical energy, for example, ETSU—perhaps mindful of the attitude of 
government—denied the photoconversion field the potential ideas and ingenuity of millions of 
clever people throughout the world. As an agency of government (as it then was), ETSU should 
consider whether it exists to shield the public sphere from the idea of a future choked by fossil 
fuel over-dependence, or whether it should help the public sphere understand the possibility and 
contribute to our avoidance of it. The relationship between science, government and the public 
sphere hinges on issues such as this. Such a competition would admittedly be only a limited and 
crude example of generative politics, but the principle is clear: where possible, the public should 
be empowered to take a role in solving collective problems in order for those problems to be 
recognised as ours (society’s) rather than theirs (government’s or engineering’s).
Case study B) A Heat Plant for HoHc
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Given the wider changes to have transformed Slovakia in recent years, it is clear that the people 
of Holic are feeling a great sense of dislocation, loss and confusion over their current 
predicament. On the one hand there is popular support for a return to local lignite mining, 
supporting traditional jobs and traditional lifestyles. On the other, there is the realisation that the 
new border and a revitalised economy could bring new opportunities to the town’s children. 
Whichever future the town stumbles across, the disaffected will feel betrayed by a system that 
barely bothers to acknowledge then existence. In Giddens’ terms, they will be crushed under the 
wheels of the juggernaut of modernity.
In my view, this situation could be helped by nurturing the reflexive development of identity, of 
individuals per se, of the organisations that are often unintentionally causing upheaval in Holic 
(not least of which is the European Commission), and, perhaps most significantly, of the town as 
a whole. Holic’s proposed new heat plant serves as a metaphor for larger questions facing the 
townspeople: whether to shelter firom change, or to embrace it; to look to the past for their 
livelihoods and opportunities, or examine the present; indeed, whether to colonise their own 
future or to have it colonised by distanciated forces on their behalf. These are fundamental 
questions of social identity that, if discussed in an open, reflexive and informed way, could help 
the townspeople come to terms with their own future, perhaps to engage the forces that would 
otherwise unthinkingly sweep past them unopposed, to instil a sense of communal influence over 
the direction of the juggernaut, and to enjoy whatever ontological security that may come with 
that.
But there is also an issue of identity in this case for the engineers involved. Politicians, aware of 
the sensitive political implications of a potential new heat plant for Holic, chose to couch the 
issue in terms of a series of technical studies, when actually the technological options were 
relatively simple. While it is flattering and lucrative for engineers to be considered so central to 
this project, there is also the danger that they will be made the scapegoat for the dissatisfaction 
that will inevitably follow any decision made against a background of political polarisation. 
Engineers stand to gain little but their fees if they allow themselves to be used in this way. Public 
faith in our professional integrity will surely only be developed when we speak out in such 
circumstances.
Case study C) The Plant Manager's dilemma
This case study raises an interesting point about the range of actions open to those with limited 
transformative capacity to affect change in their surroundings. As the largest local employer, 
Graiyco unsurprisingly has close contacts with the local community it serves. Based in a relatively 
remote, rural location, the plant is entirely staffed by local people, and the company executive has 
apparently everything to gain firom maintaining a sense of identity through an open and reflexive 
relationship with the public. However, the discovery of minute quantities of 3-MCPD in one of 
its process tanks, and subsequent attempts to remove it by adding an extra process step, leaves 
the company with a difficult dilemma: should it be open and honest about the development, and 
appeal for public sympathy and understanding? Or should it instead conceal its findings, in the
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belief that the remaining 3-MCPD is harmless and therefore is not worth mentioning to potential 
customers?
Were it simply a matter of convincing local people of the efficacy of its toxin removal process, 
Gravyco would seem likely to succeed. The trade off between a hypothetical process risk and the 
potential closure of the largest local employer is not one that would be likely to generate much 
local controversy. However, as is typical of late modernity, the people at potential risk firom the 
toxin are not those with an invested interest in the financial viability of the plant—those trusting 
the company not to put them at risk are anonymous and distanciated. If alerted, such people are 
likely to view the company’s dilemma unsympathetically. As the case study details, it is difficult to 
imagine how Gravyco could be honest and open with the wider public without the very real risk of 
being forced from business.
We must conclude that firom the perspective of smaller companies particularly, it is vitally 
important that the engineering community tackle the issues of openness and reflexive identity 
from a collective and united standpoint. This point will be developed further below, but it is 
worth emphasising here that a balanced public reaction to the disclosure of such information can 
only be expected when it becomes an everyday, mundane occurrence.
Case study D) The use o f mercury in dental amalgam
People who believe themselves to be suffering from an amalgam-related illness no doubt find it 
of great comfort to be connected with fellow alleged-sufferers through communications systems 
such as the Internet. There is a Virtual community’ of such people, whose identities are doubtless 
influenced by their battle against the professional dental associations. This self-help community is 
essential for many sufferers trying to find meaning in theic varied, non-specific symptoms, and is 
a mechanism for them to refiexively explore each others’ experiences in order to make sense of 
them.
In the US, they are not helped at all in this search by the ADA, which insists that mercury in 
dental amalgam is safe and that seems unwilling to discuss or justify its position. Its paternalistic 
stance on mercury belitties a large number of people who would be better served by a less 
dogmatic approach. The ADA’s strategy is clearly to deny the possible existence of a problem in 
the hope that ordinary people wül not take these safety concerns seriously. In doing so, they are 
drawing heavüy on finite resources of public trust and goodwill to defend a position that is 
ultimately untenable.
The Association would do better to ask itself what its purpose is. In late modernity, its purpose 
can longer be to protect the public spheres firom the existence of technical uncertainty. In can, 
however, seek to interpret the avaüable science in good faith and in an open and reflexive way 
with anyone else who chooses to take an interest. It must concede that it does not know whether 
or not exposure to metallic mercury through dental amalgam is harmful. However painful this
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concession may be to make in the short term, it is laying the ground for an open and honest 
reflexive relationship with the public into the future.
Case study E) The role o f engineering consultancy
Uncertainty is quickly becoming a more prominent feature of engineering—as we have seen, 
engineers are presently dealing with more technically complex and reflexive systems than before, 
and are operating in an environment of acute risk awareness, transparency and information 
circulation. Additionally, with the diversification of strongly held social values that has resulted 
from increased numbers of people seeking authentic identity in the late modem world, a kind of 
‘social uncertainty’ is developing too. For consulting engineers, an awareness of the importance 
of openness and reflexive identity is crucial, not just in order to understand and deal with the 
various social groups that might take an interest in technical projects, but to assert and develop 
themselves.
Companies like my sponsoring firm, WS Atkins, must think about their own identity and 
purpose. Should the company simply provide multidisciplinary technical services to clients on 
demand, regardless of the issues involved? Or should it use its ‘departure lounge’ of highly 
diverse rules and resources to explore and refiexively develop clear approaches towards 
championing causes and processes that might bring together traditional engineering and the 
public sphere? Should it passively respond to the needs of traditional engineering clients’ 
technical requirements? Or should it try to develop those requirements by exploring the 
underlying issues in a more holistic way?
I believe that the potential benefits to engineering consultancies of a more proactive approach to 
client and public sphere interaction are profound. Regardless of the substantial increase in fee- 
paying work that could result, such companies are ideally placed to pull together the Venn 
diagram hoops of traditional engineering and the public sphere and therefore to maximise the 
overlap of common goals and aspirations. By developing much broader input into the firaming 
and development of ostensibly technical projects, those projects are more likely to:
• address the problems they were intended to address, and to anticipate future 
developments, for example the requirements of a sustainable future;
• be more creative and ingenious;
• be less likely to involve culturally unpalatable degrees of technological risk;
• further the public understanding of technical issues;
• be seen as providing communal solutions to communal problems;
• help to bring about an end to the dichotomy of ‘us and them’.
By promoting such matters to the core of corporate identity, consultancy companies will enhance 
in a new, late modem way the ‘professional’ nature of engineering, and thereby help authenticate 
the trust that abstract systems demand.
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4 . 2 . 4  R e - e x a m i n i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
For most of early modernity, employees struggled to force employers to take responsibility for 
their welfare at work. As we have seen in section 3.3, it took a series of parliamentary Acts over 
an extended period in the nineteenth century simply to establish the principle that employers 
should actively work to find ways to protect individuals firom workplace hazards and from 
extreme forms of exploitation. Although many Victorian employers offered forms of pension 
payments to long serving employees on a voluntary basis (Joyce 1980), it was widely considered 
that the responsibility of a company to its employees began and ended at the factory gate. 
Industrial capitalists successfully ignored some of the more repugnant unintended consequences 
of the Industrial Revolution, such as the squalid urban housing conditions of working class 
people, framing their existence as an issue for the state. For much of the twentieth century, 
industrial capitalists have continued to reap the benefits of commodified labour, leaving all 
manner of unintended consequences of their action—for example, environmental externalities 
and urban ghettoisation—to be dealt with by the ‘providential state’ as if they were inevitable 
facts of life.
Over the past few decades, perhaps as more company fortunes rely on human rather than 
material ‘capital’, there has been a trend towards greater corporate ‘altruism’ towards employees. 
Whether or not pushed by legislation, employees normally receive paid vacations, company 
pensions, maternity leave, legally-enforced ‘safe’ working environments, crèche facilities, paid sick 
leave, private healthcare, job-share opportunities etc. Not just in their rhetoric, many companies 
see promoting the interests of their employees to be key corporate objectives—an expression of 
collective identity, no doubt. For whatever reasons, business is now implicitly recognising that it, 
rather than the state, should take the lead in helping employees cope with many of the 
unintended consequences of the workplace. For example, gym facilities are often provided to 
help keep fit those in sedentary occupations; relocation allowances are often paid to those 
moving to another area, etc.
Similarly, over the past two decades or so, industrial corporations are taking greater responsibility 
for the effects of their activities on the manufactured environment. Many companies now publish 
environment reports that detail their known burden on the environment along with proposed 
ameliorative strategies (e.g. J Sainsburyplc 1997).
The significance of these developments can be illustrated by again referring to Figure 2.5. As 
modernity has developed, so has its capacity to intensify the significance of the unintended 
consequences of human action. As the juggernaut gains momentum (the leftmost group 
‘modernity’ grows larger), so the actions of those wielding great transformative capacity (e.g. 
corporate executives) can have increasingly profound unexpected effects on the world. Along 
with the growing penetration of reflexive social systems over the planet, a globally reflexive 
material system now makes commonplace the fact that rather than conveniently disappearing, the 
externalities of one system often become major influences on another. Global interconnectivity
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being what it now is, the capacity for such ‘externalities’ to return to haunt thek creators is 
profound—obvious examples include global warming and ozone depletion as well as the political 
instability of some developing world countries made dependent on unsustainable cash crop 
production by western multinational companies.
It is because of the relatively new reality of global social and material reflexivity, as well as hugely 
increased localised social and material reflexivity, that responsibility for the foreseeable 
unintended consequences of action must be re-examined. Just as companies now accept 
responsibility for the welfare of thek employees and the immediate effects of thek business on 
the envkonment, so they must ask themselves to what degree they should reasonably take 
responsibility for the wider state of the modem world. Conversely, individuals must also examine 
to what extend thek personal actions contribute to what are now anonymous ‘externalities’. Only 
through reflexively discussing the complex issues that this entails might such externalities begin 
to be avoided.
4 . 2 . 4 . 1  Re-dividing r espons i bi l i t y
Much adverse publicity dkected at engineering organisations in recent years has pointed not to 
flagrant negligence, but at the need to re-examine the scope of reasonable responsibility in the 
light of the social changes of late modernity. This need is dkectly related to the life political 
questions raised in the lives of everyone by the actions of engineering organisations, and to the 
increasing power of organisations to actually take ameliorative action.
Examples abound of such issues. To what extent are fast-food restaurants responsible for 
ensuring that thek products’ packaging does not end up littering the street? Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and/or retailers are long accustomed to taking the responsibility for preventing 
children from opening pill jars—how far should all manufacturers go to ensure thek products are 
not misused? How might the responsibilities of the state, industry and individuals be defined in 
ways that re-integrate envkonmental externalities into the mainstream decision-making processes 
of each?
Such questions tie in closely with the previous discussion of corporate identity, since they 
challenge the purpose and role of established organisations and institutions. Naturally these 
considerations go beyond the concern of just engineering organisations—but often, fakly or not, 
it is through powerful multinational engineering organisations that they are often highlighted. 
There are, of course, no static answers to these questions—social values change as information 
about the world dynamically ckculates and reflexively alters our perspective of what is happening, 
and what we should do about it.
These scope and depth of these issues are huge, and can only begin to be properly considered by 
the mobilisation of the great number of experts in the field of living in late modernity. By finding 
ways of collecting, ckculatkig and reflexively developing the ideas and experience of large 
numbers of individuals, engineering companies can begin to understand which aspects of thek
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actions most people believe they have a moral duty to take responsibility for, and to explore ideas 
about how far that duty might reasonably be held to extend. Once engineering organisations, 
among other Big powers’, begin to take their social responsibilities more seriously, the 
corresponding duty of individuals to act similarly will naturally become the new focus of 
attention. Through an ongoing, dynamic and reflexive examination of individual and corporate 
rights and responsibilities based on dialogic democratic principles, society will be better placed to 
deal with the problems associated with late modernity. If it were possible to begin to develop 
some mutually agreeable division of obligation between organisations qua organisations and 
individuals qua individuals, then many currently ignored ‘externalities’ might begin to be 
addressed. And if engineering companies were to initiate such a discussion, they would surely be 
taking the first steps towards re-establishing themselves in the public eye as at least being intent on 
effecting positive change.
4 . 2 . 4 . 2  Respons i b l e  eng i nee r i ng
If delineating areas of engineers’ responsibility could in principle be approached through 
continuous reflexive discussion in the public sphere, what of the practicalities involved? Such 
discussion is likely to focus on how agents might minimise the foreseeable unintended 
consequences of their action on the world—after all, it would be ridiculous to hold a butterfly 
responsible for initiating a hurricane by flapping its wings. But the logic of institutional reflexivity 
suggests that there is no way of knowing the ultimate effects of actions—so what actually counts 
as a foreseeable unintended consequence? It is possible that even the most obnoxious and selfish 
behaviour could, in theory, bring about benefits for society as a whole—indeed, this is a central 
tenet of neo-classical economic theory.
It is by related arguments that critics have attacked the ‘precautionary principle’ of environmental 
law—that potential new actions, products or processes should be assumed to be dangerous 
unless there is reasonable evidence that they will not be. Aaron Wildavsky suggested that such an 
approach to uncertainty is inherently flawed because, since the consequences of banning 
something are just as unknown as those associated with permitting it, more human suffering may 
accrue from the failure to create wealth when there is clearly an opportunity to do so— the 
‘wealthy is healthy’ argument (Wildavsky 1995).
Accordingly it could be argued, for example, that perpetuating emissions of greenhouse gases 
may be a good thing because of the wealth it generates, the possible benefits associated with a 
small increase in temperature, and the possibility that reducing their emission might upset those 
elements of the global ecosystem that have become dependent on the present elevated levels. 
Since the environment’s response to increased greenhouse gases is unknown, how can we be sure 
that attempting to reduce them might not cause more undesired effects elsewhere? Perhaps it is 
better to plough on regardless, and react to real problems when they materialise rather than to 
run away from imaginary possibilities?
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Logically, there is no doubting that these criticisms are fak. Practically, however, it is nonsense to 
say that the likely consequences of actions are always so ambiguous that it is pointless to attempt 
to foresee what causal chain of events might be triggered by those actions. Chemical engineers 
are familiar with the common process control problems associated with systems with a time lag 
between the stimulus and system response, for example—by the time the response is registered, 
it is often too late to stop the system from collapsing. Questions as to how to best act responsibly 
in complex situations are often complicated, but should not be ignored because of this.
Many tools are available for aiding consideration of the consequences of applied technology. 
Producing product life-cycle inventories, for example, gives a ‘first order’ understanding of how 
any one particular activity—using glass to package liquids, say—affects the envkonment in a 
different way to alternative options, such as using paper or plastic. A consideration of the initial 
physical consequences of the whole life-cycle of each option—from raw material transport, 
manufacture, distribution and disposal—can give a reasonable basis on which to consider how 
each option will begin to affect not just the envkonment, but other people and society as a 
whole.
Looking at engineering activities from a life-cycle perspective encourages us to break out of 
established paradigms of product design and to focus more on function identification and 
fulfilment. For example, once we realise that the vast majority of the envkonmental impact of a 
washing machine is related to the heating of hot water, and our responsibility is to minimise 
envkonmental impact, then new factors influence how we might go about tackling the problem 
of cleaning clothes: can new clothes be produced that do not requke cleaning? if not, can we 
clean them without hot water? without water at all?
These questions are not for engineers to answer—to impose our views on the lay public on such 
matters would be to perpetuate the paternalistic paradigm that is currently the source of many of 
late modernity’s social problems. However, I believe it should be within engineers’ responsibility 
to ensure that thek arguments are fakly and clearly taken to the public sphere so that they cannot 
fail to become an integral part of discussions on the role of engineering, and of engineering 
technology in the future. If engineers are distanced from the debate by thek refusal to participate 
in it, then there is a danger that thek valuable perspectives on issues may not form part of the 
public understanding of issues.
4 . 2 . 4 . 3  j udging r espons ibi l i t y
Through continuous reflexive discussion, individuals and organisations could more clearly 
understand the division of responsibilities that might be requked to address the effects of human 
on the manufactured envkonment and on each other. But how might the performance of each be 
judged and encouraged?
At the moment, the responsibilities of engineering organisations are governed generally by the 
‘polluter pays principle’, about which much has been written. That the polluter should pay for
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pollution is a central principle of environmental law throughout the western world. Innocent and 
common-sense-sounding, the principle is ambiguous in many ways.
For example, as the fast-food restaurant example illustrated above, which party should assume 
responsibility as the polluter—in this case, manufacturer or customer—is often unclear.
In addition, what counts as ‘pollution’ is also open to interpretation—at what point does an 
open-air classical music recital constitute a nuisance or noise pollution, for example? Trickier 
than this, in many cases ‘pollution’ itself cannot always be identified as such until it manifests 
itself in some way in the environment, which may occur decades after release and be masked by a 
complex chain of casual events—or may never be detected at all.
As Hughes and Clift (Hughes 1992, Clift 1998) discuss, even the meaning of ‘paying’ for 
pollution is subject to multiple interpretations, including:
• the polluter pays the administrative costs of the pollution-regulating authorities;
• the polluter pays the full ‘reinstatement’ costs of its activities (nonsensical in most cases);
• the polluter pays an arbitrary tax in recognition that environmental damage is not 
without ‘cost’;
• polluter faces corporate penalties, e.g. stock dissolution, disqualification from 
undertaking certain types of activity etc, designed to prevent it from viewing financial 
penalties as operating costs;
• the responsible directors of polluting companies should personally be prosecuted.
AU too often, these vagaries have resulted in ‘poUuter pays’ prosecutions becoming mired in both 
technical and legalistic controversy, and therefore largely confined to scientists, engineers and 
lawyers. Whilst of littie benefit to any party, the greatest problem with this is that public 
participation is therefore excluded to aU but the most persistent of lay audiences, and the debate 
is hugely impoverished for it. How can organisations and individuals begin to discuss the division 
of responsibility towards environmental externalities if ‘debate’ exclusively occurs in the 
acrimonious, unreflexive and adversarial diatribes of environmental lawyers?
Most of the issues raised by legalistic discussions of the ‘poUuter pays’ principle relate precisely to 
the range of Ufe political issues that every individual faces in late modernity. Leaving aside 
practical considerations for now, as a statement of principle I propose that the ‘poUuter pays’ 
principle would be greatly enhanced if,
• who the ‘poUuter’ is;
• what ‘poUution’ is, and;
• what ‘pays’ means
in any given case were to be continuously, contextuaUy and reflexively discussed in the pubUc 
sphere. In the case of fast-food take-away Utter for example, the extent to which ‘the poUuter’ is
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 4.28
the restaurateur or the individual customer, and how either or both should ‘pay’ for the litter, is a 
discussion that would be enormously enriched by the broadest possible range of perspectives, 
both to ensure the question is ‘framed’ openly and to see that proposed solutions are properly 
considered from aU sides. The outcome would be entirely dependent on arguments based on 
contemporary social values that would themselves reflexively develop as a result. In this way, 
institutional change could keep abreast of wider social change rather than being in perpetual 
conflict with it.
This approach rejects the notion that there are necessarily universal values or that there is a single 
‘rational’ approach to any but the narrowest of problems. Although it assumes that the 
expression of aU values and rationalities in principle enrich discussions, it rejects the idea that all 
values and rationalities are equally valid—to assert otherwise is to condone and legitimise 
extremist positions. It assumes that through open and reflexive consideration of issues, 
individuals are capable of reaching a thoughtful opinion based on their own values, priorities and 
perspectives, and that marginally held views will remain such unless they progress by power of 
their content alone. In a society where discussion and analysis are free, open and widespread, 
extremist influence—of whatever political nature—is minimised.
4 . 2 . 4 . 4  I s s ues  of social  r espons i b i l i t y  in t he  ca s e  s t u d i e s
Case study A) The future of photoconversion technologies
In considering the future of renewable energy sources in the UK, it was part of ETSU’s remit to 
identify promising novel technologies that deserved to be given special government support, and 
those which instead should be left to vie for research grants from existing funding agencies. 
ETSU was quite rightly concerned that government funding should not be squandered on those 
technologies whose chances of ultimate success were uncertain. ETSU’s strategy for picking 
potential winners was not primarily based on intellectual or technological merit, but rather on 
their nearness to commercial viability. Those technologies that were at an advanced stage of bench or 
prototype scale development, and/or that had attracted significant commercial interest or 
sponsorship, were deemed to be least Likely to fail and therefore most deserving of state support. 
Unfortunately, in practice this meant that all photoconversion research was left unsupported 
since, by the admission of the researchers themselves all avenues of photoconversion research 
were at least ten years away from bearing Emit, and I had found little commercial interest in 
photoconversion technologies as part of my study.
ETSU’s approach is understandable from a political perspective. With limited funds available, it 
perhaps wished to ensure that its contribution to the development of novel energy technologies 
was as high profile as possible—and what better way to achieve this than to be associated with 
the success of the short-term favourite candidates? However, ETSU’s strategy inevitably 
marginalised and stunted the growth of those more fundamental technologies that in time society 
will have to turn to if it is to make the transition to sustainability—few doubt that some form of
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photoconversion process must be developed if our dependence on fossil fuels is to be seriously 
addressed.
In acting purely with short-term goals in mind, did ETSU act responsibly? Did it consider the 
foreseeable unintended consequences of its (in)action on the future of society? Should it reasonably 
have been expected to do so? Might not future generations and current developing nations 
reasonably hold us to account for not seriously trying to develop sustainable energy sources while 
we had the chance? Such questions are ‘life political’ in that they address issues of habitual 
importance to us aU, such as the quality of life we aspire to for our children.
Case study B) A new heat plant for Holic
At such a key moment in its history, the town of Holic appears to be in the hands of several 
powerful distanciated organisations whose decisions will profoundly affect the development of 
the town for years to come. However, in exerting whatever influence they can over the issue of 
the proposed plant’s future, the town’s citizens should be prepared to take into consideration 
those others who would potentially be affected by any decision.
As recipients of heat from the lignite-fired plant in the nearby Czech town of Hodonin, some of 
Holic’s residents outspokenly object to the proposed Holic heat plant on the grounds that since 
Hodonin is currently taking the burden of the pollution caused by the plant, Holic should enjoy 
its clean air and keep quiet.
Of course, this view is as selfish and socially irresponsible as anything the corporate bodies 
jostling for involvement in the town’s development could be accused of. By seeking to avoid 
taking responsibility for its own energy generation for such reasons, Holic’s residents would quite 
foreseeably be ensuring that its neighbours in Hodonin would be forced to live with an unfair 
environmental burden. Clearly, for dialogic democracy to be effective in resolving such situations, 
the input of all potentially affected stakeholders—in this case particularly the people of 
Hodonin—needs to be ensured.
However, Renn et al (1996) have shown that once local stakeholders are given genuine influence 
in mutually-vital community decisions, (in his study, the siting of a regional waste management 
facility), then extraordinary levels of public fairness and altruism can be displayed. Public 
empowerment can, if encouraged properly, solve many ostensibly ‘technical’ problems.
Case study C) The Plant Manager’s dilemma
By not disclosing the 3-MCPD present in small quantities in its process, Gravyco are guilty of 
perpetuating one of the main causes of the public suspicion of technological experts—namely, 
the feeling that experts will not reveal a public risk even when one is recognised. The company’s 
managers, however, would argue that they are also perpetuating something more important—the 
livelihood of the local economy. Grappling with the new responsibilities of late modernity wiU be 
difficult indeed.
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Such scenarios are likely to become increasingly common as more questions are asked about the 
safety of well-established and apparently innocuous technologies in the light of increasingly 
sophisticated analytical processes, heightened public suspicion and better information exchange. 
But what can the Graiycos of the world do to prevent or ameliorate this situation?
From a technical point of view, it might be argued that food manufacturers particularly should 
consider exercising more caution during process selection. Public sphere input from the 
beginning could prove valuable in this way for two reasons: Firstly, a lay person is more likely to 
be more conservative in their judgement of what they consider to be ‘reasonable’ food processing 
techniques—a judgement that may not be groundless. A lay person’s concerns about the wisdom 
of using hot, concentrated hydrochloric acid as a raw material for a foodstuff (as in the case of 
acid-HVP) might well cause a chemical engineer to think twice about doing so, for example (in 
the same way that feeding recycled animal parts to ‘naturally’ vegetarian livestock seems ill- 
advised to us now in the light of the BSE crisis). For similar reasons, manufacturers may be 
treated more sympathetically if the public endorsed their processes firom the beginning.
On a more general level, stimulating reflexive public sphere debate about a hypothetical ‘Plant 
Manager’s dilemma’ could be a helpful way of helping the public understand the nature of the 
problems to face engineering managers, perhaps playing a role in recasting such problems as 
social ones rather than business ones. Engineering Managers, of course, would do well both to 
contribute to such a discussion, and to take their lead from the direction they take.
Case study D) The use o f mercury in dental amalgam
One of the most surprising findings in WS Atkins’ report to the Environment Agency on 
mercury and cadmium was that one of the major sources of mercury releases to the environment 
in the UK is from dental practices (second only to the chlor-alkaH industry at the time of the 
report, i.e. 1995). Several tonnes per year of metallic mercury is washed into municipal sewerage 
systems, and its chemical behaviour there and at sewage treatment facilities is largely unknown. 
However, mercury could potentially be methylated into an uncontroversially highly toxic, organic 
form, and subsequently enter the food chain.
Since the use of mercury in dental amalgam is long established, this unintended consequence of 
oral medicine will be approached by government in a sensitive way—it is usually illegal for any 
industry to release a ‘Red List’ substance under aU but the most exceptional of circumstances, but 
as yet, the dental industry is aUowed to continue. In the past, mercury poUution caused by 
dentistry was an ‘environmental extemaUty’ that was ignored. In late modernity, it should be 
debated whether the dental industry should be obUged to take responsibUity for at least this 
recognised unintended consequence of its use of mercury. WS Atkins estimated that the cost of 
fitting amalgam separators to aU UK dental clinics would cost the dental industry— or the 
NHS—around £2^ miUion. Should this be paid, or should the poUution continue to be ignored? 
While it remains an extemaUty, surely it wiU continue to be ignored—should the dental industry
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instead be financially ‘encouraged’ to develop alternatives to mercury amalgam? This, in turn 
returns to the debate on the ‘polluter pays principle’, discussed above.
Case Study E) The role o f engineering consuitancy
Engineering consultants are often the best-placed group to analyse and understand how the 
unintended consequences of engineering practice may affect the dynamic real world. This is 
because engineering consultancies are often:
• multidisciplinary by technical training;
• accustomed to researching and dealing with government and other official statistics and 
reports;
• well connected to a wide variety of experts;
•  familiar with viewing socio-technical systems at an abstract level.
Consultants therefore have a key role to play in terms of helping society understand and re­
allocate responsibility for present social and environmental ‘externalities’ that, in being unclaimed 
and unaddressed, have undermined the concept of technical ‘progress’ in late modernity.
I deduce that engineering consultancies should be proactive in this respect, by highlighting such 
matters when working with potential clients during the ‘ftaming’ phase of project definition. By 
alerting engineering companies to the possible consequences of their actions from the earliest 
possible stage, consultancies’ subsequent plans will undoubtedly be more sophisticated and 
‘enlightened’. Therefore, as it begins to encompass vital elements of social leadership, the role of 
business development and proposal writing within engineering consultancy becomes elevated to 
an evermore-critical position. This is explored more fuUy in the case study presented in 
Volume 2.
4 . 2 . 5  Te c h n i c a l  a u t h o r i t y
In some circles, the above approach to identifying and assigning responsibility might be labelled 
‘post-modern’ in its rejection of the existence of single, universal truths about the ways in which 
social problems should be dealt with. Up to now, modernity has been defined by individuals and 
organisations who believed that they knew ‘the answer’ to what specifically should be done, as if 
a single perspective existed that could deliver solutions that were universally acceptable. 
Engineers and their organisations have been particularly guilty of this—most engineering projects 
are conceived of with only a limited view of the needs and aspirations of the people for whom 
they were intended, or of whose lives they would affect. Giddens is ‘post-modern’ in the sense 
that he believes that it is only through dialogic democratic principles that society can begin to 
explore the best available options for future action—there is no single ‘grand plan’ waiting to be 
discovered.
However, the label ‘post-modern’ in this context is more usually associated with those who reject 
the central tenets of Enlightenment thought altogether—that through reason and empirical
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evidence, objective facts about a real world can be elucidated and used to progress human 
societies. Indeed, some question whether an objective outside world exists at all.
So far in this chapter, I have raised several issues that appear in some ways to challenge the 
nature of specialist knowledge. By suggesting that the public sphere may have a legitimate part to 
play in matters of the regulation of new technologies, for example, important questions arise 
concerning the ‘debateable’ nature of scientific expertise. Many post-modernist thinkers have no 
problem with this—since all knowledge is generated as the result of social processes, they argue, 
there is no clear line between what is known and what is considered opinion. Therefore, all 
knowledge claims are just that—rival claims as to what constitute ‘facts’, of which the scientific 
method is a dominant institutionalised form.
While conceding much ground to post-modernist thought, Giddens, Beck and other influential 
writers reject such a position. To understand the legitimate role of the public sphere in 
‘technological’ policy-making, it is necessary for engineering organisations to examine critically 
the nature of the expert knowledge they have in order to successfully defend the true, ‘hard’ 
science that underlies their legitimacy.
Before as recently as the Second World War, science was mainly concerned with elucidating 
'basic' facts and scientific principles. At this time it was credible to see science as uncovering facts 
about the world that were, with one or two exceptions, strongly supported by a thoroughly 
convincing body of evidence. Many theories, such as those of thermodynamics, proved to stand 
up so well, and to be so useful in predicting real outcomes., that they were called 'laws' and assumed to 
be absolute statements of truth (though Einstein showed the danger of assuming scientific laws 
to be absolute when he showed Newton's 'laws' of motion to be approximations). But there 
remains little basis on which to doubt the objectivity of this so-called 'normal' sciencek
After the War, however, science became much more 'industrialised' (Ravetz 1971) and scientists 
progressively worked in the more obscure and esoteric branches of disciplines. Much of the 
science in these areas remains immature or, because of the complexity of certain systems such as 
the environment and the human body, is inherently incapable of reaching anything like the levels 
of certainty achieved by 'basic' science.
For example, in a bid to isolate the variables they think might be controlling what is happening in 
complex systems, researchers study more and more abstract and removed 'simulated' versions of 
those systems rather than the real systems themselves—unreal assumptions that are often 
ignored when that science is applied to the increasingly novel and complex real world. Often,
 ^However, there is a long line of philosophers that have attempted to argue otherwise, e.g. Rorty 
(1987) offers an interesting, unashamedly ‘post-modern’ view. The discussion is huge, fascinating, 
and unfortunately, beyond the scope of this work. A robust defence of science’s claim to 
objective truth is given by Dunbar (1995).
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such abstractions come to be regarded, in effect, as material things in themselves— economic 
indicators are sometimes reified in this way. The line between what is scientifically known and 
what can assumed to be the case becomes blurred.
Moreover, the whole scientific process becomes increasingly social, as value judgements pervade 
research, not least in its dependence on statistical analyses, publication rituals, commercial 
pressures for 'successful' results etc (e.g. Gilbert and Mulkay 1984). Studies have become 
necessarily larger and more expensive and are therefore more difficult to repeat; in any case, 
social pressures ensure that there is little incentive for independent researchers to try to repeat 
others' work. The way research work is 'framed' at its conception is also highly relevant to the 
results that are achieved - 'framing' being an entirely value-driven process (e.g. Wynne 1989). For 
example, had the environmental impact of birth control pills been considered as part of their 
safety assessment, then their alleged effects on fish gender and male human sterility might have 
been foreseen.
On Figure 2.5, we might visualise this taking place against the gradual ‘mushrooming’ of the 
‘modernity’ group on loop three. Before the 1940s, when modernity was relatively ‘pre-radical’, 
most of the unintended consequences of technical action were effectively externalised, localised, 
and anyway relatively simple. For example, pollution firom bulk chemical plants largely had no 
discernible effect beyond the locality of the plant itself—the scale of production was relatively 
small, and the Earth apparently had the capacity to absorb the diluted emissions. The pollutants 
themselves were usually simple inorganic chemicals such as acids and alkalis, and there were few 
major instances of pollutant ‘cocktails’ arising from the inadvertent and uncontrolled mixture of 
separate effluents.
Today, the situation is profoundly different. With a radicalised modernity (an enlarged 
‘modernity’ bubble on Figure 2.5), distanciation, disembedding and institutional reflexivity all see 
to it that evermore complex chemicals are being shipped to more places, to be used in 
conjunction with other complex chemicals to achieve increasingly extraordinary things. Industry 
is undertaken on an exponentially rising scale, proportionally increasing the likelihood that 
intractably complex chemical mixtures can arise. The problems that science is charged with 
understanding become more impenetrable as the 'manufactured environment' continually 
assimilates the chemically exotic products of industry and the bizarre conrings-together of 
substances and social relations brought about by institutional reflexivity.
AU too often, hard political decisions must be made involving consideration of the poorly 
understood potential consequences of discrete options, decisions that convention requires must 
be based on the 'best available' science - even when science teUs us very little about some 
particular systems. When political or commercial decisions are made in the name of science, and 
those decisions prove inadequate or unpopular, people inevitably lose faith in science and the 
decision-maker.
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Exploring a hypothetical, but not untypical, example of the limitations of technical expertise in 
late modernity helps to focus on the points at issue:
Suppose a lorry loaded with steroids collides with another loaded with nitric acid, and both 
consignments disperse quickly into a tropical lake. Decisions must be taken about what to do to 
minimise the consequences, how to rehabilitate the lake and what lessons can be learned, etc. 
Various experts are quickly assembled. A hormone expert knows something about the way 
hormones act in controlled environments, but knows little about their effects on tropical 
ecosystems. Vice versa for a tropical ecosystem expert (if such a thing exists). An organic chemist 
might shed some light onto the likely initial side reactions that might occur, but can know little 
about the role of unknown quantities of unknown by-products on the barely understood 
environment. In short, a great deal of guessing will ensue.
Many questions arise firom this that are of importance to the way engineering companies deal 
with technical uncertainty and the public sphere. Firstly, although all these experts are scientists, 
to what extent will they be able effectively to communicate with each other? Much of the 
discussion must surely reduce to fairly jargon-firee English and very general scientific terminology 
since the technical vocabulary of a tropical fish expert will have little in common with that of an 
organic chemist. Next, most of the discussion will revolve around value judgements - even the 
very purpose of the group could have multiple framings. Is the group there to minimise the loss 
of biodiversity of life in the lake? to prevent the steroids from affecting biodiversity beyond the 
lake itself? to clean up the lake as quickly as possible? to take advantage of the research 
possibilities? to monitor the degree of safety of the water as drinking water? to prescribe limits on 
suitable human use of the water? to minimise the impact of the accident for future generations, 
regardless of the short-term expense or timetable? Each of these framings could have multiple 
sub-framings - (which tropical fish are more important, etc) — and each issue would be of varying 
importance to any given individual. Third, to what extent, and in what ways, could and should lay 
knowledge about the specific lake, specific tropical fish, etc be used to influence the very limited 
technical understanding of what is happening (after Wynne 1996)? Fourth, what balance of 
ethical considerations regarding decision-making should be made in such circumstances of 
uncertainty - how should we weigh the moral rights of local people, indirectly affected people, 
the tropical fish, the water company etc?
In such contexts of uncertainty, the scientific community and engineering organisations must 
consider their position on the role of lay knowledge and opinion both in terms of the technical 
understanding of problems and in the value judgements involved with the (ongoing) framing of 
technical problems. Few would claim that lay opinions on technical problems are in any way 
superior (or in most cases, equal) to scientific expertise, nor that lay value judgements are in any 
way more important than those of scientists. But in the light of this extreme example it seems 
difficult to argue that lay knowledge or experience is without value without resorting to scientific 
fundamentalism (the view that only knowledge generated by science can have worth in an applied 
situation, since aU other knowledge is valueless superstition), elitism (on the basis of education.
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 4.35
scientific elites are better qualified to make value judgements), simple fundamentalism (this is 
how things have always been done, so this is how it must be) or fatalistic pragmatism (like 
democracy, the present system is the worst possible - apart from aU the others—once the public 
is involved, all decisions wiU be convoluted, antagonistic committee compromises that will please 
no-one, double the time and expense and lose direction).
O f these arguments, the last is perhaps the most important, because it has several dimensions to 
it. The more people are involved in the consideration of such complex issues, the more unwieldy 
existing processes certainly become - both in terms of the sheer number of people and because 
of the huge number of relevant arguments that need to be heard (the very purpose of the 
exercise). Second, processes may move more slowly because many lay people wiU not possess the 
general technical vocabulary and elementary knowledge to foUow multidisciplinary discussions. 
Third, whereas scientists may tend to take each other’s word on trust, the public may be more 
reluctant to do so. Such suspicion may reduce co-operation and introduce the need for external 
verification, handicapping the executive effectiveness of the group. So perhaps it is the case that 
if something could be done institutionally to alleviate the shortcomings of alternative processes, 
then science and its proponents and institutions would be more forthcoming about admitting its 
own?
The issues surrounding the potential role of the public sphere in apparently ‘technical’ matters 
may be clarified in this way by reference to an extreme example, but how is this different from 
more mundane, every day ‘technological’ decision-making? Referring back to the illustration of 
the life political questions raised by the introduction of mobile phones in the previous chapter, 
many of the issues raised parallel those just raised, such as whether or not mobile telephone 
companies should be permitted to erect powerful transmitter towers adjacent to primary schools. 
Many people have children, many have mobile phones, many have both and most, given 
appropriate support, are readily able to balance the available evidence and come to a value 
judgement based on thek own experience. Because the value judgement is just that, there is no 
‘correct’ or simple ‘rational’ answer. Whatever dkection the public sphere debate might take, the 
actions of any organisation acting in accordance with it will be greatly legitimised. Where no clear 
‘public will’ reflexively develops, then perhaps a ‘precautionary’ conservative position might be 
adopted by default? This way, the public sphere may begin to regulate the rate of technical 
development rather than being passively swept along by it. Importantly, engineering organisations 
may establish themselves as supporters and advisors to the public sphere rather than the cavalier 
drivers of it.
If such an approach seems unlikely to us now, the alternative consequences of a radical review of 
the present system of public participation should be clear to engineering organisations. As each 
new development brings with it new contexts of social ckcumstances, more people will be asking 
more questions from increasingly varied perspectives. Public frustration will increase as engineers 
continue to make poor decisions based on inadequate conceptions of public needs, fears and 
aspkations. The decline of public trust in present institutions will continue, the power of self-help
Graham Long, EngD Environmental Technology 1999
PAGE 4.36
and pressure groups will continue to rise. If engineering organisations and other powerful groups 
do not use their influence now to proactively empower the public sphere, a future of mutual trust 
seems distant indeed.
4 . 2 . 5 . 1  I s s u es  of t echni ca l  au t hor i t y  in t he  c a s e  s t u d i e s
Case study A) The future of photoconversion technoiogies
ETSU’s decision not to fund photoconversion research was naturally a value rather than a 
technical judgement; as I have discussed, such discussions are also necessarily politically 
influenced (ETSU’s attitude may have been moulded to reflect those of the government of the 
day, for example). However, the decision nevertheless implicitly draws on certain beliefs about 
technical realities that are worth exploring:
By failing to ‘push’ potential long-term solutions to society’s unsustainable dependence on fossil 
fuels, ETSU is revealing that it believes either that:
• concerns about the inherently fragile nature of the Earth and its capacity to withstand 
the medium-term and long-term effects of drastically increased levels carbon dioxide, 
are unfounded or overstated; and/or
• the market is the best judge of which technologies are worthy of development, and that 
only market favourites should be supported to ensure their success.
Either of these positions may be right or wrong—science has no way of knowing at the present 
time. Such are the technical uncertainties associated with the effects of fossil fuel combustion on 
the environment that there is abundant scientific knowledge that could be used to support 
arguments either way. However, neither of these beliefs is a conservative position—both, if 
wrong, could exacerbate the situation. For example, a number of recent studies (e.g. Greenpeace 
International 1997) have suggested that the market will only drive renewable energies once we are 
overwhelmed in some way by pollution, since so much fossil fuel remains untapped that fuel 
supply will not be a problem before this happens). On behalf of government, ETSU is taking 
what might be considered to be a high-risk strategy.
There are many in the public sphere that would nevertheless agree with ETSU’s position, for a 
variety of valid reasons. However, because the judgement has been made by a technical body, the 
public is likely to see it as another example of scientists gambling our future on uncertain science, 
a decision that serves to underline the dichotomy between technologists and the public. Were, on 
the other hand, the debate about strategies towards the environment to take place in the public 
sphere, decisions following from them—whichever dkection they took—would be seen to be 
vastly more legitimate.
Case study B) A new heat plant for Holic
The European Commission employed WS Atkins to investigate the technological and financial 
feasibility of a new heat plant in Holic. Ostensibly, the report was to be a purely objective study
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into which, if any, technologies could be physically capable of reliably delivering the required heat 
load at a reasonable cost to the town’s taxpayers. However, the study was always more than this, 
since we were also required to examine other factors relevant to the town, such as the tradeoffs 
between the job prospects of local lignite miners and the local air quality, etc. Nevertheless, the 
emphasis was on the technical, the economic, the quantifiable—we were, after all, there as 
‘technical experts’.
Technically, it is not difficult to supply efficiently a pre-defined quantity and quality of hot water 
to a town’s primary district heating system. However, the problem arises in deciding on the 
assumptions for supply and demand patterns that go into a financial model. Such assumptions 
depend on the people of the town to behave in predictable and reliable ways—notoriously 
difficult in late modernity. As Giddens teaches us, people’s behaviour is becoming evermore 
reflexive. People monitor their own actions with respect to that of thek friends and neighbours, 
thek impression of exposure to financial risk, thek political affiliations and aspkations, thek 
values and concerns. These facts are of huge significance to a study of this type because the 
financial viability of a district heating system depends on how many people will use it. How many 
people will use it will depend, on the first count at least, on people’s guesses of how many others 
will use it; since the cost of the heat supply will be divided by the number of users via thek hot 
water bills (assuming no subsidies are given—and it is unlikely that the European Commission 
would be happy to encourage new subsidised energy systems in central Europe), the cost to each 
individual decreases as more individuals sign up. Since many other sources of private hot water 
are available (e.g. private gas boilers), social reflexivity becomes the dominant factor in 
determining the financial feasibility of the plant. How odd, then, to leave public discussion out of 
the feasibility study!
Despite this, a decision on Holic’s heat plant is likely to be presented to the people of Holic as a 
technicality/ accompli. My impression is that political and social issues will be downplayed, perhaps 
to dampen inevitable local controversy over the outcome— technically, it will be said, the plant was 
or was not feasible. Again, a decision of communal significance wiU be seen to be taken by 
technical people on technical grounds. As Grove-White argues (see Volume 2), this would not be 
without precedent in the UK.
Somewhat konically, the decision process is stiU, several years later after WS Atkins involvement, 
awaiting the conclusions of yet more technical feasibility studies.
Case study C) The Plant Manager's dilemma
In an attachment to this case study presented in Volume 2, I have reproduced a Food Advisory 
Committee (FAC) newsletter article that outlines the government’s advice to the UK 
manufacturers of acid-HVP regarding 3-MCPD contamination. (The FAC is part of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries).
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In response to clinical studies that found a link between exposure to 3-MCPD and cancer in rats, 
in May 1996 the FAC recommended that since acid-HVP manufacturers said they could not 
remove 3-MCPD entirely from their products, steps should be taken to reduce levels to the 
minimum detectable, and a timescale agreed over which a switch to 3-MCPD-free products could 
be made. Later, in October of that year, the food industry was given 18 months to reduce to 
undetectable levels the amounts of 3-MCPD not just in acid-HVP, but also in other food 
products in which fats were exposed to acids. By the summer of 1998, 3-MCPD was still found 
to be present in quantities above lOppb in a ‘few cases’ (See Volume 2).
It is perhaps not long ago that such admissions would be difficult to extract firom a government 
department at all. However, MAFF will not name those companies with products that still 
contain 3-MCPD because it believes that small amounts of 3-MCPD constitute a negligible 
health risk—the important thing, MAFF would argue, is that these manufacturers are taking steps 
to ultimately remove the toxin from our food. The fact that this is taking much longer than it 
initially anticipated is merely regrettable.
Are we to be reassured by this approach? This, of course, depends to some degree on how much 
we trust MAFF to make such judgements on our behalf. Since BSE and countless other food 
scares, few in the public sphere are likely to be particularly sympathetic to MAFF’s declarations 
that “there is no immediate cause for concern”. Many people deeply object to the way that 
MAFF is making a value judgement based on its own assessment of technical risk—an 
assessment that is inevitably affected by the political consequences of labelling particular foods 
‘unsafe’. The science underlying MAFF’s decision—in this case toxicity experiments on rats—is 
far from conclusive, but is suggesting some kind of link between 3-MCPD exposure and cancer.
Surely it should be up to the individual to decide whether or not that risk is worth taking? 
Through reflexive debate in the public sphere, individuals could be empowered to choose 
whether or not the risk of exposure to 3-MCPD is worth the benefits of the product. The more 
information is available, the more independent technical interpretations are on offer, and the 
more practised the consumer becomes at informing him or herself of the options, the less 
hysterical such events need be. The government’s proposed independent Food Standards Agency 
may be a critical and interesting development m. generative politics.
Of course, the acid-HVP /  3-MCPD problem has an added, typically late modem twist: since 
HVP is present m almost all processed foods, it does not really matter that the identity of 3- 
MCPD-containing HVP manufacturers is unknown, since it would be almost impossible for a 
concerned consumer to avoid exposure to it without eating only organic foods. Perhaps therein 
lies the moral?
Case study D) The use of mercury in dentai amalgam
In this case study, I describe how the use of mercury in dental amalgam has long been 
controversial. As early as 1848, the New York dentists’ society suspended seven members for
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malpractice because they used mercury amalgam. Later, as the toxic effects of mercury in a great 
many contexts became clearer, professional dispute over its suitability as an oral medical 
constituent continued unabated. Royal (1991) explains that the American Dental Association 
(ADA) was formed directly in response to the mercury amalgam controversy, and has remained a 
powerful advocate of amalgam ever since.
As the study I helped prepare for the Environment Agency makes clear, the effects of mercury 
on biological systems are extremely complex—so complex, in fact, that they may never be fuUy 
understood. It wiU probably be impossible to confirm or deny whether any of the long list of 
non-specific symptoms that some people believe are caused by exposure to mercury in dental 
amalgam actually are so. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that they 
may be.
However, in an attempt to assuage public fears, the ADA absolutely, categorically denies that 
mercury in dental amalgam is of questionable safety. It insists that mercury’s safety record is 
‘indisputable’, and condemns those who disagree, such as the UK Department of Health, for 
possibility ‘caus[ing] unnecessary anxiety’.
This is a clear case of technical experts making value judgements on public safety issues based on 
incomplete science. The ADA is simply wrong to state that the safety of mercury amalgam is 
indisputable. The question is, how should the problem of scientific uncertainty in this case be 
handled? Putting to one side the complications of the potential legal consequences of conceding 
that mercury amalgam may not be totally safe, how could the issue be more adeptly handled?
Again, I believe that the important point is to foster the framing of such issues as ‘social’ rather 
than ‘technical’ issues, thereby transforming them from questions of conflict (‘what are they 
doing to us now?’) to questions of community (‘how should we deal with this?’). The only way to 
do this is through openness and honesty, and reflexive discussion in the public sphere.
Case study E) The rote of engineering consuitancy
In each of the above examples, conflict has arisen as a result of the tendency of technically- 
trained people, often unintentionally, to mix statements of scientific fact with those based on 
professional and personal experience or on general value judgements. The results can be quite 
damaging for science as a whole, particularly when scientific research is selectively interpreted for 
political ends, as the BSE crisis illustrates all too well.
Consultant engineers are familiar with working with scientific facts and professional value 
judgements. This places them in a strong position to help take esoteric scientific findings to 
people unfamiliar to them (i.e. the public sphere) as well as to point out the inherent value 
judgements present in much of today’s ‘industrialised’ science to those more familiar with 
working with more fundamental, ‘normal’ science (i.e. traditional engineers).
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4 . 2 . 6  Di r ec t i on  a n d  p r o g r e s s
. .people would like to think that there's someho^ up there who knows what he's doing. Since we don't 
participate, we don't control and we don't even think about questions of vital importance. We hope someone 
is paying attention who has some competence. 'Let's hope the ship has a captain, in other words, since we're 
not taking part in what's going on. ..It is an importantfeature of the ideological system to impose on people 
the feeling that they are really incompetent to deal with these complex and important issues: they'd better 
leave it to the captain".
— Noam Chomsky (1988)
‘This is an era of specialists, each of whom sees his own problem and is unaware or intolerant of the larger 
frame into which itfits"
— 'Rachael Carson (1962)
The modem world, as Chomsky implies, has no captain. Instead, this is an era of specialists 
unaware of the larger frame, as Rachael Carson observed as long ago as 1962. With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the command-control, ‘cybernetic’ philosophy of government, we have 
entered a period of modernity in which many systems are simply beyond human 
comprehension—we often seem to be at the mercy of a series of multiplying forces that wiH take 
us where they will. To extend Chomsky’s analogy for a moment, living in the modem world can 
feel like being on board a captainless ship, buffeted around by the high seas of uncontrollable 
forces, ultimately doomed, sooner or later, to smash on the rocks of environmental disaster, 
economic collapse or nuclear apocalypse.
This analogy may be one that somehow influences much modem behaviour. An emphasis on 
short-term investment cycles, for example, makes perfect sense from this perspective. If the ship 
happens to miss the rocks, who knows where the waves will take us in fifty years’ time? With the 
future so uncertain and potentially bleak, it is also understandable that many people may look to 
the past for the ontological security they crave. Totalitarianists may be expected to offer to help 
to thek feet those knocked over by an unexpected wave, for example—yet another high 
consequence risk created by modernity.
Giddens would reject the ship-on-the-high-seas analogy. The difference between this metaphor 
and that of the juggemaut is subtle, but important: the juggernaut is controlled by people-, it lurches this 
way and that because of our day-to-day behaviour. Unlike uncontrollable high seas, the juggemaut can 
be steered by those who comprise it, and the mechanism of potentially co-ordinating action—the 
transport and telecommunications sectors—are an integral part of the juggemaut itself.
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The main problem with the juggemaut, Giddens suggests, is that it has no destination in mind. 
Society has largely lost faith in human progress based on Enlightenment principles—with no 
altemative, human systems are perpetuated simply for the sustaining and apparently stable 
rewards they deliver. Is the modernist notion of ‘progress’ necessarily killed by the unintended 
consequences of human action? Is there a way of actively ‘steering’ a juggemaut comprised of 
reflexive and unpredictable clever people? For Giddens, a possible solution lies in the nature of 
modernity to look forward, to ‘colonise the future’, and the reflexive way that colonisation affects 
our action today (Giddens 1990, ppl77-178).
Suppose we were to replace the certainty of yesterday’s tradition with visions of tomorrow’s 
future. Suppose that future were attractive enough to most people so as to constitute something 
worth working towards; something that did not compromise too much adapting present modes 
of existence, and that in many ways opened up new avenues for individual aspirations. More 
importantly, suppose that this future was not so much a creation of whimsical fantasy, but 
instead had enough in common with the present world as to be a recognisable, straightforward 
possible development firom it. With a clear vision of this future in our heads, we would be more 
likely to take decisions now that may, by the forces of institutional reflexivity, bring it closer to 
us. We should all think, Giddens suggests, in terms of utopian realism (Giddens 1990, ppl54).
4 . 2 . 6 . 1  Utopian real i sm
Utopian realism, Giddens agrees, sounds like an oxymoron. Our visions of the future must have 
elements of utopianism in them in order that we have something specific to aspire to, rather than 
a collection of things to run away from. Modem literature is awash with the latter, from Huxley’s 
Brave New World to Orwell’s 1984. Each of these was written with an eye to influencing 
contemporary political debates about how the future might be colonised, and no doubt both had 
a significant reflexive effect on today’s world. But knowing what we do not want is not the same 
as knowing what we do want—building a future on avoiding foreseen pitfaUs runs the risk of 
stepping backwards into an unforeseen one. Similarly, our thought should be towards realistic 
goals, lest our fantasies remain such. In this regard, the trick must be to identify “institutionally 
immanent possibilities” (Giddens 1990, ppl55) and to identify ways of helping them to unfold to 
our advantage.
On Figure 2.5, utopian realism might be thought of as the conscious consideration of the likely 
events that might be triggered during loop (3), and the subsequent modification of individual 
action to selectively limit those possibilities. To use an analogy firom process control, it is a form 
of feedforward mechanism in which a set point is aimed for by modifying part of a system in 
intelligent anticipation of how that change wiU affect the system as a whole (in contrast to a feedback 
mechanism, that attempts to hit a set point by making alterations on a trial-and-error basis).
On first consideration, this may seem to be a blatant contradiction of everything that has been 
said before. If institutional reflexivity is so profound, how can we begin to second-guess the ways 
in which technology or social information wiU be reflexively applied to change the world? Why
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will simply having a vision of the future necessarily move us towards it—might it not instead 
reflexively cause exactly the opposite to happen? Also, given the infinite scope for reflexive 
‘projects of the self to lead individuals in different directions towards authenticity, how could a 
single vision of the future be acceptable to everyone? If, alternatively, multiple visions of the 
future are to be proposed, how can ontological security be based on the ‘certainty’ of future?
Such objections resurrect the ‘individual autonomy’ debate of Structuration Theory’s critics. 
Giddens passionately believes in the ‘cleverness’ of people, and their ability to take charge of their 
own lives in spite of the stmctures that they perpetuate. A ‘realistic utopia’, he argues, puts the 
brakes on reflexivity by defining what the outcome wiU be in advance. It provides for a fixity of 
certain aspects of life that may come to resemble some features of tradition. Ontological security 
wUl have something to be grounded in, as wiU our faith that our world is under our control. 
Utopian realism reintroduces the relevance of looking at time from a broader perspective rather 
than the immediate, myopic demands of the (current) financial system.
For me die idea of utopian realism begins to strike a chord when we return to the example of the 
family mentioned in the introduction to Structuration Theory. A family, as I mentioned earlier, is 
a group of people who happen organise thek daily lives ki such a way as to resemble something 
we can identify as a family. Now in modem times much of the logistical ‘push’ for groups of 
related people to act as a family unit has been dissolved by changes in the social world: pre­
prepared dinners mean there is no longer any real need for everyone to eat together; changing 
gender roles mean that women are no longer necessarily dependent on men to support them and 
thek chUdren; greater financial independence is possible for aU; the state (mosdy) prevents the 
children of broken marriages becoming destitute, etc. No longer a powerful practical necessity, 
the family is more usuaUy seen as a deskable end in itself, and for the security, certainty and 
intimacy it can provide over the alternatives. With a fixed ideal of what ‘the family’ should be, we 
adjust our behaviour in conscious ways that help perpetuate it: we make special efforts to eat 
together despite the inconvenience, we take holidays together despite the fact that we may not 
always want to or need to, etc. The family unit is now a form of ‘realistic utopia’, and our 
strategic decisions—whether to accept a highly-paying job involving a long commute, say— 
habitually involve consideration of how that utopia might be affected.
Utopian realism is about bracketing-off an infinite range of possibilities in order to focus in on 
something understandable and deskable. In some limited ways, this happens akeady in 
commercial practice—what are company mission statements if not ways of ruling out certain 
dkections of future business development? Thinking in terms of utopian realism goes one step 
further than this; rather than saying ‘this is why we are here’, utopian realism says, ‘this is where 
we want to go, and this is how we intend to get there’.
Through utopian realism, Giddens asserts that it is possible to continue to think positively in 
terms of ‘social progress’ in the modernist sense. Unlike some modernist philosophers, he does 
not believe that progress is inevitable—it is something that must consciously be worked at—but
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nor is it impossible. We should think, he suggests, in terms of a ‘critical theory without 
guarantees’ (Giddens 1990, pp 156).
The advantages of thinking in terms of utopian realism certainly seem to be appealing. However, 
there are many ways in which this idea could be developed, and it is helpful to pursue the line of 
argument that leads to a possible practical proposition, and (hopefully) to understand what 
Giddens is suggesting.
The immediate problem regarding the application of utopian reaHsm relates to the nature of the 
vision itself: should we look for one or more ‘general’ visions that are agreed upon and shared by 
us all, or should utopian realism simply be regarded as a personal philosophy, with no specific 
vision? In modernity’s past, grand utopian visions of the future were imposed from the top down 
by powerful leaders who, for reasons discussed in the previous chapter, were able to control 
information circulation and limit altemative points of view. This approach must surely be 
abandoned in the light of Giddens’ Modernity Thesis.
But if utopian realism is simply a personal principle by which each individual might be 
encouraged to live their life, how is this any different firom the present situation of unfettered 
reflexivity? With everyone chasing different goals and objectives, where does the ontological 
security of a more predictable future come from? Where is the basis for faith that we can, after 
all, control our own destiny? Surely we will continue trip over each other’s unintended 
consequences in exactly the same way as we do already?
These reservations might well prove to carry weight, but there is a crucial difference between 
modem institutional reflexivity and a hypothetical situation of post-scarcity reflexivity. By the 
former, I mean the present state of affairs whereby the wider consequences of most individuals’ 
actions are unconsidered and risk is extemalised—in other words, individuals do what they can to 
make it through thek lives in a fulfilling way, and see universal social problems as remote and the 
job of government to deal with. By the latter, I mean a situation where individuals have in mind 
some elements of utopian realism of thek own, moulded in light of an awareness that economic 
growth and compulsive hard-labour are becoming manifestly counterproductive (Giddens 1995, 
p 163), and so make strategic decisions on a day-to-day basis that will reflexively contribute to 
realising that goal.
Critically, individuals are not alone in thek thoughts. Given the profound extent of knowledge 
ckculation that characterises late modernity, many of the issues concerning individuals akeady 
reflexively pervade social communication. The more ideas of the future ckculate, the more likely 
people will reflexively adopt pattems of present behaviour that increase the likelihood of that 
future coming about. Martin Luther King’s ‘I have a dream’ speech in Washington in 1963 is a 
powerful example of a utopian realistic vision reflexively altering contemporary behaviour in 
ways that made a particular future more likely. King’s ideas, projected into the public sphere, 
ckculated widely because they resonated with the values of many people at the time. Although
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still perhaps unfulfilled, King’s dream that his “four little children wUl one day live in a nation 
where they will not be judged by the colour of thek skin but by the content of thek character” (in 
Lowe 1988) is probably nearer to realisation now than if he had not expressed it. The 
ambivalence of King’s success also highlights the fragile nature of colonising the future in an era 
of profound institutional reflexivity.
Engkieerkig’s visionaries might similarly offer forth visions of the future to the public sphere. 
Technology’s most creative visionaries may not be technically trained at aU. The principle is, 
though, that by exchanging ideas and concepts, the public sphere and engineering organisations 
might together sketch out elements of a future in which people, perhaps in different ways, would 
be motivated to aspke to. Concepts are likely to continuously change and evolve rather than ever 
be firmly defined, but ontological security may be supported by the belief that there was a 
possibility of something better around the comer.
4 . 2 . 6 . 2  Sus t a i nabi l i t y  as  u t op i an  real i sm
Perhaps the most significant example of utopian-realism thinking of recent years has been the 
international effort to conceive of how we might develop a viable, sustainable future for human 
societies. Most of us have a fakly vague impression of what sustainability is. The influential 
definition offered by Gro Harlem Brundtland—that sustainability involves finding ways of 
development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet thek own needs” (WCED 1987)—implies consideration of physical factors 
such as resource depletion or envkonmental pollution. It seems to imply an expert problem, 
waiting for technical solutions—let’s find more efficient ways of making food, of generating and 
using energy, of minimising the production of waste, of re-examining the nature of our material 
economy. O f course, sustainability is very much about dealing with these things, as many 
commentators have pointed out (e.g. Jackson 1996). But this interpretation is, in the light of 
Giddens’ theories, too limited to address the full range of sustainability issues.
By definition, sustainability is about bringing to an end those features of modernity that are 
unsustainable. Modernity’s rapid increase in change and uncertainty cannot continue 
mdefkiitely—the human demand for ontological security demands otherwise. In a related way, 
the increasing loss of trust in professional bodies and traditional forms of authority must 
eventually end, one way or another. The aU-pervasive extent of our reliance on abstract systems 
demands that we must soon either feel more secure in trusting those responsible for them, or 
abandon that reliance. The latter of these possibilities would probably prove to be painful for all 
concerned. For the moment at least, the power to adapt lies with the traditional bases of power.
Sustainability as utopian realism then, is a multi-faceted proposition. From a technical 
perspective, it certainly involves ‘traditional engineering’ issues, mostly centring on the most 
fundamental limiting factor of all human activity: the laws of thermodynamics. This places an 
absolute boundary, an ‘energetic bottom-line’ around what, physically, we can do to ameliorate 
our condition. From a social perspective, it involves issues of how we can live together in a
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complex world, creating viable new structures that enable us and future generations to achieve 
self-fulfilment. Both technical and social perspectives are, of course, simultaneously constrained 
and enabled by the structures of an economic system that itself is currently geared to a growth 
paradigm that cannot go unquestioned.
Alario argues that late modem environmental risks are both decision forcing situations and action 
forcing events that have made “rethinking the nature, scientific soundness and democratic character 
of environmental policy decisions... critical political issues” (Alario 1998). Giddens interprets the 
“ecological crisis” as “essentially a crisis of moral meaning”, and “saving the planet” is 
“essentially a gloss for the problem of how we should cope with the double dissolution of 
tradition and nature” (Giddens 1994, pp247). This may be so, but it is to play down the 
importance of the massive physical changes to the manufactured environment that have really 
happened in the short period of late modernity. Environmental risks slam their fist on the table and 
demand answers—if they are ignored in the way other political issues often are, the consequences 
could be devastating to us all. This underlines the importance of technically trained people 
partaking fully in public sphere discussion on the future—the world as a physical environment 
has physical limitations that are difficult to identity and quantify, but consideration of which must 
underlie aU our plans.
Experts of all kinds therefore have a duty to ensure that relevant aspects of their technical 
knowledge are projected with honesty and with self-critical reflection into the public sphere, to 
enable that knowledge to be recognised as constituting the real, physical boundaries within which 
reflexivity can rebound. This is especially important for engineers, since examples are already 
available of well-intentioned efforts to improve the environment that are inherently flawed 
because of ignorance of important elements of physical Boundary’ conditions. For example, Clift 
(1995) describes how situations of environmental profligacy may arise from ill-informed efforts 
to recycle certain materials under certain conditions.
In addition, such an outlook may provide the very arena for engineers to show off their creativity, 
ingenuity and humanity in a way that the public sphere might again begin to appreciate as an 
unambiguous human benefit. Similarly, engineers are sure to be surprised by the myriad ways that 
lay people may creatively develop engineering concepts by making use of their personal rules and 
resources, introducing concepts from other spheres of life (art? biology? sport? ethnic culture? 
psychology? parenthood?) that may hugely enrich the whole.
So much for utopianism; what of the realism? What are the “institutionally immanent 
possibilities” that may anchor utopian thinking to a world of actual agency? Again we have to 
look to actual social trends to see that change will come from a variety of sources—individuals 
and spontaneously arising self-help groups are gaining in power and influence, almost aU Western 
governments speak of the decentralisation of power. As many traditional institutions—including 
even the monarchy—are finding, public pressure, in its various forms, is becoming weightier.
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Against this, engineering organisations must be seen as actors in the overall picture of social 
change. They face two contradictory changes in their power base—on the one hand, their 
physical and social “transformative capacity” is greater than ever, thanks largely to the abstract 
systems of their creation—on the other, their power to act autonomously and without 
burdensome social obligation is waning. Engineering organisations can choose to ignore these 
changes, and wait and see what regulatory controls states or self-help groups will gamer the 
power to impose on them. Or they may look forward and colonise their own future by taking 
pre-emptive action now that may safeguard their autonomy and independence in the years to 
come.
4 . 2 . 6 . 3  I s s ues  of di rect ion and p r o g r e s s  in t he  c a s e  s t u d i e s
Case study A) The future o f photoconversion technologies
The position of British government and industry regarding photoconversion technologies was in 
stark contrast to their Japanese equivalents at the time. Whereas the prospect of uncertain 
jSnancial rewards for at least ten years precluded the former from taking any interest in 
photoconversion, the latter understood the potential benefits (both financial and otherwise) of 
investing mindful of a longer time-frame. Since thermodynamics suggests that photoconversion 
is very likely to form the basis of the energy systems of the future, driving potential technologies 
now to bring that future into being sooner is not such a high risk strategy. By allocating relatively 
minor amounts of development resources into a range of potential technologies, the Japanese 
consortium was further hedging their investments.
In adopting these strategies, the British were implicitly adopting a ‘ship-on-the-high-seas’ 
approach to the future, and the Japanese one of utopian realism. The former’s outlook could be 
characterised as follows:
What happens in the future is unknowable— what will be, will be. To survive in the short and medium 
term as commercial operations, we must focus on what we are sure will deliver financial rewards. A.s 
technologies develop and global circumstances change, our strategy will be to adapt to those changes on a 
continuous basis.
Whereas the Japanese perspective could be put quite differently:
In the future, photoconversion technologies are likely to dominate energy production. Not only is this a 
realistic prediction, but highly desirable in the way that the manufactured environment may be freed of 
many poisonous emissions. However, this future will only come about if someone makes it happen— it is 
not inevitable, and many other, more negative possibilities may also occur. By acting now in ways that help 
to bring about this future, we not only make that future more likely to actually happen, but we also stand 
to become very wealthy doing so at relatively small risk to our current commercial continuity.
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If more people, including engineering organisations, were to engage in this kind of ‘utopian 
realistic’ thinking in a more open and reflexive way, then the outlook for human ‘progress’ and a 
sustainable future would be considerably brighter.
Case study B) A new heat plant for Hoiic
I argued earlier that the people of Holic would benefit hugely in terms of ontological security if 
they collectively discussed how they each viewed the town—was it a sleepy mining village or a 
new frontier standing to cash in on cross-border business? The reflexive identity of the town, of 
course, links in very closely with utopian realistic futures the town may look to. Not only does 
ontological security come firom the sense of reality afforded by the construction of a coherent 
identity, but it also comes from colonising one’s own future and reflexively limiting future events.
•With a clear dkection and concept of the future, the message would be sent to those external 
powers that seek to develop the town—‘this is who we are, and this is what we want for our 
future’. Projects, such as a new heat plant, wiU only work with the townspeople’s co-operation. 
At least in this example, the power is the people’s to exercise.
This is not, however, to underestimate the powerful globalised effects of distanciation, 
disembedding and institutional reflexivity. Holic is unlikely to be shielded from the brute 
commercial force of multinational corporations. But if, in terms of fundamental dkection at least, 
the people can reflexively discuss thek needs and aspkations, the results could be surprising.
Case study C) The Plant Manager’s dilemma
Giddens’ social theory helps to explain why concerns about food safety are mounting. The issues 
are complex, and relate to the general acceleration of change, of the maturing relationship 
between government and the governed, of the modem culture of risk, of increasing technical 
uncertainty and decreasing trust in the creators of technology, of identity and authenticity in a 
globalised world of interpenetrating reflexive systems. Food scares are harmful to all concerned: 
consumers, manufacturers, retailers, and society as a whole—yet there is no reason to believe that 
these social forces will suddenly reverse thek dkection. What can society do to protect itself and 
the Graiycos of the world from worse in the future?
Perhaps the answer lies in thinking in terms of utopian realism? An extensive, reflexive debate of 
the life political issues surrounding food production would bring to a head many of the fears and 
uncertainties that underlie the industry. Such questions, many often akeady vigorously debated in 
the (presently all-too-smaU) public sphere, include:
how best should we regulate the use of chemicals in food production? which chemicals, 
if any, are actually necessary? what would be the consequences of not using them? would 
we be prepared to suffer these?
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• are we content with present modes of food imports and exports? should people by more 
locally produced food? what might be the consequences of doing so on, for example, 
developing world economies?
• what information should there be on food labels? should restaurants detail the sources of 
their ingredients?
• do genetically modified foods have a valid role in our society, or should they be strictly 
separated or banned?
By encouraging a fuU debate on how we would like our food industry to be in the future, current 
food manufacturers will be better placed to produce foods that will be problem-free—be that 
through the abandonment of some present forms of food production and the acceptance of the 
consequences for society, or be it through a more pragmatic and empowered recognition of their 
value. Given direction, Graiyco would then be in a position to plan its long-term investment 
strategies around producing what it knows society will find acceptable in principle into the future.
Case study D) The use o f mercury in dental amalgam
A similar approach might benefit the dental profession in its current problems regarding the use 
of mercury in dental amalgam. Since the toxicity or otherwise of mercury used in this context is 
unlikely ever to be scientifically proven due to the scientific uncertainties involved, and since the 
backing of the world’s dental associations inhibits the search to find alternatives, what is to 
prevent the mercury controversy living for another 150 years?
The issues, of course, go deeper than identifying an appropriate material with which to fill our 
cavities. Alternative materials, defended in the same way that mercury has been defended, are just 
as likely to develop into scares of their own. The real questions are life political, and they impinge 
in a very general way on how we live together in late modernity—they concern, amongst other 
things:
• who, and under what conditions, can declare something ‘safe’? is there such a thing as 
‘total safety’? if not, how do we deal with that?
• how can technical uncertainty best be dealt with? must medical professionals point out 
the potential risks of eveiything to their patients? or is it enough to differentiate 
professional opinions and value judgements from statements of scientific fact?
• how do patients currently inform themselves of medical controversies? should the 
medical industry consider new strategies to ensure that their positions are made more 
accessible and coherent to patients to empower them to make better decisions for 
themselves?
• what are the welfare budget implications of allowing freedom of choice in medical 
treatments? the social justice implications? what balances are society willing to accept?
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Again, through reflexive discussion in the public sphere, an understanding of how things could 
be in the future will arise. By having a clear idea of what could be, our actions today help bring 
that future about.
Case study E) The roie o f engineering consultancy
The previous case studies have highlighted a large number of issues that must be addressed when 
considering a sustainable future. Not only must the public sphere decide what elements of the 
possible future are desirable, but engineers, particularly engineering consultants, must be vigilant 
in ensuring that the technical limitations and implications of these good intentions are thoroughly 
explored. Indeed, it is through this function that engineering could begin to reassert itself as a 
socially potent force—but only if its work is performed openly rather than furtively. If engineers 
choose to use their technical knowledge to dominate rather than support, resentment will again 
result.
In a related way, as aU parties begin to consider more seriously some of the foreseeable 
unintended consequences involved with their potential actions, it is vital that the engineering 
consultants chosen to help with this process are seen as credible sources of information by all 
concerned. This, of course, is tied into the issues of professional trust and integrity that I have 
sought to explore throughout this work, and to the importance of authentic identity and 
corporate purpose discussed earlier this chapter.
4 . 3  E n g i n e e r i n g ’s i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  i m m a n e n t  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s
In the UK at least, the state is beginning to recognise the importance of ‘opening up’ scientific 
and technical institutions to reflexive debate. For example, David Sainsbury, the former 
Chairman of the large supermarket chain and now Minister for Science, said at a recent 
conference (Sainsbury 1998):
It is clear that over the years the public’s faith both in Government’s—and the scientific community’s—  
handling of advances in science and technology has been eroded. This is a trend m  have got to reverse...
One of our challenges for the future is to make the debates behind science and engineering accessible to 
everyone. We need to break down perceived barriers and engage people in debates about the science issues of 
the day. Openness and honesty are key to a better understanding of scientific concepts.
By this last sentence, Sainsbury was presumably referring to the public understanding of scientific 
concepts, though he might equally have added that openness and honesty are key to a better 
scientific community understanding of the concept of the public. However, the point is that few 
now deny the need for engineering organisations to engage the public sphere in discussion. The 
question is how this might be approached, and, as I have discussed, to what extent. In his speech.
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Sainsbury outlined a number of government initiatives—but what can engineering organisations 
themselves do to take a lead?
The engineering organisations that have so far made the most serious efforts to engage the public 
sphere have generally been those whose activities have previously been highlighted by pressure 
groups—companies such as the previously mentioned group of Shell, Monsanto and BNFL. 
Their attempts have generally been reactive and defensive, though they have recently shown signs 
of evolution, as discussed above. It is understandable that a company under attack will feel the 
need to defend itself—but what about companies whose reputation is so far untarnished? Is there 
any incentive for them to pre-emptively ‘open up’ to the public sphere?
Triggering debate is, of course, playing with fire from the point of view of established interests— 
as environmental protesters have found, once an issue enters the public sphere it is not so easy to 
control the direction it takes. Most companies and industrial sectors have developed implicitly 
defensive strategies—this is certainly the least expensive option for those fortunate enough not 
to be cast as the lightening rod for pent-up, unexpressed social angst. Let those poor souls that 
have been publicly humiliated and dissected—the Shells and Monsantos—take the risks 
associated with dealing directly with the public. Once attention has drifted elsewhere, others can 
discretely examine their operations and make sure they are not exposed in a similar way.
Who is to say whether or not this is the best strategy to take for any specific company? It is a 
judgement to be made by a company’s executive, and, aside firom ethical considerations, is 
essentially a risk assessment. But that assessment should bear in mind the dynamic nature of the 
world, and the growing numbers who will feel the need to actively engage with understanding 
their role in it. It should consider the paradox of evermore-complex interactions between social 
(including business) systems occurring alongside greater operational transparency to those who 
actively look. It should realise that the public sphere is becoming more organised, and legitimised 
through the actions of government and proactive companies. It should understand that what 
constitutes ‘exposure’ is itself amorphous and open to challenge from anyone with a telephone 
and/or access to the Internet. It should weigh the cost/benefit ratio of proactively engaging the 
outside world from a position of goodwill against that of struggling to regain a shattered 
reputation.
Firms that open out have a chance to ‘frame’ their activities—that is, to have influence over how 
debate about their operations begins, to create a ‘first impression’—rather than have the terms of 
the debate initiated by a third party with its own agenda. Of course, organisations that are 
considered to manipulate this advantage will have it turned against them, and the point will be 
lost. Similarly, those that market themselves as ‘ethical companies’ must ensure they are. There is 
no doubt that managing this process will requite a very subde hand.
Proactively engaging the public sphere is indisputably a real risk. Companies that do so are 
putting themselves on the line and inviting public condemnation of their business operations. But
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they are also sowing the seeds of public trust—trust germinates through a two-way process of 
opening out and mutual disclosure, with aU the danger that this implies. Fostering the public 
sphere offers the best available escape route, both for industry and society as a whole, &om the 
seemingly endless cycle of cynicism, conflict and bitterness that plagues late modernity.
However beneficial the development of an institutionalised public sphere may be to industry as a 
whole, game theory suggests that individual ‘innovator’ companies in this regard will 
disproportionally pay, in terms of time, effort, uncertainty and risk, for what wül ultimately be a 
universal benefit. At the moment, it would be a brave company that truly embraced the 
challenges of actively engaging the public sphere unless forced to do so. Given the endemic 
cynicism that currently defines late modem life, those companies that have actively grappled with 
these problems have unsurprisingly been subject to considerable attack from many sources. Anita 
Roddick’s Bodyshop, one of the most high-profile such companies, has been vilified in the public 
sphere. Part of the reason for this is that a whole body of life political questions that relate to the 
ethics of the generic role of large international organisations can presently only find expression 
through targeting the specific actions of individuals companies. Clearly, a mechanism needs to be 
found that boosts the industrial promotion of the public sphere, but in a way that spreads the 
start-up risk around industry as a whole.
The main proposition I wish to make is this:
The greater strides industry can collectively take towards promoting an active 
public sphere that reflexively circulates life political questions in a generic way, 
the more likely public concern over specific company decisions, developments or 
activities w ill focus on the issues at hand and amicably be resolved.
In other words, through fostering a continuous, inclusive and highly reflexive public debate, 
issues of relevance to everyone that are presently ignored by conventional politics—questions of 
life politics, of how we should live in the world—can find expression through a mutually 
rewarding process of dialogue and self-examination rather than as emotionally-charged 
undercurrents to what are often otherwise minor issues.
A possible new role for industrial associations, or—more importantly in terms of the arguments 
of the previous chapter, professional institutions—might be to act as forums for generative 
political debate between their members. Institutions could be a focus for the exchange of 
members’ ideas regarding how they could empower individuals to take control of their lives.
This would have many advantages for all:
• the professional institutions themselves would regain credibility and trust over the long 
term with the general public, and enhance their standing in the sectors they serve;
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• companies could explore the issues firom the relative ‘safety’ of the group rather than 
learning difficult lessons directly in the public sphere;
• the experiences of ‘lightning rod’ companies could be shared and explored;
• ‘best practice’ guidelines could be developed on a continuous basis in reflexive
consultation with the public sphere. This may include, for example, the types of 
information the public sphere would like to have access to, a universal format for ease of 
use of information, etc.
• the public sphere would have more of a ‘one-stop-shop’ for addressing generic issues, 
rather than having to identify and ‘make an example o f  one specific company;
• the institution itself could act as a vehicle for sanctions to be taken against rogue 
companies whose actions threaten to undermine the public trust in its members 
generally;
• the actual costs (m terms of time, effort and money) would be considerably less if the 
problem was approached communally;
• by sharing effort on the communal issues, individual companies can then devote more
time to take their own specific issues to the public sphere.
The goal of this body would be to find ways of taking the life political questions generated by 
industry to as many comers of the public sphere as possible. The challenge will be to show a 
comparable degree of creativity to engage public attention that environmental groups have shown 
in the past—with the advantage of money and the handicap of keeping within the law and 
remaining inoffensive. An important point is that industry should actively strive to bring people 
into active engagement with the world rather than simply seek to satisfy those already interested. 
Only with a massively expanded public sphere will the credibility and trust we all need begin to 
flourish.
How could this be achieved? Shell has provided a starting point with its ‘TeU Shell’ postcards and 
Internet dialogue sites. Obvious conventional methods include conferences and open letters to 
newspapers, television advertisements, sponsorship of events in the form of a life political 
question (e.g. a ‘dump or bum?’ food festival), radio phone-ins, life-questions posed on aU 
product packaging with free retum postage, etc. With the combined resources of the industrial 
sector, the results should not be less than spectacular.
4 . 3 . 1 . 1  A combined eng i nee r i ng  forum and the ca s e  s t u d i e s
Case study A) The future of photoconversion technologies
A combined engineering forum could make a major impact on helping the public sphere 
understand and identify with the problems associated with the long-term future of energy supply. 
At the moment, such considerations are limited to government and energy companies, both 
lobbied to a relatively limited extent by Non-Govemmental Organisations (NGOs) such as 
Friends of the Earth or the Sierra Club. To many people, the continued human dependence on
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fossil fuels and its inherent contradictions contributes in a vague, half-conscious way to the 
general sense of angst that industrial society is not in control of its destiny. Consequently, 
engineering organisations are viewed with suspicion, since they do not appear to be particularly 
concerned about how their actions are; altering the manufactured environment.
Through a combined forum, engineering companies could demonstrate to the public sphere that 
they are concerned about the future of the planet. Since market forces are unlikely to be effective 
in moving society towards a sustainable future, the forum could argue, we must together decide 
our priorities for future energy supply. The types of life political questions that arise include:
• should the future of energy supply be left to market forces regardless?
• if not, how quickly should we attempt to wean ourselves off fossil fuels?
• what role, if any, should nuclear energy play in the medium-long term?
• how much public money should go towards funding research in renewable energy 
sources?
A great deal of technical information wiU be required to frame this discussion—the forum could 
facilitate access to this. The point is to involve the public sphere as much as possible in exploring 
how a utopian realistic future—a sustainable future—might look. In this way individuals might 
begin to modify their everyday practices—purchasing decisions, domestic energy usage etc—in 
ways that makes that future more likely. The critical result from the forum’s perspective will be 
that engineering wül be seen to have taken the lead in addressing the problem, rather than to 
have irresponsibly ignored it. It is in this way that trust in engineers might begin to be 
reconstructed.
Case study B) A new heat plant for HoHc
A combined engineering forum could take the lead in Holic in assisting the town to understand 
the technical implications of a new heat plant—and so encourage the people to decide whether 
or not it is wanted. If the pros and cons of a district heating system were properly explained, the 
reflexive discussion that will anyway dictate its success or faüure could take place in the open: the 
system wül only work if a certain number agree to sign up to it. In possession of the fuU technical 
facts (as far as they are known, of course), of the implications for the future of the town (in terms 
of trade and development) and after a debate about the dkection the townspeople would like to 
take into the future, the success of the heat plant—if it were wanted—would be far more secure. 
So would the people of Holic, and the condition of contemporary engineering.
Case study C) The Plant Manager’s dilemma
As I have suggested, Graiyco could not realisticaUy reveal its 3-MCPD problem in the public 
sphere without taking a huge gamble on the reaction. Even if a combined engineering forum 
were actively to take the generic 3-MCPD problem to the public sphere, in the present climate 
the result would be little different—in aU likelihood, its withdrawal from the market would be
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demanded. This is not altogether unreasonable, since the fuU effects of even tiny quantities of the 
substance on the human body can only be hinted at by scientific experiments.
However, the same is true of a large number of other substances to which the human body is 
exposed. If, through a combined engineering forum, the potential uncertainties and risks 
involved with exposure to such substances were openly admitted, and genuine professional 
opinions were offered regarding the relative safety of each, then the public would, over time, 
become accustomed to dealing with this uncertainty and would be in a position to judge which 
substances they would be willing to be exposed to. Individuals could select particular experts 
whose opinion they trusted, and so be empowered to gauge their own level of perceived risk. 
Perhaps then ihe discovery of exotic chemicals in Graiyco’s food products might not necessarily 
lead to public hysteria.
The sooner the public sphere understands and leams to live with technical uncertainty, the 
sooner engineering companies will be freed of the self-destructive obligation to pretend it does 
not exist.
Case study D) The use of mercury in dentai amaigam
For the same reason, the current damage being inflicted on the dental profession by the mercury 
amalgam controversy could be addressed by a combined engineering approach to technical 
uncertainty and public sphere honesty. Dental associations need not dogmatically defend mercury 
amalgam’s safety record (as does the ADA), nor remove themselves firom the discussion (as does 
its British equivalent): with the safety record in the open and taken to the public sphere, dental 
associations can then offer professional opinions on its suitability under various circumstances with 
respect to the alternatives.
Again, freed of the burden to pretend that all is certainly well, dentists can more honestly assure 
patients that they believe that all is prohablj well—and therefore sustain patients’ ontological 
security on a more sustainable and honest footing.
Case study E) The roie o f engineering consuitancy
The formation of a combined engineering forum will have great implications for the role of 
engineering consultancy as I have defined it here. Much of the ‘access point’ interaction between 
the public sphere and the forum will naturally faU within their remit, for the reasons I have 
developed.
4 . 3 . 2  Con c l u d i n g  r e m a r k s
Of course, merely stimulating debate is useless if we are not prepared to act upon the changes 
that this will provoke. Many consequences will result firom the reflexive responses of large 
numbers of people altering their day-to-day behaviour—for example, a prolonged, 
multidimensional debate on ‘dump or bum’ might result in the production of less waste as more 
people recognise the responsibility they have in unnecessarily exacerbating the problem. It will
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probably equally fuel calls for reduced (or more innovative) packaging, trigger interest in novel, 
less wasteful ways of shopping, etc.
The questions are no easier to answer by being simply expressed. Delivered en masse, these 
questions are likely to overwhelm. But the suggestion that most people could not cope with these 
issues, and that therefore others should make decisions on their behalf, is simply false (e.g. Petts 
1998). People are implicitly faced with such life political issues everyday, in almost every aspect of 
their lives. The fact that many choose to disengage firom thinking through most of them is 
indicative of many things, not least the already complex and demanding nature of their day-to- 
day lives, a sense of political fatalism and the ontological security that can inauthentically be clung 
to by bracketing them out of discursive consciousness. Giddens emphasises that any legitimate 
democratic system should not discriminate against those who choose not to engage. The trust 
that we are ultimately aiming to foster depends upon individuals feeling free to ‘tune out’ from 
time to time. The larger the engaged public sphere, the easier this will be, since we are 
considering arguments and not sheer weight of iU-informed gut-reaction.
The enhanced reflexive ‘discursive space’ Giddens is suggesting will not necessarily lead to 
consensus on any given issue. Although consensus has been practically reached in many issues in 
the public sphere (e.g. the social ‘wrong’ of child labour, the legitimisation of adult homosexual 
relationships), there are equally many issues that are likely to remain contentious for the 
foreseeable future (e.g. foetal rights, the rights of future generations). The same will be true of 
specific life political issues—the role of the car in a world of 10 biUion people, say. Dialogic 
democracy does not gain its legitimacy from achieving consensus—rather, it creates an 
environment of mutual tolerance and trust, channelling the emotional energy generated by issues 
into reflexive self-exploration rather than violence.
However, both the opportunity and risk created by the discussion of life political issues in the 
context of a world of generative mechanisms (that is, where individuals have opportunity to 
express their autonomy in practical ways), is that certain ways of living in the world are likely to 
come to an abrupt end. From an industrial perspective, this may increase the dynamism of the 
market, while simultaneously placing restrictions on it. For example, after intensive debate about 
the way our food is farmed and processed, there may be a sudden demand for say, locally and 
organically produced food. The resulting market change would create new opportunities for 
some, drive others from business, restrict the ways that food may be produced in future and have 
unintended consequences in various localities throughout the global economy.
Some established industrial powers will therefore try to suppress the power of the public sphere 
to protect their own interests. Certain companies—particularly those associated with the potential 
manufacturing of high consequence risks, such as the nuclear industry, biotechnology, 
petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, waste management etc., stand to lose most firom a highly 
developed public sphere: large fractions of their business could potentially disappear. Their
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business sectors, however, will be greatly stimulated by the potential for change towards more 
universally acceptable practices.
And here is the crux of the issue: by stimulating debate about the kind of world individuals want 
to live in, industry will be (morally and economically) obliged to mould themselves around and 
adapt to the resulting change in social values.
It will take many years for legitimised, explicit discussions of generic life-political issues to evolve 
into being an effective avenue for their expression. In the meantime, these issues will continue to 
underlie specific disputes between national and local government, industry and the emerging 
public sphere. Perhaps the most vexing question that faces contemporary engineering managers 
is how best to handle these disputes. Many techniques of public participation are currently in use, 
each with their own shortcomings—these I have explored in several of the works presented in 
the Appendix.
4 . 4  C o n c l u s i o n s
In this work, I have explored a limited but influential section of the sociological literature in an 
attempt to broaden debates within engineering about its future social role given the widespread 
public disillusionment, apathy and mistrust of the discipline and its practitioners. During the first 
years of this work, I became evermore confused as the perspectives on the environmental ‘crisis’, 
to which engineering are inevitably linked, seemed to multiply and become increasingly 
contradictory the more I looked. In 1996,1 attempted to organise and categorise these nebulous 
outlooks (Appendix A.8). Although, I hope, relatively successful in its limited way, I succeeded 
mainly in becoming overwhelmed by the sheer complexity and incoherence of it all, and wanted 
nothing more than to turn back to straightforward engineering consultancy.
Such a reaction, I now realise, is entirely typical of everyone facing theitr own complex situations. 
As late modernity becomes evermore complicated, the temptation as individuals to duck away 
into reality-bracketing activities becomes stronger—matched only by the growing angst many feel 
as the same condition stretches their grasp on the objective, outside world. For every new way 
society develops of helping individuals escape from reality, reality finds new ways of forcing itself 
back on personal agendas.
In the 1960s, much time was spent discussing how people would be able to spend the leisure 
time that would be created in individuals’ lives by labour saving technologies—a debate that now 
seems laughable. The introduction of those devices simply increased the amount of work that 
could be done. If anything, individuals’ lives have become busier and more exhausting. In the 
light of Giddens’ views on human psychology and reflexivity, I wonder how much of the frantic 
pace of modem life is a result of considering a possible future of extensive leisure? The prospect 
of abundant firee time raises big philosophical questions, including the biggest of all—the
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meaning of life. Could it be that late modernity is driven by billions of individuals existentially 
terrified of looking beyond their immediate practical tasks? Whose actions, channelled through 
institutional reflexivity, make the world yet more complicated and ‘unreal’, and in doing so 
hronicaUy make the task of sustaining trust in the real world yet more difficult?
However, the meaning of life, I presume from Giddens’ existentialist perspective, is to find 
meaning in life. The complex diagnoses of the environmental ‘crisis’ presently on offer, I can agree 
with Giddens, are profitably thought of as the result of millions of individuals breaking, at least 
momentarily, from the safety of their routines, confronting their own existential reality and 
searching for meaning in what they see. These experiments in trust are to be welcomed in all their 
diversity and breadth, as each carries with it some element of the profoundly complex real 
situation. As human beings, we must pool and reflexively consider all such insights if we are to 
attempt to regain some element of control over the unintended consequences of our actions.
The concluding words I will leave to a fellow engineer and considerably more articulate writer, G. 
Bugliarello (Bugliarello 1991):
.. .the great challenge to engineering, worldwide, is whether it can demonstrate the promise of an enlightened 
technology by placing society’s more immediate needs in a broader context. Our choice, as engineers, is clear. 
Are we willing to ensure that the new technologes are placed in a context that affords maximum utility to 
society? Or are we satisfied with confining our task to the creation of technologies that make change 
possible? Will we broaden our social role and take the lead in developing more integrated sociotechnobgical 
approaches to society’s problems? Or will we continue to play a specialist’s role without participating in the 
broader decisions about technology in the future of our society?
Until engineering is prepared to assume greater leadership it will remain a most honourable and skilful 
profession, but it will renounce its legitimate role as a splendid manifestation of humankind’s will to control 
its destiny.
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Glossary
Abstract systems
Abstract systems are the embodiment of modem technical knowledge in either symbolic tokens 
(most usually money, but also political office and university degrees etc) or expert systems 
(including aU forms of modem technology and expertise that have come to organise and define 
the late modem world). These include global financial systems, modem medicine and the medical 
profession, engineering and its institutions and multinational organisations, telecommunications, 
transport systems, as well as the maps and clocks that help establish independent space and time 
etc. The use of abstract systems has become a focus of day-to-day activity in the modem world 
and is central to the definition of routine. Abstract systems demand the trust of lay people during 
theit: employment.
Access Points
The Tiuman interface’ between an organisation and the lay public. These are of critical 
importance to organisations concemed with abstract systems upon which the lay public must 
depend, as personal trust developed here can be ‘transposed’ into trust for the particular abstract 
system. An example of an access point is a GP’s surgery—the doctor forms a personal link 
between the medical sector and the patient.
Authenticity
A term adapted firom existential philosophy; an authentic person is one who ‘knows herself and 
can express herself clearly in relations with others. An authentic person has a clear sense of 
personal identity and morality, understands how to be ‘tme to herself. Authenticity is developed 
through disentangling the emotional blocks and tensions that prevent an individual from seeing 
herself clearly. Authenticity is of great importance when establishing personal trust.
Being, being, being-in-the-world
Another existentialist term. Being refers to that fact that there is something and not nothing. 
Anything that is not nothing is part of Being. This is the starting point of existentialist 
philosophy, which, importantly, does not address any spiritual or religious matters—that is, the question, 
'‘why is there Being and not nothing?’ is ignored. A ‘being’ (with a lower-case ‘b’) is a living thing 
that is part of Being. Questions of being-in-the-world usually address issues that concem an 
awareness of existing as a living ‘being’ in the material world.
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Colonisation o f the future
A metaphor describing the way that modernity’s tendency to think in terms of risk allows people 
to take decisions now that will affect what happens to them in the future. The future is therefore 
‘colonised’ because it is in some way ‘structured’ before it arrives (e.g. plans for Millennium 
celebrations are ‘colonising’ the time and space of Greenwich, 1999). Modem colonisation of the 
future is inherendy uncertain, in contrast to its premodem equivalent, which was set in the 
concrete of ‘fate’.
Disembedding
The tendency of abstract systems to ‘lift-out’ social relations &om one context, and ‘drop-back’ 
the same or modified thing in a different time and space. For example, in premodem times, soup 
was made in individual homes, immediately prior to eating it there. Now, soup is often made in a 
soup factory, where it is tinned and distributed all over the world to be eaten in a huge variety of 
locations, times and novel contexts (e.g. at three in the morning in the Gobi desert, two years 
later). Disembedding is the prime cause of institutional reflexivity.
Enlightenment
An intellectual movement of the eighteenth century that sought to ‘unshackle’ the world from 
religious dogma and superstition through the methodical appliance of empirical experiment and 
formulated reason. The Enlightenment sought to control human destiny using these tools, but 
late modernity has revealed that this goal is only partly obtainable—human destiny is in our 
human hands, but mechanisms of achieving control are more effectively used by society to elude 
it.
Existential angst, existential questions
Existential questions probe an individual’s psychological attachment to the real world of objects 
and other ‘beings’. In day-to-day life they crop up implicitly in certain situations, e.g. witnessing a 
fatal road accident. These questions can be deeply disturbing, but because of theic implicit nature, 
this disturbance tends to manifest itself in a diffused, emotional sense of anxiety, or angst, rather 
than fear of a specific unknown or undesired event. In extreme cases, angst can cause the ‘self to 
seemingly drift away from reality, resulting in debilitating feelings of detachment firom a 
meaningful, social world.
Faith
The confidence held in the reliability of someone or something, in appropriate contexts, to 
deliver predictable, positive outcomes.
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Fate
The belief that the future is predetermined and independent of human action 
Fateful moments
Potentially disturbing events that involve the dissolution of ‘reality bracketing techniques’ 
combined with circumstances that forcefully bring existential questions to the fore. Examples 
include the death of a loved one, being physically threatened etc.
Institutional dimensions o f modernity
Four social ‘structures’ that act as the engine or wheels of the ever-expanding ‘structure’ of 
modernity. The dimensions— capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and military power—mutually 
reinforce each other, and contain within them a dynamic component that causes the whole to 
constantly modify and change itself in unpredictable ways. As side-reactions, modernity produces 
time-space distanciation, disembedding and institutional reflexivity that accelerate change and 
cause modernity to lurch forward, this way and that, like a huge ‘ju^em aut’, crushing those who 
try to resist it.
Juggernaut
A metaphor Giddens uses to describe the nature of modernity. The term comes from a huge idol 
of the Hindi god Krishna, which was transported through the streets on a massive carriage under 
which some followers threw themselves to be crushed to death. Modernity’s juggernaut is ever­
growing and guided by social reflexivity, crushing (socially marginalising) anyone who opposes it 
(for example, those who do not wish to work).
Mediated experience
Any experience of the worid that an individual was not personally involved in. Camp-fire story 
telling is a form of mediated experience; the vast majority of facts we know about the modem 
world are a result of mediated experience. Given the human tendency to lie, exa^erate or ‘spin’ 
mediated experience to fit personal or political agendas, trust becomes central to mediated 
experience.
Modernity, premodernity and iate modernity
Modernity is particular collection of social structures that, since the onset of there development in 
the early 1500s, have become globally dominant. Modernity embodies the principles of the 
Enlightenment project, namely to establish control over the natural world through the use of 
reason and empirical experiment, and to reject all forms of ‘received knowledge’ or dogma. 
Premodemity is a general term that encompasses human civilisations before this time, although
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modernity itself only became ‘fully developed’ in the seventeenth or eighteenth Century. 
Premodemity and modernity, like laminar and turbulent flow in fluids, are govemed by entirely 
different social ‘physics’. Late modernity, i.e. the last thirty years or so of modernity, have seen a 
rapid ‘radicalisation’ of the principles of modernity, and in particular have proved an inherent 
failing in the Enlightenment’s aims—the incompatibility of the rejection of dogma and the 
development of ‘cybemetic’ control over the future.
Ontological security
Ontological security is the sense people have of ‘being at home’ in the world, of being relaxed 
about the continuity of the future. The human need for ontological security is an all- 
encompassing one, for without it an individual can become swamped by existential angst and lose 
track of their reality as a human being. Ontological security is developed through the early ‘basic 
tmst’ relationship between an infant and its caretaker, and in an adult is sustained through trust 
relationships with people or other aspects of the real world.
Pure relationship
This is one of the three main ‘reality engagement’ or ‘trust’ mechanisms of modernity. Without a 
pre-defined sense of personal identity and morality, and in a world of ever-changing trust 
contexts and increasingly ‘bizarre’ reality, modem people frequently engage in intense personal- 
tmst relationships with others, where conceptions of the world are discussed in a solid and 
supportive environment. ‘Pure relationships’ are entirely ‘intemally referential’, i.e. they are 
sustained in any form the participants wish, for so long as they are rewarding to the participants.
Reaiity-engagement techniques (trust), reaiity-bracketing techniques (routine)
Human beings can engage with the reality of the world through ‘putting themselves on the line’ 
on the basis of their faith in its existence, i.e. through trust. Premodemity and modernity often 
have different contexts of reality engagement, though one major area of common ground is 
personal tmst. Engaging with reality can be a hazardous activity because of the potential for 
confronting the ‘void’ of non-existence.
Human beings also avoid reality by the use of reality bracketing techniques, usually embodied in 
routine. Reality bracketing techniques include the adoption of a ‘practical consciousness’ and that 
of a ‘natural attitude’.
Reflexivity, institutional (wholesale) reflexivity, reflexive monitoring of action, 
reflexive project o f the seif
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A reflexive relationship is the relationship that something or someone has to itself. In Giddens’ 
Structuration Theory, society is reflexive because social ‘structures’ define, empower and limit the 
actions of individuals, but are themselves modified and perpetuated as a result of individual 
action.
Modernity is institutionally reflexive primarily as a result of the situations created by disembedding 
mechanisms, and by the way modernity readily integrates the ‘reflexive monitoring of action’ into 
defining itself. Modernity’s institutionally reflexive nature accelerates change. This contrasts to 
the way premodem societies sought social rigidity and resisted change.
AU human beings pay attention to, and judge the effectiveness of, thek actions as part of 
performing them. If a more attractive way of meeting an objective presents itself, a human being 
wiU tend to be alert to it, unlike an automaton. In modernity, this reflexive monitoring of action is 
institutionaUy ‘handled’ differently than in premodem societies—simply, it is less likely to be 
suppressed by the force of tradition.
The reflexive project of the self]s the third main way that the modem person engages with reality of 
the world, and is therefore a form of tmst. An individual builds a sense of identity and personal 
authenticity through an engagement, often through tmsting abstract systems and through pure 
relationships, with the real world around them. This involves exploring issues of interest and 
concem to build a coherent sense of ‘who one is’. Where a person is concemed with the nature 
of the tmst they are forced to invest in abstract systems they deem ‘untmstworthy’, as part of the 
reflexive project of the self they might investigate that abstract system in detail in order to reduce 
the role of ‘blind’ tmst in that system, to better assess tmstworthiness, or to decide to what extent 
they wish to tmst themselves to that system.
Risk, risk assessment, institutionalised risks, risk culture, high consequence risks
The concept of risk foUows firom the generic recognition of possible dangers (i.e. that there are 
threats to desired outcomes) and the belief that present actions can affect the likelihood of the 
threat occurring—it stands, therefore, in contrast to ‘fate’.
A risk assessment is a judgement one makes about the wisdom of a course of action, where the 
likelihood and benefit of a deshred outcome on one hand is compared in a complex way with the 
likelihood and nature of the threat to a desired outcome on the other.
Modernity institutionalises risk taking through the stockmarket, insurance industry, political 
elections etc.
Modernity is a risk culture because, unlike premodem societies, it recognises and organises itself 
around risk as a concept.
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High consequence risks are created by modernity, and are those risks whose ‘down-side’ would 
have calamitous consequences for huge numbers of ‘beings’.
Self, seif-identity, seif-narrative
The self is conceived to be a subject of consciousness, a being capable of thought and experience 
(Lowe 1995).
A being’s self-identity can be expressed through a self-narrative and relates to the coherence and 
authenticity of a person’s view of himself.
Trust, Basic Trust, Personal Trust, Trust in Abstract Systems
Trust is the act of ‘putting oneself on the line’ on the basis of one’s faith in the reliability of 
someone’s integrity, and/or in the correctness of a system of knowledge. All adult trust relations 
stem from, and are parallel to, the basic trust an infant develops in the retum of its caretaker. 
People engage in reality through some form of tmst relation with it—these relations have 
significantiy changed in modem times relative to their premodem equivalents.
Personal tmst is a vital form of ‘reality engagement’ in both premodem and modem times. 
Whereas personal tmst in premodem times was usually restricted to fixed kin relations, in 
modernity, personal tmst must be constantly ‘worked at’ in various ways that approach the ‘pure 
relationship’.
In modernity, people must continuously place their tmst in an enormous variety of abstract 
systems, regardless of the extent of their faith in those responsible for them, or in the correctness 
of the knowledge upon which they are based. This is a major source of personal angst in 
modernity.
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